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2Abstract
Following  the  terrorist  attacks  of  September  11  2001,  the  Bush  administration 
articulated an anti-terrorism grand strategy of armed democratisation in the Middle 
East that constituted the heart of the “Bush Doctrine.” This strategy derived primarily 
from  the  framework  of  activist  democracy  promotion  developed  by 
neoconservatives, and reached its apex in 2003 when it served as the rationale for 
regime change in Iraq as the fulcrum for the democratic transformation of the Arab 
world.  Yet by 2008, the Bush administration's democratisation policies and many 
elements of the broader neoconservative framework of democracy promotion have 
been significantly scaled back as a result of the challenges they have faced in the 
Arab world – to the extent that both are now entering a state of decline. In seeking to 
assess the development, assumptions and outcomes to date of the United States' post-
September 11 anti-terrorism strategy in the Middle East, this thesis offers a critical 
account of the rise and decline of the “neoconservative moment” in American foreign 
policy as exemplified by the Bush Doctrine's Middle East democratisation policies. 
This  thesis  examines  the  origins,  evolution  and  claims  of  the  neoconservative 
paradigm of armed democracy promotion; it  relates these to the justifications for 
interventionist democratisation in the Middle East present in the terms of the Bush 
Doctrine; and it assesses some of the key critiques made of these assumptions over 
the  past  five  years.  Unlike  a  number  of  studies  of  the  Bush  Doctrine  and 
neoconservatism,  this  thesis  takes  seriously  the  Bush  Doctrine's  claims  and 
neoconservative  beliefs  as  a  genuine  intellectual  framework  for  intervention, 
consistently examining their assertions on their own terms. Further, this thesis utilises 
an  interdisciplinary  approach  of  study,  adopting  a  number  of  the  methods  and 
analytical tools of history and political science in making its arguments and reaching 
its conclusions. 
Key terms: Neoconservatism. Democratisation--Middle East. United States--Foreign 
Relations--Middle East. Iraq War--2003--. United States--Foreign Relations--2001-
2008.
3Introduction
In a speech at West Point in New York on 1 June 2002, President George W. Bush 
laid out his administration's post-September 11 foreign policy framework, which was 
subsequently  expanded and formalised  in  the  September  2002  'National  Security 
Strategy of the United States.'1 These pronouncements quickly became known as the 
“Bush Doctrine” and established a new foreign policy grand strategy for the United 
States  focused  on  four  key  pillars;  American  hegemony,  pre-emptive  war, 
unilateralism and democracy promotion in non-democratic states.2 The last of these 
pillars  – activist  democratisation  – was  the  heart  of  the  Bush  Doctrine  and  the 
cornerstone of a strategy for fighting and winning the war on terrorism through the 
democratic transformation of the Arab world by American intervention. The roots of 
the Bush Doctrine's conceptions of Middle East democratisation can be traced to a 
group of foreign policy intellectuals known as “neoconservatives.” Many members of 
this group, such as William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, 
Richard Perle, Paula Dobriansky and Zalmay Khalilzad, among a number of others, 
spent much of the decade prior to the announcement of the Bush Doctrine developing 
and articulating a framework of interventionist democracy promotion for the Middle 
East in a variety of foreign policy think-tanks and publications.3
The  election  of  George  W.  Bush  and  the  influx  of  neoconservative 
intellectuals and policy makers into his administration in early 2001 meant that many 
neoconservatives held positions of influence when the September 11 terrorist attacks 
occurred. In their search for a strategy to comprehend and deal with the threats, crises 
1 'President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point'. Remarks by the President at 2002 
Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1 June 2002. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html, accessed 2 February 2007; 
The White House, 'The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002'. 
(Hereafter NSS 2002) Washington, 17 September 2002, pp. iii, 1. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html, accessed 1 May 2007.
2 These four elements of the Bush Doctrine are drawn from Robert Jervis, who offers one of the best 
analyses of the doctrine as a whole. See Robert Jervis, 'Understanding the Bush Doctrine'. 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 118, No. 3, (Fall 2003), pp. 351-378; For further discussion of 
the claims of the Bush Doctrine, see Edward Rhodes, 'The Imperial Logic of Bush's Liberal 
Agenda'. Survival, Vol. 45, No. 1, (Mar., 2003), pp. 131- 155; G. John Ikenberry, 'America's 
Imperial Ambition'. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 5, (Sept., 2002), pp. 44-60.
3 For a detailed discussion of the activities of neoconservative intellectuals and policy makers in the 
decade before the Bush administration came to power, see chapter two of this thesis.
4and  opportunities  of  the  post-September  11  world,  senior  members  of  the  Bush 
administration came to  embrace  many of  the conceptual  frameworks and foreign 
policy prescriptions developed over the previous decade by neoconservatives. These 
offered a compelling explanation for the origins of the attacks and provided clear 
guidelines for a new and 'revolutionary' anti-terrorism strategy of activist democracy 
promotion in the Middle East. By mid-2002 the Bush administration had formulated 
a strategy of armed democratisation considerably more grandiose, self-assured and 
ambitious than most foreign policy doctrines that  had come before.  This strategy 
served as the primary rationale for regime change and democratisation in Iraq as the 
fulcrum for  bringing about  the  democratic  transformation and pacification  of  the 
Arab world.
Since  the  invasion  of  Iraq,  scholars  of  the  Bush  Doctrine  have  generally 
offered negative appraisals of its democracy promotion policies and the effects and 
consequences of these in practice. In his 2007 book,  A Pact with the Devil, Tony 
Smith,  a  professor  of  political  science  at  Rutgers  University,  contends  that  the 
“delusions of omnipotence” of the Bush Doctrine's democratisation policies
Rested on its belief that America enjoyed both military primacy and a 
blueprint  for  world  order  thanks  to  its  global  experience  fostering 
“free market democracies.” As a consequence, the United States could 
remake foreign countries – their state institutions, economic and civil 
orders, and basic cultural arrangements – so as to engender a peaceful 
international order under American control, a terror-free tomorrow.4 
Echoing  elements  of  Smith's  argument,  Francis  Fukuyama  of  Johns  Hopkins 
University writes in his 2007 book, After the Neocons, that events in the Middle East 
since 2003 show that “the Bush administration and its neoconservative supporters 
vastly overestimated the ability of America's conventional military power to achieve 
the political ends they sought in the Middle East, particularly the goal of bringing 
about  a  broad-ranging  transformation  toward  democracy.”5 While  there  is  not 
unanimity among scholars about the Bush Doctrine's democratisation policies, there 
has since 2003 been a general shift towards criticism of this grand strategy and a 
decline  in  the  number  of  those supportive of  its  claims and application.6 Indeed, 
4 Tony Smith, A Pact with the Devil: Washington's Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of  
the American Promise. New York, Routeledge, 2007, p xxxviii. 
5 Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at The Crossroads. New Haven and London, Yale 
University Press, 2007, pp. viii-ix.
6 The views of neoconservatives and scholars who are supportive of the principles of the Bush 
Doctrine's democratisation policies are primarily examined in the first half of the thesis. Although 
5important elements of the critical literature utilised in this thesis have been published 
by  'establishment'  foreign  policy  journals  and  institutes,  such  as  the  Council  on 
Foreign Relations, the Brookings Institute, Foreign Affairs, The RAND Corporation 
and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; organisations that prior to 2003 
had often been supportive of the Bush administration's goals in the Middle East. 
In seeking to add to this growing critical literature and to assess anew the 
development, assumptions and outcomes to date of the Bush administration's anti-
terrorism grand strategy of democratisation, this thesis offers a critical account of the 
rise and decline of the neoconservative foreign policy paradigm of democratisation in 
relation to the Bush Doctrine's democracy promotion policies in Iraq and the wider 
Arab  Middle  East.  This  thesis  critically  assesses  the  most  important  intellectual, 
theoretical and historical sources of the neoconservative foreign policy framework of 
democratisation,  and  the  interventionist  policies  that  stemmed  from  this.  It  then 
examines  to  what  extent  this  thinking  influenced the  Bush Doctrine's  underlying 
assumptions  about  armed  democratisation  in  the  Middle  East  and  how 
neoconservative ideas coloured many of the policies and strategies articulated in the 
documents that constitute the doctrine. Finally, it provides a detailed critical analysis 
of  the  theoretical  and  practical  problems  and  challenges  of  such  policies  in  the 
Middle East from 2003 to 2008. 
Based on this critical analysis, this thesis argues that by 2008 the range of 
challenges posed to the assumptions of the Bush Doctrine and neoconservatism by 
critics and by developments in the Middle East have resulted in the scaling back, and 
in  many cases  the  abandonment,  of  most  aspects  of  activist  democratisation.  By 
2008, the Bush administration and many neoconservatives have in practice exhibited 
a turn towards elements of foreign policy realism. With the adoption of new political 
and military strategies in Iraq, along with the revival of regional policies focused 
more on diplomacy and the balance of power than democratic transformation, the 
Bush Doctrine's  democratisation policies that were at  their  peak in 2003 have by 
2008 entered a state of decline. Commensurate with these developments, much of the 
neoconservative  democratisation  framework  from  which  the  Bush  Doctrine  was 
derived  has  also  been  tempered  by  a  resurgence  of  realism and has  moved into 
eclipse. In addition to these changes, a new administration assumed office in January 
some of these views will be again considered in chapters four and five, the main focus of these 
chapters is upon the critiques of the Bush Doctrine that have developed in the literature on 
American foreign policy in the Middle East over the past five years. 
62009. The new American president, Barack Obama, and his foreign policy advisers 
have not been sympathetic towards the Bush Doctrine's democratisation strategy, and 
it appears unlikely at present that they will rehabilitate such policies.7 While some 
neoconservative ideas might retain residual influence in American foreign policy, the 
time has now passed when armed democratisation lay at  the heart  of  the United 
States' anti-terrorism grand strategy in the Arab world.
 It is essential to take the claims made about interventionist democratisation 
by neoconservatives and the Bush administration seriously on their own terms.  A 
number of critics have argued that the assertions made by the Bush administration 
and its supporters about armed democracy promotion represent a Straussian 'noble 
lie'  designed  as  a  cover  for  ulterior  agendas.8 Some  critics  contend  that 
neoconservatives and the Bush administration employed the rhetoric of democracy 
promotion in order to rally domestic support around a supposedly idealistic foreign 
policy to foster national unity and “republican virtue” at home.9 Others hold that talk 
of  democracy  promotion  served  as  a  way in  which  to  frame  intervention  in  the 
Middle East on behalf of oil interests or the security of Israel in idealistic terms.10 
Further, some argue that since the Bush Doctrine's democratisation policies were not 
equally applied in practice to all of America's Arab allies after 2003, this shows that 
these  policies  were  largely  rhetorical  and  should  not  be  taken  seriously  as  the 
7 See for example Barack Obama's discussion of Iraq and the war on terror in the second 2008 
presidential candidate debate between Barack Obama and John McCain. Commission on 
Presidential Debates, 'The Second McCain-Obama Presidential Debate'. Commission on 
Presidential Debates, (7 Oct., 2008). http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2008c.html, accessed 18 
December 2008. In this debate, Obama argues that “there are some things I don't understand. I 
don't understand how we ended up invading a country that had nothing to do with 9/11, while 
Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda are setting up base camps and safe havens to train terrorists to 
attack us.” Later in the debate, Obama asserted more broadly that the United States needed to 
“fundamentally change... George Bush's foreign policy. It has not worked for America;” For an 
overview of Obama's approach to the Middle East and the war on terrorism, see Barack Obama, 
'Renewing American Leadership'. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 4, (July/Aug 2007). 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070701faessay86401-p0/barack-obama/renewing-american-
leadership.html, accessed 7 November 2008.
8 Many critics of the Bush Doctrine and neoconservatism hold that neoconservatives believe Leo 
Strauss supported the idea that public officials should engage in a 'noble lie' where self-interested 
aims should be framed by idealistic rhetoric for public consumption. A number of critics paint 
democracy promotion in the Middle East as a 'noble lie' that does not deserve serious 
contemplation, as this is apparently a cover for a hidden agenda. This is a tenuous argument that, 
while discussed by other critics of the Bush Doctrine, is not considered as important or relevant in 
this thesis. 
9 See Anne Norton, Leo Strauss and the Politics of the American Empire. New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 2004; For an older argument about the importance of the “noble lie” in 
neoconservative thinking about foreign policy, see Shadia B. Drury, The Political Ideas of Leo 
Strauss. New York, St Martin's Press, 1988, passim. 
10 For this argument, see Noam Chomsky, Gilbert Achcar, Perilous Power: The Middle East and U.S 
Foreign Policy. New York, Hamish Hamilton, 2007. 
7framework  through  which  the  Bush  administration  rationalised  its  actions  in  the 
Middle East.11 
Despite  on-going  debate  among  scholars  about  the  sincerity  of  the  Bush 
Doctrine's claims, this thesis holds that the justifications neoconservatives and the 
Bush Doctrine put  forward for  armed democracy promotion nonetheless had real 
world consequences in practice. The interventionist propositions put forward by the 
Bush Doctrine acted as the way through which the use of violence by the United 
States  in  the  Middle  East  for  liberal  ends  was  rationalised,  understood  and 
legitimised. Whether all who articulated them genuinely believed in such rationales 
is not such as important matter.12 In their own right, neoconservative arguments for 
armed democratisation and the justifications  for  this  strategy offered in  the Bush 
Doctrine  represented  a  fully-formed  rationale  for  American  military  intervention 
abroad.  These  justifications  deserve  serious  critical  examination  as  they  have 
significant theoretical, historical and intellectual depth, and offer a comprehensive 
ideology  and  policy  framework  for  a  strategy  of  activist  democracy  promotion. 
Taking these justifications seriously allows the assumptions put forward by the Bush 
Doctrine and neoconservatives to be criticised on their  own terms and contrasted 
against the outcomes to date of democratisation in the Arab world.
To  assess  the  rise  and  decline  of  the  neoconservative  democratisation 
paradigm in relation to the Bush Doctrine, it is useful to adopt an interdisciplinary 
approach of  study.  Unlike a number  of  studies of this  topic,  this  thesis  bases its 
analysis  in  both  history  and  political  science.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  the 
neoconservative democratisation framework and the terms of the Bush Doctrine were 
at once historically grounded and tied to a number of major debates in contemporary 
international relations theory. Many current studies of neoconservatism and the Bush 
Doctrine are situated in political science and focus on examining various elements of 
the theoretical claims present in the Bush Doctrine. Accordingly, this thesis engages 
extensively  with  international  relations  theory  – particularly  liberal  international 
relations theory and foreign policy realism – in its analyses and critiques. Further, it 
11 See Glenn E. Perry, 'Imperial Democratisation: Rhetoric and Reality'. Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 
28, No. 3 & 4, (Summer/Fall 2006), pp. 55-86. 
12 For brief discussion on the importance of taking these liberal justifications for the use of violence 
abroad seriously on their own terms – whether they are reflective of genuine belief or otherwise – 
see Jeremy Moses, 'Humanitarianism and International Law: The 'Standard of Civilisation' in 
Contemporary International Relations'. Paper Prepared for the 46th Annual Convention of the 
International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, (1-5 Mar., 2005), p. 50. 
8utilises important elements of the voluminous material produced by foreign policy 
specialists on American Middle East policy during the Bush presidency, as well as 
many of the major works produced on neoconservatism over the past several years. 
 This thesis also seeks to provide a historical account of the origin, evolution 
and decline of the Bush administration's post-September 11 grand strategy of armed 
democratisation  in  the  Arab  world.  It  examines  at  length  the  longer-term 
development  of  neoconservative  thinking  on  democratisation,  places  the  Bush 
Doctrine's claims in a broader context of recent American foreign policy history, and 
seeks  to  maintain  some  historical  distance  from  the  events  under  examination. 
Further,  this  thesis  treats  documents  produced  by  the  Bush  administration  and 
neoconservatives as primary sources, assessing these as primary material produced 
by earlier  administrations and their  intellectual supporters  would be examined by 
historians.  An  interdisciplinary  method  of  study  allows  for  greater  flexibility  of 
analysis, increases the variety of sources and interpretations available, and can offer 
more robust conclusions than a study based exclusively in one or the other discipline. 
Indeed, this method of analysis is integral to critically assessing the rise and decline 
of neoconservatism in relation to the Bush Doctrine's Middle East democratisation 
policies. 
9Chapter One
The Neoconservative Paradigm of Democratisation
Neoconservatives have  long articulated a  range of  ideas  about  some of  the most 
important questions facing American foreign policy. These include, among others, 
ideas  relating  to  the  need  to  uphold  and  enhance  American  hegemonic  power, 
wariness  about  international  institutions  and  the  norms  of  international  law,  the 
importance of morality in foreign policy, as well as the need for the United States to 
expand liberal values and democratic government in other states. It was the last of 
these concepts  – the need to promote liberal democracy abroad  – that came to be 
associated  more  than  all  else  with  neoconservatism  and  which  deserves  serious 
contemplation and analysis. A number of scholars have examined neoconservative 
ideas about democracy promotion as a part of broader studies of neoconservatism 
and its relationship to the Bush administration's policies. Few, however, have paid 
attention  exclusively  to  the  origins,  development  and  nature  of  neoconservative 
thinking  about  democratisation,  and  few  have  treated  the  claims  made  by 
neoconservative as constituting a serious interventionist paradigm. From where did 
neoconservative  conceptions  of  promoting  democracy  and  liberal  values  derive? 
What  were  the  most  important  theoretical,  intellectual  and  historical  influences 
underlying  neoconservative  thinking  on  democratisation  as  a  pillar  of  American 
foreign policy, and how did this thinking develop over time?
Neoconservative thinking about democratisation derived from a synthesis of 
the experiences and lessons neoconservatives gained from the Cold War with some 
of the most important recent debates in liberal international relations theory about the 
globalisation  of  liberal  ideas  and  the  link  between  democracy  and  peace.  This 
synthesis  facilitated  the  formulation  of  a  historically  informed  and  theoretically 
sophisticated  argument  for  the  promotion  of  democracy  abroad  through  the 
application of American power. Neoconservatives held that the United States was a 
benevolent  hegemon  that  possessed  the  ability,  commitment  and  vision  to  bring 
about democratic change abroad, and they believed  that the spread of democracy 
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offered the promise of peace, security and enhanced American power. Drawing from 
their  experiences  in  the  Cold  War,  particularly  in  relation  to  combating 
totalitarianism, pushing for democratic transformation and witnessing the collapse of 
communism, and from their embrace of the 'activist' versions of liberal international 
relations  theories  that  developed  in  the  1990's,  neoconservatives  articulated  a 
sophisticated framework for justifying interventionist democratisation abroad by the 
United States. 
Examining  the  key  theoretical,  intellectual  and  historical  influences  that 
contributed to the neoconservative paradigm of democracy promotion is essential for 
understanding  the  policies  advocated  by  neoconservatives  and  for  examining  the 
transmission of such thinking into the Bush Doctrine itself. Establishing the nature of 
neoconservative  assumptions  about  activist  democratisation  is  a  prerequisite  for 
assessing these claims on their own terms against their outcomes and consequences 
to  date.  Further,  analysing  the  origins  and  evolution  of  neoconservative  thinking 
about democratisation shows that their arguments and the interventionist terms of the 
Bush Doctrine were not made of whole cloth, but rather had deep roots in a number 
of  important  liberal  academic  theories  and  historical  experiences  embraced  and 
interpreted by neoconservatives as their outlook developed.
The Neoconservative Foreign Policy Outlook: An Overview
In an issue of the Weekly Standard published in August 2003, Irving Kristol, the so-
called  'god-father'  of  neoconservatism,  opened  an  essay  on  what  he  termed  the 
'neoconservative persuasion' by asking “what exactly is neoconservatism?” Kristol's 
article was an attempt to lay out what constituted the neoconservative world view and 
the principles it espoused, particularly owing to the highly critical spotlight that had 
been turned on neoconservatives as a result of the Bush administration's invasion of 
Iraq in March 2003. Kristol noted in the introduction to his article that “journalists, 
and now even presidential candidates, speak with an enviable confidence on who or 
what is “neoconservative,” and seem to assume the meaning is fully revealed in the 
name.”1 Kristol commented that “those of us who are designated as “neocons” are 
1 Irving Kristol, 'The Neoconservative Persuasion: What it Was, and What it is'. The Weekly 
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amused,  flattered,  or  dismissive,  depending  on  the  context.  It  is  reasonable  to 
wonder: Is there any "there" there?”2 Kristol argued that neoconservatism existed not 
as a 'movement' or school of thought, but as a “persuasion.”3 Neoconservatism was 
an  outlook  intimately  associated  with  Cold  War  anti-communism,  moral  foreign 
policy  and  military  intervention  to  foster  democratic  values  abroad,  and  offered 
consistent  critiques  of  modernity  and  what  its  members  often  described  as  the 
decadence and nihilism of liberal thinking within American politics and society.4 
Kristol  spent  some  time  in  his  essay  examining  the  distinctive 
neoconservative  views  about  American  foreign  policy.  According  to  Kristol, 
neoconservatives held that power and principles must be one in American foreign 
policy.  Neoconservatives  expressed  an  optimistic,  moralistic  and  outward-looking 
foreign policy world view, that, among other things, held that promoting values of 
freedom  and  democracy  abroad  was  also  beneficial  for  American  power  and 
interests. In Kristol's view, there were four “attitudes” common to neoconservative 
foreign policy thinking, which together underpinned many aspects of the persuasion:
First,  patriotism  is  a  natural  and  healthy  sentiment  and  should  be 
encouraged by both private and public institutions. Precisely because 
we are a nation of immigrants, this is a powerful American sentiment. 
Second, world government is a terrible idea since it can lead to world 
tyranny.  International  institutions  that  point  to  an  ultimate  world 
government  should  be  regarded  with  the  deepest  suspicion.  Third, 
statesmen should,  above all,  have  the  ability  to  distinguish  friends 
from enemies. This is not as easy as it sounds, as the history of the 
Cold War revealed.  The  number  of  intelligent  men who could not 
count the Soviet Union as an enemy, even though this was its own 
self-definition, was absolutely astonishing. Finally, for a great power, 
the "national  interest"  is  not  a  geographical  term,  except  for  fairly 
prosaic  matters  like  trade  and  environmental  regulation.  A smaller 
nation might appropriately feel  that  its  national  interest  begins  and 
ends at its  borders, so that its foreign policy is  almost always in a 
defensive mode.  A larger  nation has more extensive interests.  And 
large nations, whose identity is ideological, like the Soviet Union of 
yesteryear and the United States of today, inevitably have ideological 
Standard, Vol. 8, No. 47, (25 Aug., 2003).
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
12
interests in addition to more material concerns.5
Kristol  aptly  captured  a  number  of  important  aspects  of  neoconservative 
foreign  policy  thinking,  emphasising  that  foreign  policy  always  had  a  domestic 
context and was influenced by regime type. To Kristol, United States foreign policy 
should  be  infused  with  an  outward-looking  patriotism  that  rallied  the  American 
people  around  moral  causes  and  therefore  encouraged  “republican  virtue”  and  a 
healthy democratic system at  home. In relation to other states,  Kristol  noted that 
neoconservatives believed that regime type was a primary determinant of foreign 
policy; that if a state was authoritarian or repressive at home, it was more likely to be 
so abroad as it externalised the violence inherent in its system of government against 
other states. Further, Kristol also made apparent that neoconservatives rejected what 
they deemed the overly materialist realist conception of the 'national interest.' As an 
'exceptional' nation, neoconservatives held that the national interests of the United 
States extended beyond merely material matters to encompass support for the spread 
of democratic values abroad.  In practice,  this meant that promoting freedom was 
consistent  with  advancing  American  interests  and  power,  as  values  and  interests 
could not be realistically separated in United States foreign policy.
Neoconservatives viewed democracy as the surest  form of government for 
promoting  peace,  ensuring  security,  and  enhancing  American  interests.  Kristol 
argued that neoconservatives believed the promotion of democracy was at once a 
moral act and a national security imperative, and that it was essential for the United 
States to use its power to advance its national interests and the values of humanity 
simultaneously.6 Through this argument, neoconservatives reinforced their claim that 
the academic dichotomy between foreign policy realism and idealism was faulty and 
that the United States could be both self-interested and altruistic at once.7 As Oxford 
University  political  scientist  Patricia  Owens  put  it  in  a  2007  article  on 
neoconservatism, “its proponents speak of power and morality, credibility, interests 
and values,”  and  held  that  spreading  democracy  and  encouraging  human  rights 
norms abroad was indivisible from the promotion of American national interests.8 
5 Ibid.
6 For critical discussion of this key aspect of neoconservative foreign policy thinking, see Michael 
C. Williams, 'What is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory'. 
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11, No. 3, (Sept., 2005), passim. 
7 For discussion of this view from a neoconservative perspective, see Joshua Muravchik, 'The Past, 
Present, and Future of Neoconservatism'. Commentary, Vol. 124, No. 3, (Oct., 2007), pp. 20-1. 
8 Patricia Owens, 'Beyond Strauss, Lies and the War in Iraq: Hannah Arendt's Critique of 
Neoconservatism'. Review of International Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1, (2007), p. 266. 
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In relation to the means of promoting democracy abroad, Kristol argued that 
neoconservatives placed important emphasis on the efficacy of American military 
power as a tool of foreign policy. Military power could be employed in the service of 
national interests, as with any great power; however,  many neoconservatives also 
strongly  believed  that  military  power  should  be  used  to  advance  liberal  values 
abroad.9 Younger  neoconservatives,  such as Irving Kristol's  son,  William Kristol, 
began arguing in the 1990's that America's military superiority was so manifest, and 
its intentions so clearly virtuous, that the United States could act as a “benevolent 
hegemon,”  employing  its  immense  military  power  in  the  service  of  the  national 
interest and humanity at once.10 Thus, American military power could be put to use 
not only to enhance pragmatic American interests and national security, but also to 
encourage the expansion of democracy, human rights and free trade as well, so as to 
make the world both a safer and a better place.11 
Irving Kristol's exposition of the key tenets of the neoconservative foreign 
policy  outlook  in  2003  came  at  a  time  when  neoconservatism  had  achieved  an 
unprecedented level of international attention and had engendered significant critical 
analysis and comment. Yet neoconservatism existed as a distinct and sophisticated 
body of thought before the election of George W. Bush, the promulgation of the 
Bush Doctrine and the invasion of Iraq, having held a prominent place in American 
politics and foreign policy for a number of decades prior.  Examining the origins, 
development  and  assumptions  of  the  neoconservative  foreign  policy  paradigm of 
democratisation  is  key  to  understanding  the  policy  prescription  put  forward  by 
neoconservatives for armed intervention in the Middle East. Further, such an analysis 
is integral to appreciating the theoretical and historical depth of the Bush Doctrine's 
propositions about armed democratisation that emerged as the cornerstone of its post-
September 11 grand strategy. 
9 Kristol, 'The Neoconservative Persuasion'; For critical analysis of this view in brief, see Smith, pp. 
27-9.
10 William Kristol, Robert Kagan, 'Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy'. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
75, No. 4, (Jul/Aug 1996), pp. 18-33.
11 For brief critical discussion of this key neoconservative idea, see G. John Ikenberry, 'The End of 
the Neoconservative Moment'. Survival, Vol. 46, No. 1, (Spring 2004), pp. 9-10. 
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The Influence of the Cold War
The neoconservative foreign policy paradigm of democracy promotion was in the 
first instance profoundly influenced by the experiences of neoconservatives during 
the  Cold  War.12 Events  during  the  Cold  War  and  the  collapse  of  communism 
decisively shaped neoconservative thinking on democracy promotion as integral to 
American foreign policy. Some of the key neoconservative propositions about regime 
change and democratisation that emerged during the 1990's and 2000's were drawn 
from  the  'lessons'  offered  by  the  lengthy  confrontation  with  the  Soviet  Union. 
Especially important was the neoconservative embrace of anti-totalitarianism and the 
belief  that  policies  of  regime  change  and  rollback,  rather  than  accommodation, 
containment  and  détente,  were  the  most  effective  way  to  manage  ambitious 
totalitarian states. These claims were also made in the Bush Doctrine, and there was 
clear intellectual lineage between neoconservative Cold War thinking and the Bush 
administration's anti-terrorism grand strategy. 
Anti-Totalitarianism, Rollback and American Foreign Policy
At the core of neoconservative thinking about American foreign policy in the Cold 
War was a strong belief in anti-totalitarianism. Some of the leading members of the 
nascent neoconservative group of the late 1940's, such as Irving Kristol,  Norman 
Podhoretz,  Michael  Novak  and  others  began  their  careers  as  Trotskyite  or  left-
leaning  intellectuals  at  City  College  New York.13 Among leftist  intellectuals,  the 
early Cold War period was dominated by intense ideological competition between 
Trotskyites and Stalinists, and more broadly between liberals sympathetic to the aims 
of  communism,  and  staunchly  anti-communist  Cold  War  liberals.14 Kristol, 
12 On the formative role of the Cold War in neoconservative thinking, see Gary Dorrien, Imperial  
Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana. New York, Routledge, 2004, chapter 1; 
James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet. New York, Penguin, 2004, 
pp. xvi-xv, chapter four; John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals in Foreign 
Affairs, 1945-1995. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1995, preface, chapter 1, 
chapter 5 passim; For analysis of this issue from a conservative position, see Stefan Halper, 
Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004, chapter 2.  
13 For informative discussion of the genesis of early neoconservatism at City College, see Halper, 
Clarke, pp. 44-6. 
14 Irving Kristol, 'My Cold War'. The National Interest, No. 31, (Spring 1993), pp. 141-145; For 
further discussion of the importance of anti-communism in the formation of the neoconservative 
outlook, see Fukuyama, pp. 15-17.
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Podhoretz,  and  others  became increasingly  disillusioned with  the  American  left's 
apparent sympathies for Soviet communism and the weak elite response to what they 
viewed  as  the  evil  and  dangerous  regime  in  Moscow.  This  disillusionment  was 
heightened further as more became known about the horrors of Stalinist Russia, and 
many of these thinkers concluded that the promise of “real existing socialism” had 
been usurped by a totalitarian regime utilising Marxist-Leninism in an attempt to 
justify  utopian  violence  that  caused  immense  suffering.15 Owing  to  this,  the 
intellectuals  later  deemed 'neoconservative'  became staunchly anti-communist  and 
committed to anti-totalitarianism as a pillar of American foreign policy.
On  a  theoretical  level,  the  anti-totalitarian  outlook  expressed  by 
neoconservatives was strongly influenced by Hannah Arendt's book, The Origins of  
Totalitarianism. Among other issues, Arendt examined the totalitarian ideology and 
expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union, deeming the Marxist-Leninist ideology 
of  the  Soviet  state  a  primary  cause  of  its  belligerence  and  aggressive  foreign 
policies.16 Arendt's exposition of totalitarian theory offered neoconservatives a cogent 
explanation for the origins of the Cold War,  providing a compelling argument in 
which Marxist-Leninism and the very nature of the Soviet Union itself explained the 
ambitions and hostility of the enemy.17 While Patricia Owens notes that “Arendt was 
horrified  that  The  Origins  of  Totalitarianism...  became  a  staple  of  Cold  War 
propaganda,” and did not think that her book would provide an influential theoretical 
framework for conceiving of the Soviet threat,18 to neoconservatives, Arendt offered 
the  most  convincing  explanation  for  the  origins  of  the  Cold  War  and  further 
enamoured their belief in the necessity of principled anti-totalitarianism in American 
foreign  policy.  Subsequent  analysis  in  chapters  two  and  three  shows  that  the 
assumptions made by neoconservatives about totalitarian regimes during the Cold 
War have been applied to repressive regimes during the 1990's and 2000's, and that 
these ideas also emerged as one of the Bush Doctrine's key claims about regime type 
and conflict.
15 For informative discussion on the importance of anti-Stalinism to early neoconservatism, see 
Norman Podhoretz, 'Neoconservatism: A Eulogy'. Commentary, Vol. 101, No. 3, (Mar., 1996), pp. 
24-6, passim. 
16 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Third Edition. London, Allen and Unwin, 1967; 
For good discussion of Arendt's work and its main themes and conclusions, see Ted V. McAllister, 
Revolt Against Modernity: Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin and the Search for a Postliberal Order. 
Kansas, Kansas University Press, 1996, pp. 39-42.
17 Owens, p. 169. 
18 Ibid.
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As a result of their strong anti-totalitarian outlook, many neoconservatives 
argued that policies of “rollback” and “regime change” were among the most viable 
strategies for dealing with the threat and ambitions of the Soviet Union and its allies. 
The notions of rollback and regime change expressed in the Bush Doctrine can be 
traced to neoconservative debates about  these interventionist  strategies during the 
Cold War. One of the most important intellectual influences over neoconservative 
thinking about the utility of rollback and regime change in the Cold War was James 
Burnham, a conservative intellectual who regularly wrote in the  National Review. 
From the late 1940's into the 1970's, Burnham strongly and consistently argued for 
policies aimed at the military rollback of the Soviet Union and its allies in order to 
bring the communist threat to a heel and win the Cold War.19  Burnham argued in his 
1947 book The Struggle for the World that the United States was already losing the 
Cold War and that it was clear that if military action against the communists was not 
undertaken, Soviet world domination was assured.20 Containment was not enough, 
and what was required was the 'rollback' of communist regimes by force, with the 
ultimate goal of bringing about the collapse of the Soviet regime. The United States 
should liberate the states of Eastern Europe from communism by force, Burnham 
contended, and this was to be a part of a broader strategy to rollback communist 
regimes in the developing world as well.21
Burnham's influence was apparent in a number of neoconservative stances on 
challenging  Soviet  power.  Some  neoconservative  intellectuals,  such  as  Norman 
Podhoretz and others at Commentary, derived from Burnham the idea of not merely 
'managing'  the  Cold  War,  but  rolling  back  communism  itself.22 In  addition,  as 
neoconservatives  turned  away  from  the  Democratic  Party  and  towards  the 
Republican Party during the 1970's, their developing notions of rollback meshed with 
the strongly anti-communist views of a minority of Republicans, led by figures like 
Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan, who had never been satisfied with containment 
or détente and argued in favour of far more assertive policies aimed at  liberating 
19 James Burnham, The Struggle for the World. Oxford, Alden Press, 1947, part one, chapter 7; For 
discussion of Burnham's thinking about totalitarian regimes, see McAllister, pp. 37-8; For critical 
analysis of Burnham's claims about the nature and ambitions of the USSR, see Anatol Lieven, 
John C. Hulsman, 'Neo-Conservatives, Liberal Hawks, and the War on Terror: Lessons from the 
Cold War'. World Policy Journal, Vol. 23, No. 3, (Fall 2006), pp. 67-8.
20 Burnham, part one, chapter 7.
21 Dorrien, p. 22-3.
22 Lieven, Hulsman, p. 67; For further discussion of Podhoretz's views and their links to the Burnham 
tradition of rollback, see Ehrman, p. 143. 
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Eastern  Europe  and  pushing  back  communism  in  the  third  world.23 Burnham's 
thinking also influenced neoconservative responses to détente and the post-Vietnam 
reaction against anti-communism. Neoconservatives associated with the Committee 
on the Present Danger applied Burnham's ideas to argue that the Soviet Union and its 
satellites were not a constant fixture in world affairs, as realists like Henry Kissinger 
and Richard Nixon presumed. Nor was the USSR a partner for peace that could be 
persuaded to accept the norms of the 'international community' through détente and 
“interdependence”  as  Jimmy Carter  claimed.  Rather  it  was  possible,  and  indeed, 
necessary, to rollback Soviet gains through regime change in select communist states. 
This would help to diminish the Soviet threat and enhance peace and security in the 
world.24
According  to  neoconservatives,  the  United  States  could  transcend  the 
international status quo through applying policies of rollback and regime change to 
totalitarian states. This notion that rollback and regime change were among the most 
decisive and effective ways to deal with hostile totalitarian regimes was carried into 
the realm of foreign policy making by neoconservatives on two occasions; the first of 
which was during the 1980's, and the second, examined in chapter three of this thesis, 
during the Bush administration's time in office from 2001-8.25 
The Reagan Doctrine: Rollback and Regime Change in Practice
The  concepts  of  rollback  and  regime  change  first  emerged  as  a  key  element  of 
American foreign policy during the Reagan administration's  time in office in the 
1980's. A number of neoconservatives, such as Jeane Kirkpatrick, Eliot Abrams, Paul 
Wolfowitz, William Kristol, I. Lewis Libby, Richard Perle and Robert Kagan, gained 
a variety of policy making positions in the Reagan administration.26 Many of these 
neoconservatives held reasonably hard-line stances on challenging the USSR through 
rollback  and  regime  change,  and  their  views  became  an  important  basis  for  the 
Reagan administration's fight against communism.27 The experiences and 'lessons' of 
23 Jervis, pp. 368-9; For discussion on the Reagan faction of the Republican Party and their 
opposition to détente in the late 1970's, see Mann, pp. 72-3. 
24 Dorrien, pp. 23-4; For discussion of neoconservative opposition to détente and Kissinger's foreign 
policy realism, see Mann, chapter 4. 
25 Fukuyama, p. 114. 
26 Dorrien, p. 10; For discussion of the positions of individual neoconservatives in the Reagan 
administration, see Mann, chapter 7; Ehrman, pp. 139-141. 
27 Dorrien, p. 10.
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putting  ideas  of  rollback  and  regime  change  into  effect  – especially  the  rise  of 
democracy  that  apparently  resulted  from  such  actions  – did  much  to  influence 
neoconservative optimism during the 1990's about the efficacy of regime change as a 
route for bringing about democracy in authoritarian states. 
Ronald Reagan won a landmark election victory in November 1980. Reagan 
assumed power arguing that the policies of détente had failed and that the United 
States risked losing the Cold War if it did not adopt new strategies aimed not only at 
containing the USSR, but at reversing its gains in the third world and challenging its 
legitimacy to rule at home. President Reagan and senior administration officials, both 
neoconservative and otherwise, believed that the United States was at a crossroads in 
its  battle  against  communism  in  the  early  1980's.  Accordingly,  they  sought  to 
establish new anti-communist policies, which would later become formalised as the 
'Reagan Doctrine.' 
In its first year in power, the Reagan administration began to formulate new 
policies aimed at enacting rollback and regime change against the allies of the Soviet 
Union in the third world. Building on the existing policy of covert CIA support to the 
anti-Soviet Mujuheddin of Afghanistan begun by President Carter in 1979, Reagan 
administration planners decided that the most effective rollback strategy was to offer 
covert support to anti-communist proxy forces in pro-Soviet states in Latin America, 
Asia  and  Africa.28 The  United  States  would  channel  funding  and  arms  to  anti-
communist insurgencies in these regions, utilising such forces to bring down ruling 
communist  regimes.  In  the  early  months  of  1981,  CIA  director  William Casey, 
Secretary of  State  Alexander  Haig,  National  Security  Advisor  Richard Allen and 
United  Nations  ambassador  Jeane  Kirkpatrick  proposed  a  broad  “covert  strategic 
offensive” against Soviet influence in the third world.29 James Scott, a professor of 
political science at the University of Nebraska, notes that CIA director Casey, who, 
like the neoconservatives, was never satisfied with containment and détente, argued 
that  the  United  States  should  support  anti-communist  insurgencies  in  Nicaragua, 
Afghanistan,  Cambodia,  Angola,  Cuba,  Grenada  and  Laos,  as  well  as  programs 
aimed at the removal of the regimes of Iran and Libya to prevent Soviet gains in the 
Middle East.30 
28 For a brief discussion of the Reagan Doctrine, see Mann, pp. 121-3; See also Halper, Clarke, p. 
163. 
29 James M. Scott, 'Reagan's Doctrine? The formulation of an American Foreign Policy Strategy'. 
Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4, (Fall 1996), p. 1048. 
30 Ibid.
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The Reagan administration's anti-communist proxy war strategy became more 
formalised and systematic in 1983 with the publication of National Security Decision 
Directive  75  (NSDD  75).31 This  internal  planning  document  was  written  by 
neoconservative National Security Council staffer and Soviet scholar Richard Pipes, 
and became the Reagan administration's most significant and detailed statement on 
its  anti-communist  policies.  In NSDD 75, Pipes contended that  the United States 
should  “contain  and  over  time  reverse  Soviet  expansionism by  competing  on  a 
sustained  basis  with  the  Soviet  Union  in  all  international  arenas,”  including 
“geographical regions of priority concern to the United States.”32 NSDD 75 held that 
the United States should “support effectively those third world states that are willing 
to  resist  Soviet  pressures,”  so as  to  “weaken,  and  where  possible  undermine  the 
existing links” between third world communist regimes and the USSR.33 It was this 
planning, more than anything else, which provided the basis on which the rollback 
policies of the Reagan Doctrine was formulated and implemented. 
The language of freedom and democracy played an important role in framing 
the  interventionist  policies  articulated  in  the  Reagan  Doctrine.  This  was  highly 
significant for neoconservative conceptions of rollback and regime change, as it was 
at this juncture that these Cold War concepts became tied to the idea of democracy 
promotion. President Reagan argued in his famous speech to the British parliament in 
1982 that the west “must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole 
prerogative  of  a  lucky few,  but  the  inalienable  and  universal  right  of  all  human 
beings.”34 Reagan held that the American promotion of democracy could undermine 
communist ideology and bring the repressed people of the Eastern Bloc the liberty 
they deserved.35 Similarly,  in a 1987 speech on relations between the communist 
31 Richard Pipes, 'US Relations With the USSR'. NSDD 75, 17 January 1983. 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-075.htm, accessed 27 April 2007. 
32 Ibid, p. 1. 
33 Ibid, pp. 4-5.
34 Ronald Reagan, 'Address to Members of the British Parliament'. 8 June 1982. 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/60882a.htm, accessed 16 July 2007; For 
brief discussion on neoconservative support for morality in Reagan's foreign policy, see Mann, p. 
27; For analysis of Reagan's speech and the subsequent founding of the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED) in 1983, see Ehrman, pp. 162-3. 
35 'Address to Members of the British Parliament'; For neoconservative views on the significance of 
Reagan's language of democracy in foreign policy, see Joshua Muravchik, Allen Johnson, 'The 
Neoconservative Persuasion and Foreign Policy'. Democratiya, No. 12, (Winter 2007). 
http://www.democratiya.com/interview.asp?issueid=11, accessed 25 March 2008; See also Natan 
Sharansky, 'Democracy for Peace'. Essential Essays, AEI World Forum, Washington, 20 June 
2002. http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.15187,filter.all/pub_detail.asp, accessed 15 March 
2008; Richard Perle, 'Combating Terrorism'. Statement by Richard Perle Before the Subcommittee 
on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, Committee on Government 
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world and the west, Reagan contended that “for the sake of peace and justice, let us 
move toward a world in which all people are at  last  free to determine their own 
destiny”  through the  principles  of  freedom and individual  liberty  enjoyed by the 
nations of the non-communist world.36 This resurgence of the language of freedom 
and  democracy  in  American  foreign  policy  marked  a  milestone  in  the  link 
neoconservatives made between regime change and democratisation. This was the 
point at  which neoconservatives began to  conceive of armed interventions  aimed 
primarily  at  encouraging  democracy.37 This connection  between  coercive  regime 
change  and  the  promotion  of  democracy  would  subsequently  emerge  as  a  core 
element  of  neoconservative  thinking  about  democratisation  in  the  1990's,  and 
provided a key intellectual pillar for the claims made about regime change in the 
Bush Doctrine.38 
The Collapse of Communism and New Prospects for Democracy Promotion
Neoconservatives were staunch supporters of the Reagan Doctrine, doing much to 
influence the creation and implementation of this  policy during Reagan's  time in 
office. Yet like most observers of international relations, neoconservatives did not 
predict that the Soviet Union and communism would collapse by the early 1990's. 
Neoconservatives reasoned that the sudden collapse of communism and the end of 
the Cold War must have occurred because of the Reagan administration's policies; 
especially its strong support for rollback and democratic change.39 This conclusion 
gave extraordinary vindication to the idea of regime change as a pillar of American 
foreign  policy.  Neoconservatives  saw  that  the  Reagan  administration's  rollback 
policies, coupled with the administration's strong support for democracy and freedom 
in authoritarian regimes of all stripes, including its unprecedented calls for freedom 
Reform House of Representatives, 16 April 2002.
36 Ronald Reagan, 'Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin'.
12 June 1987. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1987/061287d.htm, accessed 16 
July 2007.
37 Mann, pp. 128-131, passim. 
38 As chapter two of this thesis shows, some neoconservatives advocated interventionist policies in 
Iraq that drew heavily on the concepts of the Reagan Doctrine; especially its idea that regime 
change could be effectively brought about by supporting proxy forces, and that through such a 
strategy, the United States could help to bring about democracy in authoritarian societies.
39 For critical analysis of this view, see Ikenberry, 'The End of the Neoconservative Moment', p. 17; 
For further discussion of the post-Cold War wave of optimism about the universal appeal of 
democracy and the centrality of American power to spreading democracy, see George Packer, The 
Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq. London, Faber and Faber, 2006, pp. 18-19. 
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in the Eastern Bloc and to “tear down” the Berlin Wall, played a decisive role in 
bringing about momentous democratic changes abroad.40 
Among the 'lessons' neoconservatives gained from the Reagan Doctrine and 
the collapse of communism, one of the most enduring was a strong faith in the utility 
of  coercive  regime  change  as  a  strategy  of  democracy  promotion.  Leading 
neoconservative intellectuals William Kristol and Robert Kagan argued that in the 
post-Cold War world “a principal aim of American foreign policy should be to bring 
about a change of regime in hostile nations... and wherever tyrannical governments 
acquire  the  military  power  to  threaten  their  neighbors,  our  allies  and  the  United 
States  itself.”41 Kristol  and Kagan argued that  by  their  very nature,  authoritarian 
regimes pursued aggressive foreign policies.42 This was a fundamental lesson drawn 
from the experience of combating Soviet aggression during the Cold War. Echoing 
the  logic  of  totalitarian  theory,  Kristol  and  Kagan  wrote  that  “the  source  of 
confrontation between the two sides [the United States and Soviet Union] was not 
mutual misunderstanding, a lack of interdependence, or the military arsenals amassed 
by both sides. It was the nature of the Soviet regime.”43 To Kristol and Kagan, only 
“when that regime came to an end, so did the arms race, so did Russian aggression 
beyond its borders, and so did the Cold War.”44 
This  lesson  had  profound  implications  for  American  policy  towards 
threatening totalitarian regimes in the post-Cold War era; the United States could not 
hope to 'manage' hostile states, but must seek to change the regimes themselves in 
order to end the threat they posed. Reflecting on their belief that regime change was 
an effective strategy for dealing with hostile states and fostering democracy where 
there was currently only tyranny, Kristol and Kagan concluded that:
To many, the idea of America using its power to promote changes of 
regime in nations ruled by dictators rings of utopianism. In fact, it is 
40 'Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin'. Despite their strong 
support for hardline stances against the Soviet Union, some neoconservatives in the Reagan 
administration, such as Richard Perle, and those outside of the administration, such as Norman 
Podhoretz, were suspicious of the warming of relations between Reagan and Gorbachev and the 
latter's calls for major reform in the USSR and Eastern Europe. For discussion of this point, see 
Dorrien, chapter one. 
41 Robert Kagan, William Kristol, 'The Present Danger'. The National Interest, No. 59, (Spring 
2000), p. 65; See also an expanded version of this argument in Robert Kagan, William Kristol, 
'Introduction: National Interest and Global Responsibility' in Robert Kagan, William Kristol (Eds), 
Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defence Policy. San Francisco, 
Encounter Books, 2000, pp. 3-24. 
42 Kagan, Kristol, 'The Present Danger', p. 64.
43 Ibid, p. 66. 
44 Ibid. 
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eminently  realistic.  There  is  something  perverse  in  declaring  the 
impossibility of promoting democratic change abroad in light of the 
record  of  the  past  three  decades.  After  we  have  already  seen 
dictatorships toppled by democratic forces in such unlikely places as 
the Philippines,  Indonesia,  Chile,  Nicaragua, Paraguay, Taiwan and 
South Korea, how utopian is it to imagine a change of regime in a 
place  like  Iraq?  How  utopian  is  it  to  work  for  the  fall  of  the 
Communist Party oligarchy in China after a far more powerful and, 
arguably, more stable such oligarchy fell in the Soviet Union? With 
democratic change sweeping the world at an unprecedented rate over 
these past thirty years, is it "realistic" to insist that no further victories 
can be won?45
The largely peaceful domino-like collapse of communism in Eastern Europe 
and the increasing spread of democracy in the developing world helped to engender a 
surge  of  optimism  among  many  neoconservatives  that  it  was  now  possible  to 
encourage the spread of democracy anywhere. Francis Fukuyama argues in After the 
Neocons that following the collapse of communism, a number of neoconservatives 
came to hold that the “experience of the East Europeans” could be extended “to other 
parts of the world.”46 Neoconservatives, writes Fukuyama, contended that they “had 
been fooled once by people who said that the East Europeans had learned to love 
their captivity; by this view, we should not underestimate the democratic impulse 
elsewhere.”47 This  optimistic  thinking was further  reinforced  by the rise  of  what 
Samuel Huntington calls the “Third Wave” of democratisation, where a number of 
authoritarian  regimes  in  Southern  Europe,  North  East  Asia,  Latin  America  and 
Southern Africa became democratic during the 1980's and early 1990's.48 A majority 
of  neoconservatives  concluded  from  the  events  of  1989-1991  that  democratic 
government was the future for all of humanity, and that now was the time to harness 
America's new heights of global hegemonic military power to encourage the spread 
of liberal democracy everywhere.49
45 Ibid.
46 Fukuyama, pp. 52-3.
47 Ibid.
48 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late 20th Century. Norman and 
London, Oklahoma University Press, 1991, pp. 94-6, 98; For a critical assessment of the 
neoconservative conception of the Third Wave, see Ehrman, pp. 160-1.
49 Smith, p. 34; For further discussion of the self-confidence of democratic globalism at the end of 
the Cold War, see Claes G. Ryn, America the Virtuous: The Crisis of Democracy and the Quest  
for Empire. New Brunswick and London, Transaction Publishers, 2003, p. 130; See also Gary 
Dorrien, 'Imperial Designs: Theological Ethics and the Ideologies of International Politics'. Cross 
Currents, Vol. 54, No. 2, (Summer 2004), pp. 4-5. http://www.crosscurrents.org/Dorrien0204.htm, 
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Neoconservatism and Liberal International Relations Theory
Following the end of the cold war, a number of neoconservatives became closely 
engaged with some of the leading liberal international relations theories of the 1990's. 
Neoconservatives came to see many of these theories – in a simplified form in which 
their probabilistic elements had been marginalised by 'activist' liberal scholars  – as 
compelling guidelines for a foreign policy of interventionist democracy promotion.50 
Alongside  the  influence  of  the  Cold  War,  the  framework  of  activist  democracy 
promotion articulated by many neoconservatives during the 1990's, and central to the 
Bush  Doctrine,  owed  much  of  its  theoretical  and  empirical  depth  to  the 
neoconservative embrace of select liberal theories of international relations and the 
implications taken from these as guides to action. 
Democratic Globalism and Democratic Realism
Shortly after  the end of the Cold War,  two distinct strands of thought developed 
within  neoconservatism  over  the  question  of  democracy  promotion  in  American 
foreign policy. The first of these strands, labelled 'democratic globalism,'  took an 
expansive and optimistic view about the prospects for democratisation in the post-
Cold  War  world,  and  in  the  United  States'  ability  to  bring  about  democracy  in 
authoritarian states through intervention.51 One of the prominent early democratic 
globalists  was  Joshua  Muravchik,  who  wrote  in  1991  about  the  need  to  “fulfil 
America's  mission”  through  spreading  democracy  in  the  post-Cold  War  world.52 
Murvachik was joined during the early 1990's by, among others, Richard Perle, Paul 
accessed 27 March 2008.
50 For discussion of the links between neoconservatism and liberal international relations thinking, 
see  Ehrman, p. vii, chapter 1; See also Michael C. Desch, 'America's Liberal Illiberalism: The 
Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S Foreign Policy'. International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3, 
(Winter 2007/8), pp. 19-20.
51 For good discussion by democratic globalist and democratic realist neoconservatives about the 
comparative merits of their stances, see the contributions by William Kristol, Robert Kagan, 
Charles Krauthammer, Michael Ledeen, Jeane Kirkpatrick and Francis Fukuyama in 'American 
Power- For What?: A Symposium'. Commentary, Vol. 109, No. 1, (Jan., 2000), pp. 21-48.
52 Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny. Washington, American 
Enterprise Press, 1991.
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Wolfowitz,  Norman  Podhoretz,  Michael  Ledeen,  and  most  prominently,  William 
Kristol  and  Robert  Kagan,  who  each  began  to  argue  for  the  globalisation  of 
democracy as a cornerstone of American foreign policy.53 Kristol and Kagan perhaps 
did the most to champion the democratic globalist position in the publication  The 
Weekly Standard and in the think-tank, the Project for a New American Century, 
effectively establishing democratic globalism as the orthodoxy of neoconservative 
thinking about democratisation, and seeing much of this vision come to influence the 
formulation of the Bush Doctrine from 2001. 
Despite  democratic  globalism  becoming  the  mainstream  of  the 
neoconservative  persuasion  in  the  1990's,  there  were  nonetheless  several 
neoconservative figures who articulated a more restrictive and cautious outlook on 
the centrality of democratisation in post-Cold War American foreign policy. Among 
these figures was neoconservative writer Charles Krauthammer, who following the 
collapse of communism called himself a 'democratic realist.'54 While Krauthammer 
agreed with the principle of promoting democracy as a pillar of American foreign 
policy,  he held that this could not be universal  and must based upon “criteria of 
selectivity;”  namely  the  importance  of  democratisation  for  the  advancement  of 
strategic interests and national security.55 Krauthammer contended that while the aim 
of  encouraging  democracy  everywhere  was  a  noble  goal,  it  lay  in  the  realm  of 
aspiration,  and  in  the  real  world  the  United  States  needed  to  be  selective  in  its 
interventions to promote democracy, lest it squander its resources in democratising 
unimportant states.56 Similarly, Irving Kristol and Jeane Kirkpatrick held that while 
commendable  in  principle,  a  foreign  policy  premised  on  activist  democracy 
promotion was not  always prudent or  in  the national  interest  in every instance.57 
'Democratic  realists'  called for greater  selectivity  in deciding upon interventionist 
democratisation,  and cautioned against  expansive policies that might  have only a 
53 Kristol, Kagan, 'Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy', passim; For further discussion, see 
Michael C. Desch, 'Liberals, Neocons, and Realcons'. Orbis, Vol. 45, No. 4, (Fall 2001), p. 525. 
54 Charles Krauthammer, 'In Defence of Democratic Realism'. The National Interest, No. 77, (Fall 
2004), pp. 15-26. See also Charles Krauthammer, 'Democratic Realism: An American Foreign 
Policy for a Unipolar World'. American Enterprise Institute, Irving Kristol AEI Annual Dinner 
Speeches, (10 Feb., 2004). Krauthammer had previously been a strong supporter of bringing 
democracy to states under communist rule, but in the post-Cold War years, he took a more 
restrictive view about democratic promotion. Krauthammer believed democratisation must always 
be tied to American national interests, and could not be carried out simply for humanitarian 
reasons, or because it was the moral thing to do everywhere.
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid.
57 Dorrien, Imperial Designs, pp. 76-7. 
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tenuous relationship to the 'national interest.'
Discussion  in  chapters  two  and  three  of  this  thesis  makes  clear  that  the 
assumptions about democratisation that emerged in the Bush Doctrine were derived 
from  democratic  globalist  beliefs.  Indeed,  the  democratic  globalist  variant  of 
neoconservative foreign policy thinking became so dominant in the persuasion that it 
is possible to use the term 'neoconservative' without the prefix 'democratic globalist' 
when discussing arguments for activist democratisation made from the 1990's to the 
last  two  years  of  President  Bush's  time  in  office.58 This  is  because  those 
neoconservatives that called for armed democracy promotion in the Middle East were 
almost invariably of a democratic globalist outlook. In this and subsequent chapters, 
unless otherwise indicated, the term 'neoconservative' and its derivatives refers to the 
democratic globalist majority of the group. 'Democratic realism' does occasionally 
enter into subsequent analysis, and it will be made clear where it is this strand of 
thought,  rather  than  globalism,  that  is  under  examination.  Nonetheless,  when 
discussing  activist  democratisation,  the  term  'neoconservative'  will  be  generally 
equated with 'democratic globalism' for accuracy, and ease of reading and analysis. 
The Liberal Character of Democratic Globalism
The foreign policy beliefs expressed by democratic globalists were clearly liberal in 
character.  Democratic  globalists  did  not  themselves  describe  their  foreign  policy 
outlook as being 'liberal,' and their use of the term was more often restricted to a 
domestic context where it was employed as an epithet against political opponents. 
Rather,  scholars  external  to  the  neoconservative  persuasion  identified  democratic 
globalist thinking on democratisation as liberal. In an article published in the journal 
Orbis in 2001, University of Kentucky professor Michael Desch identifies some key 
elements of liberal foreign policy thinking. Desch writes in list  form that,  among 
other things, a foreign policy liberal 
Is someone who believes that (1) individual rights hold primacy over 
national  interests  and  sovereignty;  (2)  the  natural  state  of  man  is 
peaceful; (3) the application of reason can resolve conflicts of interest 
among  individuals  and  states;  (4)  human  nature  is  malleable  and 
58 For discussion of the state of democratic globalism during President Bush's last years in office, see 
the conclusion of this thesis.
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improvable; [and] (5) human society is progressively improving.59
Desch accurately captures many of the essential elements of liberal foreign policy 
thinking; especially its focus on the importance of human rights, its conceptions of 
the centrality of democracy as key to the resolution of conflict, and its underlying 
sense  of  optimism in  human  rationality  and  progress.  Examining  liberal  foreign 
policy thinking in 2007, Tony Smith similarly writes that a central element of this 
school  of  thought  is  “the  belief  that  fostering  human  rights  and  democratic 
governments  abroad  should  enjoy  a  prominent  role  in  the  making  of  American 
foreign policy.”60 Democracy was seen to embody a number of core liberal beliefs 
about the universal appeal of freedom and the continuity of human progress. Further, 
many liberals saw democracy as the last remaining legitimate form of government 
that would over time be embraced by all societies.61
The foreign policy outlook expressed by most neoconservatives was liberal in 
nature in three principle ways. The first of these was that neoconservatives strongly 
supported the notion that 'freedom' had universal appeal. Leading neoconservative 
intellectual  Paul  Wolfowitz  held  that  freedom  and  democracy  were  universal 
aspirations to which culture and religion were no barrier.62 In a speech shortly before 
the  invasion  of  Iraq,  Wolfowitz  contended  that  “the  values  of  freedom  and 
democracy are not just  Western values or European values,  they are Muslim and 
Asian values as well. Indeed, they are universal values. They are the bridge that span 
civilizations.”63 Wolfowitz maintained that freedom was the natural condition of Iraq 
and the  wider  Arab world,  and that  it  was  condescending to  believe that  certain 
people  or  cultures  were  somehow incapable  of  realising this  inherently  universal 
aspiration.64 Similarly,  neoconservative  writer  Natan  Sharanksky  argued  that  the 
appeal of freedom was universal in all nations, and that tyrannical governments that 
59 Desch  'Liberals, Neocons, and Realcons', p. 522. 
60 Smith, p. ix.
61 For further discussion of this important point, see the examination of Francis Fukuyama's End of 
History thesis later in this chapter. For analysis of how this idea was articulated by the Bush 
administration, see chapter three of this thesis.
62 'Deputy Defense Secretary Addresses Iraqi-Americans in Michigan: Wolfowitz Says U.S. Would 
Seek to Liberate, Not Occupy, Iraq'. State Department Press Releases and Documents, 24 February 
2003.
63 Ibid.
64 Mark Bowden, 'Wolfowitz: The Exit Interviews'. Atlantic Monthly, (Jul/Aug 2005). 
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200507/bowden,, accessed March 11 2008. For discussion of how 
these ideas relate the Bush Doctrine's claims about the universality of freedom, see chapter three of 
this thesis. For discussion of the problems of conceiving freedom in this manner, see chapter four 
of this thesis. 
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repressed freedom were not only illegitimate, they were unnatural.65 Liberal thinkers 
regularly  emphasised  the  importance  of  freedom  of  speech,  religion  and  self-
determination, as well as freedom from arbitrary arrest, prosecution, discrimination 
based  on  gender,  values  or  faith,  and  other  denials  of  basic  rights.66 Many 
neoconservatives articulated a conception of freedom largely indistinguishable from 
that expressed by liberal scholars, showing one of the important ways in which their 
thinking on foreign policy was at its core liberal in nature.
The foreign policy beliefs expressed by neoconservatives were also liberal as 
they consistently championed democracy as the ideal and final form of government 
for all. Neoconservative intellectual Paula Dobriansky argued that “the United States 
has  a  moral  imperative  to  advocate  that  individuals  around  the  world  have  the 
freedom to pursue their dreams in a secure, prosperous and peaceful environment,” 
and that encouraging democracy was the best means to these ends.67 Emphasising the 
importance of democracy as a way to promote human rights and uphold the freedom 
of all people, Wolfowitz similarly argued that “nothing could be less realistic than 
the version of the "realist" view of foreign policy that dismisses human rights” and 
support for democracy as an integral part of American foreign policy.68 Wolfowitz 
argued  that  encouraging  liberal  democracy  was  essential  to  the  advancement  of 
peace, prosperity and security in all states.69 While neoconservatives differed from 
many foreign policy liberals in their belief that military force could be an effective 
tool for promoting democracy abroad, their ideas did echo the claims made by some 
influential “liberal hawks” such as Paul Berman, Michael Ignatieff,  Peter Beinart, 
and Christopher Hitchens. Each of these figures argued that military power could and 
should  play  a  key  role  in  helping  to  foster  liberal  democracy  in  non-democratic 
states.70
Finally, the foreign policy beliefs expressed by democratic globalists were 
liberal  in character as they argued that it  was imperative for democratic states to 
65 'Natan Sharansky, 'What Are We Fighting For? - Spread Freedom in the Mideast'. The Wall Street  
Journal, (10 Oct., 2001), A16.
66 See Thomas M. Franck, 'Are Human Rights Universal?' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 1, (Jan/Feb 
2001), pp. 191-205. 
67 Paula J. Dobriansky, 'Advancing Democracy'. The National Interest, No. 77, (Fall 2004), p. 71.
68 Paul Wolfowitz, 'Remembering the Future'. The National Interest, No. 59, (Spring 2000), pp. 44-5. 
69 Ibid.
70 For critical discussion of liberal hawk views on using military force as a tool of democracy 
promotion, see Barry Gewen, 'Why Are We in Iraq? A Realpolitik Perspective'. World Policy 
Journal, Vol. 24, No. 3, (Fall 2007), pp. 14-15; See also James Atlas, 'Changing Minds; What It 
Takes to Be a Neo-Neoconservative'. The New York Times, (19 Oct., 2003). 
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uphold international human rights norms by protecting people in other states from 
abuse by their own government. In an interview published shortly before the invasion 
of Iraq, William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan put forward a strong argument for 
humanitarian  intervention  in  the  state.  When  asked  by  the  interviewer  “is  there 
anyone you can think of (nation, pol, constituency) the Bush administration has not 
convinced  that  going into  Iraq is  necessary who should and can  be  convinced?” 
Kristol and Kaplan replied:
Liberals. Not liberals at  The Nation or  The American Prospect, who 
can  always  be  counted  on  to  favor  tyranny  over  anything  that 
strengthens American power,  however marginally. But liberals who 
supported  the  American  interventions  in  Bosnia  and  Kosovo  – 
humanists, in short. For if ever there was a humanitarian undertaking, 
it  is  the  liberation  of  Iraq  from a  tyrant  who  has  jailed,  tortured, 
gassed, shot, and otherwise murdered tens of thousands of his own 
citizens.71
Kristol and Kaplan maintained that the Bush administration needed to publicise more 
effectively regime change in Iraq as aimed at saving the Iraqi people.72 A year after 
the invasion of Iraq, Robert Kagan and William Kristol similarly defended the war as 
a  legitimate  form  of  humanitarian  intervention.73 Kagan  and  Kristol  wrote  that 
“liberating the Iraqi people from Saddam's brutal, totalitarian dictatorship” was in its 
own right “sufficient reason to remove Saddam,” as “for the people of Iraq, the war 
put an end to three decades of terror and suffering.”74 Indeed, Kagan and Kristol 
argued, “the mass graves uncovered since the end of the war are alone sufficient 
justification  for  [regime  change,]”  and  removing  Saddam Hussein  meant  that  he 
could never again unleash pogroms of terror against his own people.75
This  democratic  globalist  support  for  humanitarian  intervention  echoes  a 
number  of  ideas  championed  by  leading  liberal  scholars.  The  notion  that  Iraq's 
sovereign rights became suspended owing to Saddam Hussein's domestic brutality, 
71 Kathryn Jean Lopez, 'Closing In: A Conversation with Lawrence Kaplan and Bill Kristol on Iraq'. 
National Review Online, (24 Feb., 2003). 
http://www.nationalreview.com/interrogatory/interrogatory022403.asp, accessed 6 May 2008.
72 Ibid; For further discussion on humanitarian intervention in Iraq by the same authors, see William 
Kristol, Lawrence Kaplan, The War Over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission. San 
Francisco, Encounter Books, 2003.
73 Robert Kagan, William Kristol, 'The Right War for the Right Reasons'. Weekly Standard, (27 Feb., 
2004).
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
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and  that  armed  intervention  was  a  just  way  to  end  suffering  in  the  state,  have 
resonance in the some of the rationales of humanitarian intervention contained in the 
“responsibility to protect.”76 While this doctrine proposes a range of precautionary 
principles and a detailed set of criteria that must be satisfied before intervention can 
proceed, some liberal scholars such as Fernando Tesón, Eric Heinze and to some 
extent, Michael Ignatieff, have concluded that war in Iraq qualifies as a humanitarian 
intervention. To these scholars, it is clear that the humanitarian rationale for regime 
change was a strong one, and that such action did indeed satisfy all of the major 
criteria  for  intervention  expressed  in  the  “responsibility  to  protect.”77 Further, 
neoconservative arguments for humanitarian intervention echo the claim of leading 
liberal scholars, Lee Feinstein and Anne Marie Slaughter, that there is a “duty to 
prevent nations run by rulers without internal checks on their power from acquiring 
or  using  WMD.”78 Feinstein  and  Slaughter  adapt  the  notion  of  sovereignty  as 
responsibility to argue that dictatorial states that gain weapons of mass destruction 
forfeit  their  sovereign  rights  and  therefore  become  legitimate  targets  for 
intervention.79 In these ways, democratic globalist advocacy for intervention can be 
76 'The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty'. Ottawa, International Development Research Centre for ICISS, 2001. 
http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp, accessed 10 November 2007. 
77 For a lengthy defence of regime change in Iraq as a form of humanitarian intervention, see 
Fernando R Tesón, 'Ending Tyranny in Iraq'. Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 2, 
(2005), pp. 1-21; See also Eric A. Heinze, 'Humanitarian Intervention and the War in Iraq: Norms, 
Discourse, and State Practice'. Parameters, Vol. 36, No. 1, (Apr., 2006), pp. 20-30; For Ignatieff's 
somewhat more circumscribed views about Iraq and humanitarian intervention, see Michael 
Ignatieff, 'I am Iraq'. The New York Times, (23 Mar., 2003), p. 13; Michael Ignatieff, 'The Year of 
Living Dangerously'. The New York Times, (14 Mar., 2004), p. 13; By 2007 Ignatieff recanted his 
support for humanitarian intervention in Iraq and appears to have belatedly realised the way in 
which the ideas of humanitarian intervention bear some responsibility for enabling regime change. 
See Michael Ignatieff, 'Getting Iraq Wrong'. The New York Times, (5 Aug., 2007), p. 26; For 
critical discussion of the ways in which the neoconservative discourse of humanitarian intervention 
fits with, and indeed was enabled to some extent, by the “just war” arguments put forward by 
liberal advocates of humanitarian intervention and Cosmopolitan Theory, see Helen Dexter, 'The 
'New' War on Terror, Cosmopolitan War and the 'Just War' Revival''. Government and Opposition, 
Vol. 43, No. 1, (2008), pp. 55-78. Despite the arguments made by neoconservatives, many liberals 
who supported humanitarian intervention in the Balkans and elsewhere in the 1990's were appalled 
that Iraq was considered as a humanitarian intervention, and disagreed that the ICISS's intervention 
criteria could be applied to justify the intervention. See S. Neil Macfarlane, Carolin J. Thielking, 
Thomas G. Weiss, 'The Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone Interested in Humanitarian 
Intervention?' Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 5, (2004), pp. 977-992; James Kurth, 
'Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military Realities'. Orbis, Vol. 50, No. 1, 
(Winter 2006), pp. 87-101.
78 Lee Feinstein, Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'A Duty to Prevent'. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1, 
(Jan/Feb 2004), pp. 137-8. 
79 Ibid. This is much the same argument as that made by some neoconservatives before the invasion 
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30
closely associated with many aspects of the arguments for humanitarian intervention 
put forward by some leading liberal scholars, and there is again a clear link between 
liberal internationalism and neoconservative foreign policy thinking.
Liberal International Relations Theories and Armed Democratisation
Liberal  ideas  regularly  underpinned  the  foreign  policy  beliefs  articulated  by  a 
majority of neoconservatives in the years after the collapse of communism, colouring 
a number of key concepts put forward by this group. Yet how was it that liberal 
international relations theories, that were not by nature interventionist in character, 
interpreted  by  neoconservatives  as  a  guide  to  action?  What  elements  of  liberal 
thinking convinced neoconservatives that armed intervention could promote liberal 
democracy  and that  this  action  would  have  a  range  of  beneficial  effects  for  the 
United States and the world? 
One  of  the  primary  reasons  liberal  theories  acquired  such  salience  in 
neoconservative conceptions of armed democratisation was due to an 'activist' turn 
among  some  leading  liberal  international  relations  scholars  during  the  1990's. 
Subsequent  discussion  on  neoconservatism and liberalism takes  up  Tony Smith's 
argument  that  an  'activist'  outlook  developed  in  some  key  quarters  of  liberal 
international  relations  theory  and practice  in  1990's,  and  that  this  was  central  to 
understanding the way in which liberal theories were conceived and articulated by 
neoconservatives  as  a  cornerstone  of  their  armed  democratisation  paradigm. 
Examining what he views as a major shift in liberal international relations thinking 
after the collapse of communism, Tony Smith writes that
To become capable of  seizing the times of the post-Cold War era, 
mainstream liberal internationalism needed to revise its doctrine so as 
to be relevant to a new era. Such an undertaking soon came to mean 
leaving behind the relative  restraints  of  liberal  hegemonism...  what 
was  called  for  was  a  new  action-orientated  ideology  capable  of 
expressing  the  new  self-confidence  of  liberals  everywhere  and  of 
engaging  state  power  on  their  behalf.  In  a  word,  liberalism  as  a 
doctrine had to mature from hegemonism to imperialism in the sense 
Thus pre-emptive war was a justified and sensible strategy for removing this threat, while 
democratisation would apparently ensure the pacification of Iraq and prevent it from ever again 
seeking weapons of mass destruction. 
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that  concrete  ideas were  required to  be put  forward as  to  how the 
world was to be changed.80
Thus in  the  1990's,  some influential  liberal  internationalists  came to  argue  more 
strongly for the promotion of democracy by force of arms.81 This new imperative was 
given  credibility  at  a  theoretical  level  through  the  transformation  of  what  had 
previously been qualified and cautious liberal theories of international relations into a 
reified and “action-orientated” form that seemingly provided empirical validation for 
the use of force as a route to expanding the boundaries of the democratic world.82
During the 1990's, democratic globalists embraced Francis Fukuyama's End 
of History thesis and the democratic peace theory as the guiding liberal theoretical 
frameworks of their foreign policy outlook. Neoconservatives primarily encountered 
these theories in a form distilled by liberal activist scholars where the probabilistic 
caution and academic nuance of such theories had been replaced with simplistic and 
reified  explanations  of  their  conclusions  and  implications  for  action.  From these 
simplified  liberal  theories,  neoconservatives  drew  some  major  implications  for 
American foreign policy: that democracy promotion through the use of American 
power, especially military power, could 'push' history forward, and that spreading 
democracy  was  good  for  the  United  States,  good  for  the  world  and  empirically 
proven to bring about peace and security. 
Neoconservatives did not simply co-opt liberal internationalist thinking about 
intervention and claim it as their own. The 'activist' versions of liberal international 
relations theory were embraced and utilised by neoconservatives in such a way that 
they  played  a  major  role  in  providing  theoretical  and  empirical  depth  to  their 
assumptions  and  arguments  about  armed  democratisation.  Without  liberal 
international relations theory, neoconservative arguments for democratisation could 
not have achieved the level of sophistication they did as the guiding foreign policy 
outlook of the persuasion, as a coherent grand strategy for dealing with the threats 
and challenges of the post-September 11 world, and as the core of the Bush Doctrine 
after 2001.83
80  Simth, pp. 90-1. 
81  Ibid.
82  Ibid.
83  Ibid, pp. 163-7, 190-1, passim. 
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Democratic Globalism and the 'End of History'
The  first  liberal  theoretical  framework  embraced  in  a  simplified  form by  many 
neoconservatives  was  Francis  Fukuyama's  'End  of  History'  thesis.  A  number  of 
democratic  globalists  interpreted  Fukuyama's  teleological  argument  about  liberal 
development as a guide to action, utilising his conclusions about the globalisation of 
liberalism as a theoretical basis on which to conceive of encouraging the spread of 
liberal  democracy  through  intervention.  Further,  Fukuyama  provided  for 
neoconservatives, as for liberal thinkers more generally, a framework for interpreting 
liberal  capitalist  democracy  as the  sole  remaining  legitimate  model  of  political, 
economic and social organisation for all states and societies.
The conclusions of the End of History thesis became a mainstay of liberal 
internationalist  thinking about the spread of liberal democracy.  Fukuyama's  thesis 
provided a compelling framework for liberal thinkers that explained at a theoretical 
level how and why a global liberal order was now more possible than ever before. 
The End of  History thesis  became so  ensconced in  liberal  international  relations 
thinking that it is now indelibly associated with that school of thought. It has been 
regularly  articulated  in  claims  made  by  liberal  scholars  about  the  prospects  for 
globalising liberal democracy in the post-Cold War world. Moreover, as the End of  
History was internalised and articulated by liberal scholars, many of its probabilistic 
elements were marginalised, and its assurances about the globalisation of liberalism 
were  interpreted  in  a  new  light  by  some  as  a  call  to  action  to  encourage  this 
development at a more rapid pace.84 
It is in this context that many neoconservatives engaged with and embraced 
Fukuyama's thesis. While Fukuyama identified himself as a democratic realist at the 
time he wrote the  End of History,  he adopted a considerably more gradualist and 
academic outlook on the emergence of democracy than many neoconservatives who 
subsequently  came  to  embrace  his  theory.  Fukuyama's  thesis  contains  extensive 
Hegelian political theory and ideas drawn from liberal internationalism in its pre-
activist  form.  These  are  theoretical  frameworks  not  generally  associated  with 
neoconservatism in almost any way.85 Further, unlike many neoconservatives in the 
84 Ibid, pp. 44-52, passim.
85 Fukuyama's End of History thesis is not a neoconservative theoretical framework for conceiving of 
the future of liberalism after the Cold War. Rather, it is a more wide-ranging, academic and 
theoretical enquiry into a centuries-long process of liberal development and modernisation towards 
the final state of government and the 'last man.' Fukuyama employs a variety of Hegelian theories 
and other European political philosophy that are not associated with the neoconservative outlook; 
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1990's, Fukuyama has consistently maintained that the 'End of History' thesis is a 
broad enquiry into prospects for the globalisation of liberalism which should have no 
implications for foreign policy actions such as spreading liberal democracy abroad. 
  Fukuyama's 'End of History' thesis was originally published as an article in 
the  National Interest in 1989, at a time when fundamental political changes in the 
Eastern  Bloc  and Soviet  Union offered  the  tantalising prospect  of  the  victory of 
liberal democracy over communism. Fukuyama was at the forefront of the idea that 
liberal  democracy was the victor  in  the  Cold War and the teleological  future  of 
humanity, with his argument that 'History', as conceived in a Hegelian sense, will 
eventually come to an end though the universalisation of a western liberal political 
order.86 In his End of History article, Fukuyama claims that
The century that began full of self-confidence in the ultimate triumph 
of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full 
circle to where it started: not to an “end of ideology” or a convergence 
between  capitalism  and  socialism,  as  earlier  predicted,  but  to  an 
unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism.87
Fukuyama argues that “what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold 
War, or the passage of a particular era in post-war history, but the end of history as 
such: that is, the end of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of 
Western  liberal  democracy  as  the  final  form  of  human  government.”88 While 
Fukuyama admits that “the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm 
of ideas or consciousness,” and is yet incomplete in the real world, he believes that 
there  are  “powerful  reasons  for  believing that  it  is  the  ideal  the will  govern the 
especially not its foreign policy thinking. Fukuyama's theory can, however, be considered liberal in 
two senses. First, it articulates a highly theoretical and cogent explanation for the emergence of 
modern liberal society in optimistic terms based in a favourable view of human progress, 
rationality and the innate tendencies of people towards equality and liberty. Secondly, it quickly 
became one of the key theoretical frameworks utilised by liberal thinkers of many stripes to 
understand the potential for the globalisation of liberalism in the post-Cold War world, moving to 
hold pride of place among liberal theories of progress and modernisation - even though its author 
identified at least his political leanings as being neoconservative when he penned the theory. 
86 For a good overview of this key claim about the End of History, see Francis Fukuyama, The End 
of History and the Last Man. New York, Free Press, 1992, pp. xi-xiii. 
87 Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?' The National Interest, No. 16, (Summer 1989), pp. 161-
2.
88 Ibid, pp. 161-4; See also Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, pp. 45-6, for further 
discussion of the universality of liberalism and how this values system is now the last remaining 
way through which people can organise their lives and governments. Compare Fukuyama's claims 
here with those of the Bush Doctrine in chapter three of this thesis to see the ways in which there 
are clear intellectual connections between Fukuyama's argument in 1992 and one of the most 
fundamental claims of the Bush Doctrine a decade later. 
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material world in the long run.”89 
Fukuyama holds that the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily because 
of the “total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western Liberalism.” In 
light of this, history is now moving towards an 'end' point where the sole ideology 
and form of the state guiding human affairs will be liberal in character.90 Fukuyama 
contends that  “the state that emerges at  the end of history is  liberal  insofar as it 
recognises and protects through a system of law man's universal right to freedom and 
democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed.”91 According to 
Fukuyama, not only do the fundamental changes then occurring in the Soviet Union 
and  to  a  lesser  degree,  in  China,  show  the  ideological  bankruptcy  of  Marxist-
Leninism as a viable alternative to the ideas of a liberal state,92 but the global spread 
of  Western  consumer  goods,  popular  culture,  ideas  and  consciousness  is  ever-
increasing, leading Fukuyama to conclude that the future belongs to a universalised 
form of 'western' political and economic liberalism.93 
Fukuyama views the universalisation of liberal consciousness and the liberal 
state  as  a gradual  organic  process  that  will  be  spurred  by  desires  for  economic 
modernisation and to live in societies more akin to those of the existing liberal world. 
The  liberal  state  at  the  end  of  history  will  come about  through a  modernisation 
process where, according to Fukuyama, “what is universal is initially not the desire 
for  liberal  democracy  but  rather  the  desire  to  live  in  a  modern  society,  with  its 
technology, high standards of living, healthcare and access to the wider world.”94 
Fukuyama  believes  that  the  desire  for  and  then  the  progress  of  economic 
modernisation helps to bring about a middle class and fosters the drive for new goods 
and ideas, and “liberal democracy is one of the by-products of this modernisation 
process,  something  that  becomes  a  universal  aspiration  only  in  the  course  of 
historical  time.”95 While  there  is  reason  to  question  this  link  between  economic 
modernisation and the emergence of  liberal  democracy,  especially  in  light  of  the 
examples of states like China and Singapore that have seemingly achieved the former 
89 Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', p. 162. 
90 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, pp. 42-3. 
91 Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', p. 163. 
92 For good discussion, see Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, pp. 39-40. 
93 Ibid, pp. 48-50; Fukuyama, 'The End of History?' p. 162; See also Francis Fukuyama, 'Reflections 
on the End of History: Five Years Later'. History and Theory, Vol. 34, No. 2, Theme Issue 34: 
World Historians and Their Critics, (May., 1995), p. 29.
94 Fukuyama, After the Neocons, p. 54; For further discussion, see Fukuyama, 'Reflections on the 
End of History', pp. 32-3.
95 Fukuyama, After the Neocons, p. 54.
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without the latter, Fukuyama maintains that this is not necessarily problematic to the 
achievement of the end of history, as “at the end of history it is not necessary that all 
societies become successful liberal societies, merely that they end their ideological 
pretensions  of  representing  different  and  higher  forms  of  human  society.”96 
Fukuyama  believes  that  over  time,  all  societies  will  come  to  hold  a  liberal 
consciousness  and  ultimately  develop  into  a  “universal  and  homogeneous  state” 
through an organic process of change.97
According to Fukuyama, the gradual universalisation of liberalism will mean 
that over time, most of the states of the world will become 'post-historic.'98 Fukuyama 
cautions that the growth of this 'post-historic' world will likely be rocky in the short 
to medium-term, as conflict will continue to occur between 'post-historic' states and 
the  remaining  'historic'  states  until  the  former  has  overcome  all  of  the  latter.99 
Fukuyama warns that the route to the end of history will not be a smooth one, nor 
one that is necessarily linear or easily achievable in a short period. While the end of 
history will bring about the end of the majority of the contradictions in political life 
that  other  ideologies  have  been  unable  to  resolve,  Fukuyama  maintains  that  the 
expansion of the post historic world should not involve the use of force to fast-track 
its development.100 
Despite  Fukuyama's  reservations,  the  'End  of  History'  thesis  provided 
democratic globalists with a theoretical framework that bolstered their arguments for 
interventionist policies of democratisation. The activist interpretation of the theory 
embraced and articulated by many neoconservatives  encouraged the idea that  the 
globalisation of a liberal order could indeed occur through the agency of American 
military power.101 Examining the way in which Fukuyama's claims were reinterpreted 
as a guide to action by democratic globalists during the 1990's, Barry Gewen, an 
editor at the New York Times Book Review, writes in a 2007 article that
96 Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', pp. 177-8.
97 Ibid; For extended discussion of the “universal and homogeneous state” that Fukuyama believes 
will emerge at the end of history, see Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, chapter 19. 
98 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, pp. 276-7. 
99 Ibid, pp. 259-60, 261-2, 276-7, 280-1. For discussion of the problematic implications of this 
observation as a motivation for intervention, see chapter four of this thesis. 
100 Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', pp. 168-9, 178 and passim; See also Fukuyama, 'Reflections on 
the End of History', p. 29 for further discussion of the potential for liberalism to resolve the 
majority of the contradictions of human life that non-liberal systems had been unable to address 
and satisfy. For Fukuyama's warnings about attempting to promote the end of history through 
intervention, see Fukuyama, After the Neocons, pp. 54-5.
101 For good discussion of this key innovation on the End of History teleology by neoconservatives, 
see Gewen, p. 10. 
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There was one misinterpretation of his book for whom Fukuyama had 
no one to blame but himself. Those not steeped in German philosophy 
as  he  was,  those  of  more  activist  bent,  were  unlikely  to  share  his 
timeless  perspective.  They  wanted  immediate  answers  to 
contemporary  problems,  and  Fukuyama's  book  seemed  to  provide 
them. Didn't he say that liberal democracy was expanding everywhere 
around  the  world?  Didn't  he  say  that  the  principles  of  liberty  and 
equality were intrinsic to the very nature of man? Didn't he say that 
liberal democracies rarely if ever went to war against one another, and 
that  democracies  had  an  interest  in  spreading  their  values  to  less-
enlightened regions? It was not an unreasonable reading of the book to 
conclude that the road to history's end ran through Baghdad.102
Interpreting the End of History under a light in which its probabilistic caution 
was  extricated  and its  supposed  implications  for  an  activist  foreign  policy  made 
clearer  by  activist  liberal  scholars,  democratic  globalists  developed  a  simplified 
interpretation  of  the  End  of  History  thesis  that  became  a  guiding  theoretical 
framework for their conceptions of armed democratisation. In the activist reading of 
the  theory,  the  gradualist  process  of  modernisation  and  the  'soft'  determinism 
described by Fukuyama were viewed as out of step with the sense in the post-Cold 
War  world  that  liberal  democracy  could  emerge  anywhere,  and  crucially,  that 
American  power  could  make  this  occur  at  a  faster  rate,  thus  bringing  about  the 
globalisation of democracy and the 'end of history' in the near term. There was a 
strong  sense  of  urgency  and  impatience  underpinning  the  democratic  globalist 
interpretation of the End of History; a belief that Fukuyama correctly identified the 
direction  of  history's  arrow,  but  that  the  post-Cold  War  era  presented  an 
unprecedented opportunity for securing a peaceful post-historic world that must be 
quickly seized by the United States. Accordingly, many neoconservatives believed 
that the developments required to make the end of history a reality could and must be 
fast-tracked by American agency. This idea played a key part in the Bush Doctrine's 
liberal interventionist outlook, as examined in chapter three of this thesis, and, as 
chapter four details, the policies it engendered were problematic in nature. 
102 Ibid, p. 12. 
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Neoconservatism and Democratic Peace Theory
Along with an activist interpretation of the End of History thesis, the neoconservative 
foreign policy paradigm of democracy promotion was also strongly influenced by a 
simplified form of democratic peace theory.103 This theory was reconceived during 
the 1990's by activist circles of liberal scholars as implying a strong need for policies 
of democracy promotion to make its conclusions about the roots of peace a reality. 
The version of democratic peace embraced and articulated by democratic globalists 
was accordingly a simplified version of the theory in which democracy by definition 
equalled peace,  and where it  was imperative that  leading liberal  states engage in 
activist democracy promotion to bring about peace. 
 Democratic  peace  theory  holds  that  a  clear  connection  exists  between 
democratic regimes and the absence of war among them. According to democratic 
peace theory, democratic states rarely, if ever, go to war with one another, owing to 
the domestic nature and structure of democratic government, the norms and values 
shared by democracies, and the tendency of such regimes towards compromise and 
negotiation when faced with a crisis.104 Such are the conclusions of democratic peace 
theory that University of Minnesota political science professor Jack Levy famously 
describes it as being “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in international 
relations.”105
In  its  early  forms,  democratic  peace  theory  offered  few  implications  for 
interventionist foreign policies, and was rather chiefly concerned with explaining in a 
theoretical sense the preponderance of peace among democracies. One of the first 
modern arguments about democratic peace was offered in 1983 by Michael Doyle, 
then a professor of politics at Princeton University, in two articles entitled 'Kant, 
Liberal  Legacies,  and Foreign Affairs.'106 In his  first  article on democratic peace, 
Doyle writes that  “even though liberal  states have become involved in numerous 
103 For discussion of the centrality of democratic peace theory in neoconservative arguments for 
interventionist democracy promotion, see John M. Owen IV, 'Iraq and Democratic Peace'. Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 6, (Nov/Dec 2005), pp. 122-5.
104 For discussion of the basic propositions of the democratic peace theory see Piki Ish Shalom, '”The 
Civilisation of Clashes:” Misapplying the Democratic Peace in the Middle East'. Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 122, No. 4, (Winter 2007/8), pp. 543-4.
105 Jack Levy, 'Domestic Politics and War'. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, The 
Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, (Spring 1988), p. 662.
106 Michael W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
Vol. 12, No. 3, (Summer 1983), pp. 206-235; Michael W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and 
Foreign Affairs, Part Two'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 4, (Autumn 1983), pp. 
323-353.  
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wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in 
war with one another.”107 This claim is based on the fact that “preliminary evidence... 
appear[s]  to  indicate  that  there  exists  a  significant  predisposition  against  warfare 
between liberal states,” as history shows that there are very few instances of two or 
more secure democratic states going to war.108 What can explain this fact that liberal 
democracies have almost never gone to war with each other? Doyle believes that 
Immanuel Kant offers useful answers in his work, 'Perpetual Peace.'109 Kant wrote 
that republican governments would establish among themselves a “perpetual peace” 
that would be based on shared norms and acceptance of the “definitive articles” of 
what  Doyle  describes  as  a  “metaphorical  treaty”  of  peace  between  democratic 
states.110 While Kant believed that this process of forging a perpetual peace would be 
slow and face significant challenges, he argued that over time a “pacific union” of 
states would develop.
Doyle's explanation of democratic peace is circumscribed in its claims and 
conclusions.  Doyle  emphasises  that  his  evidence  shows  that  states  in  a  “pacific 
union” can still act aggressively against regimes outside this sphere.111 Doyle worries 
that in its relations with the non-democratic world, liberal states might be prone to 
“ideological  crusades”  and  risk  undertaking  imprudent  actions,  particularly  in 
attempts to expand the reach of democratic peace by force.112 Doyle holds that “the 
very constitutional restraint, shared commercial interests, and international respect 
for  individual  rights  that  promote  peace  among  liberal  states  exacerbate  conflict 
between liberal and non-liberal societies.”113 Indeed, “liberal states are as aggressive 
and war prone as any other form of government or society in their relations with 
nonliberal states.”114
Doyle's enquiry into the nature and causes of democratic peace helped to spur 
the development of modern democratic peace theory in liberal academia. As debate 
107 Dole, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', pp. 213-14.
108 Ibid; For critical discussion of Doyle's findings, see Smith, pp. 96-100.  
109 Immanuel Kant, 'Perpetual Peace' in Stephen E. Cahn, Classics of Modern Political Theory: From 
Machiavelli to Mill. New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 572-597.
110 Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', pp. 225-6. 
111 Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part Two', pp. 330-1; For further discussion 
on liberalism and democratic peace, see John M. Owen IV, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic 
Peace'. International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2, (Autumn 1994), pp. 87-125. 
112 Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part Two', pp. 330-1.
113 Ibid, pp. 324-5. 
114 Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', p. 225. For further discussion of this 
important observation in the context of the Bush Doctrine's understanding of democratic peace, see 
chapter four of this thesis. 
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over democratic  peace theory progressed,  two versions of  the overarching theory 
developed.115 According  to  one version  of  democratic  peace,  domestic  structures, 
checks and balances within liberal democratic states best explain why such regimes 
do not go to war with each other. The second version of democratic peace theory, by 
contrast,  holds  that  normative  factors  are  most  important.  This  normative  theory 
posits that accepted norms of international state conduct and shared values help to 
reinforce peaceful tendencies between democracies.116 Further, as democratic peace 
theory  developed,  it  has  also  become  more  'scientific'  and  rigorous  in  its 
methodology of study. The early studies of Yale University professor, Bruce Russett, 
exemplify this development, as he marshals large sets of statistical information on 
historical inter-state conflicts that aim to provide concrete empirical data about the 
near-absence of war among democracies.117 \Thus,  increasingly  complex empirical 
frameworks have been devised to  assess the causes  of  democratic  peace and the 
relative merit of the structural or normative explanations for this phenomenon.
Despite its initially precautionary and scholarly nature, the intellectuals that 
make  up  the  'activist'  elements  of  liberal  internationalist  thinking  interpreted 
democratic  peace  as  an  article  of  faith  that  has  clear  implications  for  an 
interventionist  foreign policy.  Among activist  circles of liberal internationalism, a 
view developed that the 'scientific'  analysis of the connection between democracy 
and peace conclusively proved that democracies do not go to war.118 Thus, leading 
democratisation scholar, Larry Diamond, of Stanford University, writes in a 1994 
article that “democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new order of 
international security and prosperity can be built.”119 Diamond holds that “democratic 
countries do not go to war with one another,” and rather they foster peace and uphold 
a more enlightened order than any other conceivable regime type.120 Such sentiments 
are echoed in a number of studies published during the later 1990's and in the early 
twenty-first  century  by  Bruce  Russett,  John  Oneil,  Andrew Moravcsik, Spencer 
115 For brief discussion of this theoretical division, see Shalom, p. 544. 
116 Ibid.
117 Bruce Russett et al, 'The Democratic Peace'. International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4, (Spring 1995), 
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118 For critical analysis of this notion, see Piki Ish Shalom, 'Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism: 
The Democratic-Peace Thesis and the Politics of Democratization'. European Journal of  
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Weart and a number of other influential liberal scholars.121 
The  activist  proponents  of  democratic  peace  argue  that  since  democracy 
always fosters peace, it is imperative that democracy be spread worldwide. Margaret 
G. Hermann, professor of politics at Syracuse University and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 
of  the  University  of  South  Carolina,  write  that  “promoting  the  spread  of  liberal 
democratic  institutions  [is]  consistent  with  the  underlying  logic  of  democratic 
peace.”122 By spreading democratic values,  the existing liberal  world makes itself 
more secure and ensures that an increasing number of states inhabit a 'zone of peace.' 
Hermann and Kegley observe that “interventions by democracies intended to protect 
or promote democracy have tended to lead to an increase in the democraticness [sic] 
of  those  target's  political  regimes.”123 These  findings  “provide  support  for 
intervention as a tool of democratisation” and the promotion of peace, as increasing 
the number of democracies in the world is directly correlated to reducing instances of 
inter-state conflict.124 Thus, activist scholars hold that existing liberal support for the 
globalisation  of  democracy  must  be  wed  with  a  willingness  to  use  state  power, 
including military force, to make democratic peace a reality.
The  version  of  democratic  peace  embraced  and  articulated  by 
neoconservatives during the 1990's was directly derived from the “action-orientated” 
interpretation of the theory promoted by activist liberals.125 Leading neoconservatives 
asserted that democracy always resulted in peace. In an article published in 2001, 
Natan Sharansky argued that “only when the world is free will the world be safe,” 
and  it  was  therefore  an  imperative  to  encourage  the  spread  of  democratic 
governments, as this was empirically proven to be instrumental in bringing about 
peace between nations.126 Sharansky contended that “the logic of why democracies 
do not go to war with each other is ironclad. When political power is a function of 
popular will, the incentive system works towards maintaining peace and providing 
prosperity.”127 These  views  were  influential,  as  Sharansky's  argument  evidently 
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coloured President George W. Bush's views on democracy and peace; so much so 
that the President had Sharansky's 2004 book, The Case for Democracy, distributed 
among  his  top  officials  as  recommended  reading.128 Like  Sharansky,  other 
neoconservatives  likewise  asserted  that  democratic  peace  really  was  a  law  of 
international  relations.  In  a  1991 book,  Joshua  Muravchik argued that  “the more 
democratic  the  world  becomes,  the  more  peaceful  it  is  likely  to  be.  Various 
researchers have shown war between democracies has almost never occurred in the 
modern world.”129 
Democratic globalists held that the application of American military power 
was key to encouraging the spread of democratic peace. Examining neoconservative 
support for the use of violence to achieve peace, Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
political science lecturer Piki Ish Shalom writes that “the democratic peace theory as 
a  political  conviction  motivates  and  provides  reasoning  for  the  use  of  force.”130 
Shalom contends that
The theory in its neoconservative reading offered specific guidelines 
of enhancing the security of the United States; it manifested itself as a 
dogmatic  and  rigid  strategic  scheme,  advocating  the  maxim  of 
forcefully democratizing the Middle East. Put differently, what in the 
academic setting is taken modestly as a nuanced and contested theory 
that  ought  to  be  treated  cautiously  has  become  a  totalistic  and 
dogmatic  political  representation  that  acts  as  an  undisputed  and 
authoritative policy handbook.131
Shalom  notes  that  by  the  logic  of  the  democratic  globalist  interpretation  of 
democratic peace theory, bringing about peace “requires regime change, after which 
the  democratic  structure  can  be  built  according  to  universal  guidelines. 
Consequently, a foreign country can be democratized at bayonet point.”132 Promoting 
peace required war in some instances, and neoconservatives saw no tension between 
their  overarching  aim  of  peace,  and  a  violent  path  to  its  achievement.  As  a 
justification for the use of force abroad, democratic peace theory added significant 
theoretical depth to neoconservative arguments for American military intervention in 
128 For discussion about President Bush's appreciation of Sharansky's work, see William Kristol, 
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the pursuit of democracy, doing much to help engender a democratisation framework 
premised in large part on the conclusions and implications of liberal international 
relations theory.
Conclusion
A  combination  of  theory  and  historical  experience  decisively  influenced  the 
formulation  of  the  neoconservative  foreign  policy  paradigm  of  democratisation. 
Neither  liberal  international  relations  theory nor  the  experience  of  the  Cold War 
alone can fully account for the nature of neoconservative thinking about democracy 
promotion. Only together do the various streams of theory and experience form the 
coherent neoconservative outlook on democratisation as a pillar of American foreign 
policy. Neoconservative thinking on totalitarianism, the importance of regime type 
and  rollback  was  apparently  vindicated  by  events,  and  in  the  subsequent  heady 
optimism of the early post-Cold War era, an activist interpretation of Fukuyama's 
“End of History” thesis provided the framework for conceiving of the teleological 
future of the liberal world, while democratic peace theory offered an empirical basis 
for conceiving of activist democracy promotion as the best path to peace. 
The influence of liberal international relations theory and the experiences of 
the Cold War were evident  in  the prescriptions neoconservatives  put  forward for 
American foreign policy. The ideas of totalitarian theory, democratic peace theory, 
the End of History, and the broader neoconservative assumptions made about the 
nature  of  international  relations  were  not  simply  academic  abstracts;  they  were 
guides to policy making and action. Neoconservatives have been adept at turning the 
conclusions  of  academic  theories  into  pole  stars  for  American  foreign  policies 
towards  specific  states  and  issues.  This  shows  that  when  neoconservatives,  and 
subsequently  the  Bush  administration,  articulated  policies  of  interventionist 
democracy promotion in the Middle East, these stances were not made out of whole 
cloth, but were rather a reflection of a serious foreign policy outlook with deep roots 
in  liberal  international  relations  theory  and  the  historical  experiences  of 
neoconservatives during and immediately after the Cold War. 
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Chapter Two
Rollback, Regime Change and Democratisation in the 
Middle East
During the 1990's neoconservatives were denied influence over the reins of American 
foreign policy. In this decade, foreign policy was first dominated by the realists of 
the George H.W. Bush administration, and then by the liberal internationalists of the 
Clinton administration from 1993 to 2000. Despite being in large part consigned to 
political exile, it was during the 1990's that neoconservatives developed and honed a 
range  of  arguments  that  called  for  policies  of  regime  change  and  activist 
democratisation by the United States in the Arab world. On the basis of their broader 
paradigm of activist democratisation, neoconservative writers, think tanks, and study 
groups  spent  the  1990's  producing  a  number  of  policy  prescriptions  and 
recommendations for a foreign policy of armed democracy promotion in the Middle 
East.  Neoconservatives most often focused their  attention on the need for regime 
change  in  Iraq  as  integral  to  bringing  about  regional  political  transformation 
beneficial to the Arab Middle East and the United States. 
By the time George W. Bush assumed office in 2001, neoconservatives had 
produced  a  sophisticated  set  of  prescriptions  for  policies  of  interventionist 
democratisation in the Middle East. A number of neoconservatives held positions of 
influence in the Bush administration when the September 11 attacks occurred. The 
neoconservative explanation for the origins of these attacks, and their proposed anti-
terrorism grand strategy of forcibly transforming the political malaise of the Arab 
world through interventionist democratisation, were in the months after September 
2001  largely  embraced  by  senior  policy  makers  as  the  most  compelling  way  of 
dealing  with  the  new  threats  and  opportunities  facing  the  United  States. 
Neoconservatives  could  offer  the  clearest  and  most  coherent  pre-existing  policy 
framework for  an  anti-terrorism strategy that  would protect  the  United States  by 
bringing about major political changes in the Middle East.
44
A number of long-time advocates of regime change and democratisation in 
Iraq  and  the  wider  Middle  East  gained  influential  positions  in  the  Bush 
administration when it came to power in 2001. Important neoconservative figures in 
the  Bush  administration  included;  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defence  Paul  Wolfowitz, 
Defence Policy Board Chair Richard Perle,  Undersecretary of Defence for Policy 
Douglas Feith, Ambassador to Afghanistan, Free Iraqis,  Iraq and later the United 
Nations, Zalmay Khalilzad, Vice Presidential Middle East advisor David Wurmser, 
Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff, National Security Advisor, and Assistant to 
the  President,  I.  Lewis  Libby,  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Global  Affairs  and 
Democracy Paula Dobriansky, and Deputy National Security Advisor from 2007-8, 
Elliot Abrams. Joining these figures were Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary 
of  Defence  Donald  Rumsfeld,  who  shared  much  of  the  outlook  of  the 
neoconservatives but who were not identified as belonging to the group in 2001.
Examining the nature and evolution of the most significant neoconservative 
arguments made about armed intervention in the Middle East is key to understanding 
the  intellectual  origins  of  the  Bush  Doctrine's  policies  of  regime  change  and 
democratisation in the Arab world. The neoconservative paradigm of democratisation 
offered a cogent framework for conceiving of and justifying armed democratisation 
on a theoretical level. This paradigm was, however, of limited use to policy makers if 
not  distilled  by  its  proponents  into  tangible  policy  prescriptions  and  specific 
guidelines for action in reality. It is therefore integral to examine the most important 
arguments  made  by  neoconservatives  for  regime  change  and  activist  democracy 
promotion in  the Middle East  up to 2003,  as these represented the essential  link 
between the broad contours of neoconservative foreign policy thinking, examined in 
chapter one, and the specific claims about Middle East democratisation that were 
articulated by the Bush Doctrine and which are critically assessed later in this thesis. 
The Development of Neoconservative Policy Advocacy in the 1990's
In  the second half  of  the 1990's  a  number  of  neoconservative think tanks,  study 
groups  and  publications  began  to  formulate  a  variety  of  policy  prescriptions  for 
interventionist democracy promotion in the Middle East. Drawing from their broader 
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paradigm of democratisation, many neoconservatives conceived of policies of regime 
change in Iraq and the 'rollback' of hostile political forces in Lebanon and Syria as 
the heart of a strategy to enhance freedom, peace, security and American interests in 
the  Middle  East.  The  development  of  policy  prescriptions  aimed  at  the 
transformation of the Arab world was given additional impetus by neoconservative 
frustration at what they perceived as the failure and indecisiveness of the Clinton 
administration's policies towards Iraq, the Israel-Palestine conflict and the growth of 
Jihadist terrorism. Such frustration further encouraged neoconservatives to develop 
new strategies aimed at redefining the political realities of the Middle East through 
the application of American military power. 
The Clean Break Report
One  of  the  earliest  systematic  neoconservative  arguments  for  the  political 
transformation of the Middle East was the 1996 report entitled 'A Clean Break: A 
New Strategy for Securing the Realm.' The recommendations and conclusions of the 
Clean Break report served as the first template in which neoconservatives developed 
their specific policy prescriptions about regime change and interventionist democracy 
promotion in the Middle East. The Clean Break report was produced for the Israeli 
government of Benjamin Netanyahu by a study group at The Institute for Advanced 
Strategic  and  Political  Studies.  The  report  included important  contributions  from 
Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, David Wurmser and Meyrav Wurmser, among others.1 
While the report centred on finding ways to circumvent the constraints imposed upon 
Israel's freedom of action against its perceived enemies by the Oslo Accords and the 
Clinton administration's 'peace process,' one of its key conclusions was that hostile 
authoritarian Arab regimes must be rolled back by military intervention in order to 
bring about a democratic and peaceful Middle East.2
The  Clean  Break  report  argued  that  the  United  States  and  Israel  should 
engage in the rollback of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.3 This idea of rollback was 
1 Richard Perle et al, 'A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm'. The Institute for 
Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 1996, p. 7. http://www.iasps.org/strat1.htm, accessed 15 
March 2007.
2 Ibid, p. 1; For good discussion of the Clean Break report and its main authors, see Packer, pp. 30-
2. 
3 Perle et al, p. 1; For detailed critical discussion of the Clean Break report, see James Bamford, A 
Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies. New York, 
Doubleday, 2004, pp. 262-3.
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to  some extent  coloured  by  the  Reagan  Doctrine  and  the  'lessons'  it  offered  for 
overthrowing hostile governments. Yet in relation to Iraq, the version of rollback 
articulated in the Clean Break was premised on using direct military force, rather 
than proxy forces, to bring about favourable political outcomes.4 The Clean Break 
report contended that a new pro-American and pro-Israeli regime in Baghdad would, 
among other things, allow the liberated Shia of Iraq to pressure their co-religionists 
in Lebanon away from Hezbollah and Syria.5 This would relieve Israel of the threat 
of Hezbollah, allowing Israeli leaders space to overcome the constraints of the Oslo 
peace process and to impose a solution on the Palestinians.6 A democratic and pro-
American Iraqi regime would also reject terrorism as a tactic and would no longer be 
a hostile and destabilising force in the heart of the Middle East.
The Clean Break report also placed significant emphasis on rolling back the 
Ba'athist regime in Syria and changing the political order in Lebanon. The authors of 
the report held that Israel should begin “engaging Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran, as the 
principal agents of aggression in Lebanon.”7 According to the report, Israel should 
again utilise proxies to intervene in Lebanon, as it had in the 1980's, but with a new 
aim of using such forces to work towards regime change in Damascus.8 In addition, 
the Clean Break report recommended that Israel attack “Syrian military targets in 
Lebanon,  and  should  that  prove  insufficient,  [strike]  at  select  targets  in  Syria 
proper.”9 The United States should support Israel in this endeavour as a part of a 
broader strategy aimed at rolling back hostile Arab states and securing freedom and 
peace in the region.10 As with Iraq, the Clean Break report argued that the Ba'athist 
regime of Syria should be replaced with a pro-American and pro-Israeli democratic 
regime, thereby helping to undermine the forces that engaged in violence against 
Israel and the United States in the region.11 
Among  those  who  contributed  to  the  Clean  Break  report,  Richard  Perle, 
Douglas  Feith  and  David  Wurmser  each  gained  influential  policy  making  and 
advisory  positions  in  the  Bush  administration.  When  in  these  positions,  these 
4 For discussion of the neoconservatives who did advocate rollback by proxy as the best strategy of 
regime change in Iraq, see the section on proxy war and the Iraqi National Congress later in this 
chapter. 
5 Perle et al., pp. 2-3.
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. 
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individuals employed many of the ideas of the Clean Break in their calls for armed 
democratisation  as  the  key  to  winning  the  war  on  terrorism.12 Feith  was  the 
Undersecretary of Defence for Policy from 2001 to mid-2005, and was instrumental 
in planning the invasion of Iraq and post-war reconstruction and democratisation of 
the state, while Perle was until 2004 the head of the influential Defence Policy Board 
that advised Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld on foreign policy and defence 
matters.13 David Wurmser, meanwhile,  was Vice President Dick Cheney's Middle 
East  policy  advisor,  holding  this  post  until  mid-2007,  and  acting  in  this  role  to 
reinforce the hardline attitudes of those around him towards Iraq, the Israel-Palestine 
issue, and Syria.
In an article published in January 2001, shortly before he joined the Bush 
administration, Wurmser advocated policies of rollback across the Middle East that 
clearly drew on the thinking of the Clean Break report.14 Wurmser argued that “Israel 
and the United States should adopt a co-ordinated strategy to regain the initiative and 
reverse their region-wide strategic retreat.”15 This would require engaging in wars of 
rollback “to strike fatally, not merely disarm, the centres of radicalism in the region – 
the  regimes  of  Damascus,  Baghdad,  Tripoli,  Tehran  and  Gaza.”16 According  to 
Wurmser,  conducting  wars  of  rollback  “would  re-establish  the  recognition  that 
fighting with either the United States or Israel is suicidal,” and thus “many in the 
Middle East would then understand the merits of becoming an American ally and of 
making peace with Israel.”17 Wurmser reiterated this argument once a member of the 
Bush administration, contending in a June 2001 article that regime change in Iraq, 
Syria,  Iran  and  elsewhere  in  the  region  was  essential  to  undermining  political 
radicalism  and  ensuring  American  and  Israeli  security.18 Such  views  were  often 
shared by other neoconservative policy makers associated with Wurmser, as well as 
by Vice President Dick Cheney. 
The Clean Break report offered an expansive strategy of regime change that 
was generally not accepted as a viable policy option before the September 11 attacks. 
12 Bamford, pp. 267.
13 Ibid.
14 David Wurmser, 'Middle East “War:” How did it Come to This?' AEI Online, On The Issues, (1 
Jan., 2001). http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.12266,filter.all/pub_detail.asp, accessed 6 June 
2008. 
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 David Wurmser, 'The US Needs to Support Policies of Freedom in Iraq'. Financial Times, (7 Jun., 
2001); For critical discussion, see Packer, pp. 31-2. 
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After  September  2001,  however,  this  report  became  an  important  conceptual 
framework for  activist  democracy promotion in  the  Arab  world.  At  the  time the 
Clean Break report was published in 1996, launching a series of  'pre-emptive' wars 
aimed at 'rolling back' the enemies of the United States and Israel was out of the 
question,  as  it  would  never  be  accepted  by  the  American  public  and  would 
fundamentally undermine the Oslo peace process to which the Clinton administration 
remained strongly committed. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks however, 
the concepts of rollback, pre-emption and regime change gained considerable traction 
within the Bush administration as it devised a grand strategy to strike at the roots of 
terrorism in  the  Arab  Middle  East.  As  discussion  in  chapter  three  of  this  thesis 
shows, the rationales of the Clean Break report served as an important intellectual 
basis  of the Bush Doctrine's  assumptions about  promoting of  democracy through 
intervention in the Arab world. 
The Project for a New American Century
A year after the publication of the Clean Break report, a group of neoconservative 
intellectuals, policy makers and writers established a small but influential think tank 
at the American Enterprise Institute, called the Project for a New American Century 
(PNAC).  The  Clean  Break  report  laid  out  the  first  systematic  neoconservative 
argument for regime change and coercive democratisation in the Middle East. The 
Project for a New American Century advanced a number of interventionist arguments 
similar to those of the Clean Break report, and strongly advocated a foreign policy of 
armed democracy promotion that began with regime change in Iraq. 
The Project for a New American Century was established by William Kristol, 
Robert  Kagan,  Gary  Schmitt  and  Thomas  Donnelly  in  July  1997.  A  significant 
number of neoconservatives that would later gain positions of influence in the Bush 
administration,  such as Paul  Wolfowitz,  I.  Lewis  Libby,  Zalmay Khalilzad,  Eliot 
Abrams, Paula Dobriansky, John Bolton and James Woolsey, were signatories to a 
number  of  its  public  letters  and policy papers.  Other  Republicans  with a  foreign 
policy  outlook  similar  to  neoconservatism,  such  as  Dick  Cheney  and  Donald 
Rumsfeld, also signed a variety of PNAC's public statements on the need for regime 
change in Iraq. It was the Project for a New American Century, more than any other 
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neoconservative organisation, that provided the most influential rationales and policy 
prescriptions  for  regime  change  in  Iraq  and  an  expansive  policy  of  activist 
democratisation  in  the  Arab  world;  transmitting  the  broad  claims  of  the 
neoconservative  paradigm  of  democratisation  into  specific  policy  guidelines  for 
action on the ground. 
The Project for a New American Century's Statement of Principles captured 
the  outlook of  the  think  tank  and framed  its  advocacy of  interventionist  foreign 
policies  in  the  Middle  East.  The  Statement  of  Principles  document  emphasised, 
among  other  things,  the  need  for  an  American  foreign  policy  “that  boldly  and 
purposefully  promotes  American  principles  abroad;  and  national  leadership  that 
accepts  the  United  States'  global  responsibilities.”19 The  Statement  of  Principles 
maintained that the United States needed to “strengthen our ties to democratic allies 
and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values.”20 Further, PNAC argued 
that the United States must assertively “promote the cause of political and economic 
freedom abroad” through a “neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military strength and 
moral  clarity”  that  would  “accept  responsibility  for  America's  unique  role  in 
preserving  and  extending  an  international  order  friendly  to  our  security,  our 
prosperity, and our principles.”21 Prior to establishing PNAC, William Kristol and 
Robert Kagan had already emphasised the importance of a “neo-Reaganite” foreign 
policy in a 1996 article that was, among other things, sharply critical of the Clinton 
administration's reactive and ad hoc foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East.22 
The “neo-Reaganite” foreign policy platform outlined by Kristol and Kagan became 
the guiding framework for the Project for a New American Century's thinking as 
articulated  in  its  Statement  of  Principles,  as  it  did  for  much  of  the  democratic 
globalist outlook more generally.  
PNAC applied a number of aspects of its Statement of Principles to its key 
argument that the United States must overthrow Saddam Hussein and democratise 
19 Project for a New American Century, 'Statement of Principles'. Project for a New American 
Century, 3 July 1997. http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm, accessed 20 
March 2008. As of late 2008, the PNAC website is no longer a registered domain and the think 
tank has ceased all publication. It is still possible to access PNAC documents through internet 
search engines however, and the documents cited here remain available on several other websites.  
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Kristol and Kagan, 'Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy', passim. Kristol and Kagan expressed 
frustration as the Clinton administration's apparent inability to take decisive action against Saddam 
Hussein and its general unwillingness to challenge the status quo of the Middle East through 
American intervention to promote friendly democratic regimes. 
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Iraq. In January 1998, the project sent a letter to President Clinton calling for the 
adoption of policies of regime change.23 The letter argued that “current American 
policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and... we may soon face a threat in the Middle 
East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War.”24 PNAC's 
letter  stated  that  the  only  lasting  solution  to  the  threat  Iraq  posed  was  armed 
intervention  and  the  promotion  of  democracy.  The  Project  for  a  New American 
Century contended that conducting regime change in Iraq needed to “become the aim 
of American foreign policy,” and held that replacing the Ba'athist dictatorship with a 
pro-American  democratic  regime would ensure  that  Iraq no longer  threatened its 
neighbours or the values and interests of the United States.25 
Leading members of PNAC frequently  reiterated this  argument  during the 
second term of the Clinton administration. One prominent example of this  was a 
January 1998 article in the  New York Times by William Kristol and Robert Kagan 
which argued starkly that “Saddam Hussein must go.”26 Kristol and Kagan wrote that 
the  only  way  to  overthrow  Saddam Hussein  was  through  “using  air  power  and 
ground forces, and finishing the task left undone in 1991.”27 This goal was easily 
within  the  United  States'  capabilities,  and  combating  tyrants  was,  moreover,  a 
responsibility  that  came  with  global  hegemony.28 Kristol  and  Kagan warned that 
“unless we act, Saddam Hussein will prevail, the Middle East will be destabilized, 
other aggressors around the world will follow his example, and American soldiers 
will  have  to  pay  a  far  heavier  price  when  the  international  peace  sustained  by 
American leadership begins to collapse.”29 It  was thus imperative that  the United 
States act immediately to bring down Saddam Hussein's regime and replace it with a 
democracy.30 Similar arguments were also made by other project members such as 
Ruel Marc Gerecht,31 and through their advocacy, PNAC helped to play a role in 
pressuring the Clinton administration to adopt the Iraq Liberation Act, which made 
23 Project for a New American Century, 'Letter to President Clinton on Iraq'. Project for a New 
American Century, 26 January 1998. http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm, 
accessed 4 April 2008; For critical discussion of the project's letter, see Bamford, pp. 286-9.
24 Project for a New American Century, 'Letter to President Clinton on Iraq'.
25 Ibid. Compare this logic to the way in which the Bush administration articulated the benefits of 
regime change in Iraq, as detailed in chapter three of this thesis.
26 William Kristol, Robert Kagan, 'Bombing Iraq isn't Enough'. The New York Times, (30 Jan., 1998), 
p. 17. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Reuel Marc Gerecht, 'Liberate Iraq'. The Weekly Standard, (14 May., 2001).
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regime change in Iraq an official goal of American foreign policy.32
An underlying assumption made in the Project for a New American Century's 
advocacy  for  regime  change  and  democratisation  in  Iraq  was  that  the  Iraqi 
government  was  inherently  prone  to  aggression  because  it  was  totalitarian.33 
Reflecting on the nature of the Iraqi regime, Kristol and Kagan contended that “as is 
so  often  the  case  in  international  affairs,  there  was  no  separating  the  nature  of 
Saddam's rule at home from the kinds of policies he conducted abroad. Saddam's 
regime terrorized his own people, but it also posed a threat to the region, and to us.”34 
Kristol and Kagan argued that Saddam Hussein “achieved through brute force total 
dominance at home, and it was through force and the threat of force that he sought 
dominance in his region as well.”35 Saddam Hussein went to war against Iran for 
eight  years,  invaded Kuwait  in  1990 and spent  the 1990's  periodically  launching 
attacks against coalition forces in the no-fly zones, all the while continuing to repress 
the Iraqi people.36 Kristol and Kagan held that because Saddam Hussein was a brutal 
tyrant  within  Iraq,  he  was  inherently  more  predisposed  to  engage  in  wars  of 
aggression  abroad.  This  logic  also  contained  echoes  of  the  activist  variant  of 
democratic peace theory, as PNAC saw that by replacing Saddam Hussein's regime 
with a democracy, peace and security could be more assuredly advanced.37 In this 
way, the broad claims of neoconservative foreign policy thought were applied to a 
specific case and were used as the basis on which recommendations were made for 
policy  and  strategy.  This  advocacy  acted  as  a  bridge  between  the  broader 
neoconservative  paradigm of  democratisation  and the  ideas  about  regime change 
articulated by President Bush and others after September 11 2001. 
Kristol, Kagan and other PNAC members were optimistic that regime change 
and democratisation was the best way to remove Saddam Hussein and fundamentally 
reshape the Middle East. Buoyed by the spectacular spread of democracy in the post-
Cold War world and the unchallengeable military supremacy of the United States, 
32 'H.R.4655: Iraq Liberation Act of 1998'. Bill Summary & Status for the 105th Congress, 31 
October 1998.  http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/Legislation/ILA.htm, accessed 9 June 
2008; For favourable analysis of the Project for a New American Century and the Iraq Liberation 
Act, see Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on 
Terrorism. New York, Harper Collins, 2008, pp. 195-7.
33 For critical discussion of the links made by neoconservatives between totalitarian theory and Iraq's 
aggressive foreign policies, see Fukuyama, After the Neocons, pp. 40-2.
34 Kagan, Kristol, 'The Right War for the Right Reasons'.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
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neoconservatives held that it  was entirely within American power to overthrow a 
decaying totalitarian regime in the heart of the Arab world and thus trigger a much-
delayed democratic revolution in this crucial region.38 This would enhance American 
security, remove a belligerent and destabilising force in the region and allow the Iraqi 
people  to  claim  their  freedom  and  establish  a  democracy,  forever  changing  the 
dynamics of Arab politics for the better. Such conclusions were shared by a range of 
neoconservative intellectuals and policy makers,  and,  as chapter three documents, 
played  an  integral  part  in  providing  an  immediate  intellectual  basis  to  the  Bush 
Doctrine's rationalisation of armed democracy promotion in Iraq. 
Proxy War, Regime Change and the Iraqi National Congress
At approximately the same time that the Project for a New American Century was 
formed, a variation of the argument for regime change as a route to democracy in 
Iraq also developed.  Neoconservative  intellectuals  Richard Perle,  Paul  Wolfowitz 
and Zalmay Khalilzad began arguing in the late 1990's that the best way to liberate 
Iraq  and  establish  a  democratic  regime  was  for  the  United  States  to  help  Iraqi 
opposition groups launch an insurgency against  the Ba'athist dictatorship, liberate 
territory inside Iraq and eventually cause the regime to collapse.39 This would be 
cheaper and less risky than direct intervention, and would allow the Iraqis to free 
themselves and construct  a  democratic  government  with American assistance.  To 
some  extent,  elements  of  this  argument  emerged  as  a  part  of  the  Bush 
administration's pre-war assumptions about the development of democracy in Iraq. 
As chapter five of this thesis shows, the links between neoconservative policy makers 
of the Bush administration and leading Iraqi opposition groups fostered a number of 
optimistic assumptions about the ease at which regime change could be conducted 
and which democracy could be built in Iraq after March 2003. 
The  neoconservative  proponents  of  proxy  war  against  Iraq  argued  that  a 
number of steps should be taken by the United States government to initiate and 
sustain  an  insurgency  to  rollback  the  regime  in  Baghdad.  In  a  statement  to  the 
Committee  on  Armed Services  in  September  2000,  Richard  Perle  articulated  the 
38 For critical analysis of the assumptions behind this thinking, see Fukuyama, After the Neocons, pp. 
52-3. 
39 Richard Perle, 'Iraq Policy'. Statement of Richard Perle, Fellow, American Enterprise Institute, 
Before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, 28 September 2000.
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general contours of a proxy war policy when he contended that 
The United States,  alone if  necessary,  with our friends if  possible, 
should  aggressively  support  the  nascent  opposition  to  Saddam's 
regime. We should organize, finance, equip, train and protect an Iraqi 
opposition  broadly representative  of  all  the  people  of  Iraq.  Such  a 
program would be neither quick nor certain. It would certainly not be 
easy. But it has a better chance, and is a more worthy contender, than 
a new round of inconclusive air strikes or yet another abortive effort to 
organize an anti-Saddam conspiracy among retired Iraqi generals.40 
Perle believed that three steps should to be taken in order to ensure that the Iraqi 
opposition would be effective at  bringing about  regime change.  First,  the United 
States needed to release frozen Iraqi funds to finance the activities and training of the 
opposition forces; secondly, it needed to commit to the Iraq Liberation Act that the 
Clinton  administration  offered  only  lukewarm  support;  and  thirdly  it  needed  to 
support the proxy war activities of the opposition through co-ordinated air strikes 
against Iraq.41 This strategy would bring about regime change and ensure that the 
opposition could establish a democratic government.
In  a  similar  vein to  Perle,  Zalmay Khalilzad also advocated a  strategy of 
proxy war to roll back the Iraqi regime and ensure the development of a democratic 
government. Khalilzad explicitly tied his advocacy of rollback to the example of the 
Reagan Doctrine42 and discussed in some detail what would be required in order to 
ensure success in Iraq.  In a February 1998 Wall  Street Journal  article,  Khalilzad 
wrote that “now is the time to revive the Iraqi opposition, strengthening it as part of a 
comprehensive political and military strategy to end Saddam's tyranny [and] liberate 
the  Iraqi  people.”43 Khalilzad  contended  that  this  policy  was  considerably  more 
prudent and effective than the Clinton administration's ad hoc approach of occasional 
air  strikes  against  Iraq and a  piecemeal  commitment  to  the Iraqi  Liberation Act. 
Linking his argument to the example of the Reagan Doctrine, Khalilzad held that 
The U.S. should back the Iraqi people, just as it backed the Afghan 
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid. 
42 See Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack, Gideon Rose, 'The Rollback Fantasy'. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
78, No. 1, (Jan/Feb 1999), pp. 34-5. In this critical study of neoconservative advocacy for proxy 
war in Iraq, Byman, Pollack and Rose note that Wolfowitz, Perle and Khalilzad had each been 
involved in the Reagan administration and supported its policies of proxy war against third world 
communist regimes; now in the late 1990's, they were attempting to apply the lessons and 
strategies of these covert wars to Iraq. 
43 Zalmay Khalilzad, 'It's Not Too Late to Topple Saddam'. The Wall Street Journal, (25 Feb., 1998), 
A22.
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people against the Soviet occupation of the 1980's. Then, too, many 
critics argued that the Afghans were too divided and the Soviets too 
strong for the strategy to work. They were wrong, just as critics of 
"rollback" are wrong today.44 
In  his  advocacy  of  regime  change,  Khalilzad  appeared  to  have  put  aside  his 
knowledge  of  the  consequences  of  covert  war  in  Afghanistan;45 especially  the 
Islamist  militancy  it  engendered  in  Afghanistan,  and  international  Jihadist 
movements it inadvertently helped to embolden.46 Khalilzad seemingly ignored these 
implications in proposing to launch a proxy war in Iraq, insisting instead that regime 
change on a similar premise would bring about a range of positive results.
The  proponents  of  regime  change  by  proxy  war  spoke  frequently  of  the 
importance of supporting Iraqi opposition groups as the key to their strategy. Yet 
who were these opposition groups? Why did some neoconservatives place such faith 
in these organisations to carry out their aim of regime change? Among the exile Iraqi 
opposition groups, some neoconservatives came to embrace the London-based Iraq 
National Congress and its leader, Ahmed Chalabi, as key to regime change and the 
democratic  future  of  Iraq.47 During  the  1990's,  a  strong  connection  developed 
between Chalabi and some neoconservatives on the issue of Iraq. Both parties aimed 
for  regime  change  and  Chalabi  offered  the  compelling  option  of  using  the  Iraqi 
National Congress to lead the charge. Chalabi had been close to Perle and Wolfowitz 
since the 1980's, and in the 1990's he cultivated links with other neoconservatives 
like James Woolsey and Douglas Feith, as well as non-neoconservative figures such 
as Dick Cheney.48 James Bamford, of the University of California, notes that while 
the CIA and the State Department originally supported Chalabi and the Iraqi National 
Congress,  these  organisations  became  wary  of  what  they  viewed  as  Chalabi's 
44 Ibid. 
45 Khalilzad is himself of Afghani decent and was involved with the policy of supporting the 
Mujuheddin in the 1980's, as with the international diplomacy surrounding the attempts at 
resolving Afghanistan's civil war in the early 1990's. Unlike many neoconservatives, Khalilzad has 
extensive knowledge of recent Afghani history and politics, and is therefore well aware of the 
potential for unsavoury outcomes resulting from proxy war. 
46 For an excellent analysis of the consequences of the Reagan administration's proxy war in 
Afghanistan, see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars. New York, Routeledge, 2004, part II. 
47 Packer, pp. 77-8, passim; For further discussion of Chalabi and the neoconservatives, see Dorrien, 
Imperial Designs, pp. 68-9; Bamford, pp. 291-4. Neoconservatives were practically alone in the 
American foreign policy community in advocating proxy war as the best strategy of democracy 
promotion in Iraq. Mainstream views were closer to those expressed by Byman, Pollack and Rose. 
While some writers external to neoconservatism agreed that some form of military pressure for 
democratic change should be applied to Iraq, almost no one outside of neoconservative circles 
advocated a large-scale proxy war to drive Saddam Hussein from power. 
48 Dorrien, Imperial Designs, pp. 68-9; Bamford, pp. 291-4.
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exaggerated  claims  about  the  benefits  of  regime change and his  popular  support 
inside Iraq, not to mention the issue of corruption in his organisation, and dropped 
their support for him in the mid-1990's.49 Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress 
nonetheless remained key to some neoconservative's conceptions of regime change in 
Iraq. As chapter five documents, Chalabi's claims about the ease at which Iraq could 
be democratised, transmitted through neoconservative policy makers to top officials 
of the Bush administration, coloured a number of pre-war assumptions about regime 
change in Iraq. 
Those in favour of proxy war argued that the United States must support the 
Iraqi National Congress as the most effective strategy for democratising Iraq.50 In a 
chapter  published  in  Kristol  and  Kagan's  2000  volume, Present  Dangers,  Perle 
contended  that  while  the  Clinton  administration  had  failed  to  support  the  Iraqi 
National  Congress,  there  was hope  that  the  administration  chosen after  the 2000 
election would adopt a new course. Perle wrote that “if the next administration is to 
protect America's interests in the Gulf and help bring about the conditions for long-
term stability in the region, it must formulate a comprehensive political and military 
strategy  for  bringing  down  Saddam  and  his  regime.  This  can  only  be  done  by 
supporting the external opposition.”51 Perle believed that the United States should 
help  to  create  “safe  zones”  or  “enclaves”  in  Iraq,  establishing  a  provisional 
government in these areas as a route to undermining Saddam Hussein's rule over 
Iraq.52 The Iraqi National Congress-led provisional government would lift sanctions 
in  the  liberated  enclaves,  would  use  oil  revenue  to  begin  reconstruction,  would 
establish a provisional democratic regime and provide a rallying point from which 
Baghdad could be taken.53 Less than a year after making this argument, Perle became 
the  head  of  the  Pentagon's  Defence  Policy  Board;  an  informal  but  nonetheless 
influential position from which he and like-minded neoconservative advisers could 
influence the creation and implementation of the Bush administration's Middle East 
policies.
A similar argument to Perle's was also put forward by Paul Wolfowitz in the 
49 Bamford, p. 291; For a defence of Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress that places the blame 
for negative reporting about the INC on the CIA and State Department, see Feith, pp. 240-2. 
50 For critical discussion of this strategy, see Byman, Pollack, Rose, p. 29.
51 Richard N. Perle, 'Iraq: Saddam Unbound' in Kagan, Kristol (Eds.), pp. 107-9. 
52 Ibid. 
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years before he joined the Bush administration. Wolfowitz argued in a congressional 
testimony in 1998 that supporting the Iraqi National Congress represented the best 
policy option for the United States.54 Wolfowitz held that the Clinton administration 
could  use  Iraqi  assets  frozen  by  the  United  Nations  sanction  regime  to  aid  the 
opposition,  as  well  as  stepping up its  bombing of  Iraq so as  to  weaken Saddam 
Hussein's armed forces and thereby improve the likelihood of success for the Iraqi 
National Congress.55 Wolfowitz was particularly taken by the democratic credentials 
of  the  Iraqi  National  Congress,  explaining  to  the  congressional  hearing  that  the 
United States
Should...  indicate  our  willingness  to  recognize  a  provisional 
government  of  free  Iraq,  and  the  best  place  to  start  is  with  the 
principles of the Iraqi National Congress, the only organization that 
has  to  date  set  forth  a  set  of  principles  on  which  a  post-Saddam 
representative government could be built.56 
In a Senate hearing later in 1998, Wolfowitz expanded on the importance of the Iraqi 
National  Congress  as  the  core  of  the  future  government  of  Iraq  by  arguing  that 
through the enclave strategy, a provisional government could be established in the 
north and the south of Iraq, over time acquiring sufficient influence and support to 
the point that it could march on Baghdad.57  Thus, regime change would require little 
direct American involvement, and in the tradition of the Reagan Doctrine, it would 
be possible to pressure a dangerous regime out of power through proxy and to bring 
about democracy where there was once only totalitarianism.58
Post-September 11: Regime Change, Democratisation and the War 
on Terrorism
The range of arguments made by neoconservatives in the late 1990's about the need 
54 Paul Wolfowitz, 'Statement of Paul Wolfowitz, Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 
International Studies of the John Hopkins University, for the Senate Armed Services Committee 
Hearing on US Options in the Persian Gulf'. United States Capitol, 28 March 1998; For further 
discussion of the strategy Wolfowitz proposed for regime change in Iraq, see Zalmay M. 
Khalilzad, Paul Wolfowitz, 'Overthrow Him'. The Weekly Standard, Vol. 3, No. 12, (1 Dec., 1997).
55 Wolfowitz, 'Statement of Paul Wolfowitz'.
56 Ibid. 
57 Paul Wolfowitz, 'Statement Before the House National Security Committee'. 18 September 1998.
58 Ibid. 
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for regime change and democratisation in Iraq and the wider Arab world acquired 
considerably  greater  urgency  after  the  September  11  terrorist  attacks.  Many 
prominent neoconservatives redoubled their advocacy of interventionist policies in 
the Middle East following the attacks, arguing that decisive American action was 
necessary to take the fight to Jihadists, and that regime change and democratisation 
in Iraq was integral to the war on terrorism. Intervention in Iraq was again cast as a 
first  step  towards  bringing  about  the  transformation  of  the  political  systems  and 
culture in the Arab world which bred Jihadist  violence against  the United States. 
Many  of  the  policies  advocated  by  neoconservatives  paralleled  and  reinforced 
thinking within the Bush administration, owing to its sense of vulnerability following 
the attacks and to the strong neoconservative presence within the administration.59 
Moreover, many of the interventionist ideas expressed by neoconservatives outside 
of  the  administration  played  important  roles  in  helping  to  influence  the  Bush 
administration's march towards the invasion of Iraq.60
The War on Terrorism and the Project for a New American Century
On 20 September 2001, the Project for a New American Century published a letter 
signed  by  a  number  of  prominent  neoconservatives  that  offered  full  support  to 
President Bush and provided guidelines for the scope of the war on terrorism. The 
signatories to the letter agreed that Al Qaeda in Afghanistan must be the first target 
of  the  war  on  terrorism.  However,  they  nonetheless  strongly  advocated  regime 
change  in  Iraq  as  integral  to  winning  the  new global  struggle.61 Addressing  the 
terrorist attacks of less than two weeks earlier, the project's letter asserted that 
Even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy 
aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a 
determined  effort  to  remove Saddam Hussein  from power  in  Iraq. 
Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps 
decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism.62
59 For detailed discussion of the ways in which the Bush Doctrine's rationalisation of armed 
democracy promotion was decisively shaped by many elements of the neoconservative thinking 
examined here, see chapter three of this thesis.
60 Halper, Clarke, pp. 32-3.
61 Project for a New American Century, 'Letter to President Bush on War on Terrorism'. Project for a 
New American Century, 20 September 2001. http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm, 
accessed 4 April 2008. 
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In what read like an ultimatum to President Bush, the Project for a New American 
Century  effectively  demanded  that  the  Bush  administration  invade  Iraq.  PNAC 
maintained, as it had since 1997, that replacing the regime in Baghdad would bring 
about major political changes in the Arab Middle East and thus strike a blow against 
Jihadist  terrorism.  Project  members  believed  that  in  the  new conflict  the  United 
States entered on September 11 2001, the only path to victory was regime change in 
Iraq to remove a tyrant and to bring about democratic revolution in the Arab world.63 
This was not a break from the arguments put forward by PNAC before September 11, 
but the application of an existing strategy as a framework for justifying intervention 
in Iraq as the crux of the war on terrorism in the Arab world.  
Subsequent  letters  and  statements  from  the  Project  for  a  New  American 
Century further reinforced the idea that regime change and democratisation in Iraq 
was the cornerstone of an effective anti-terrorism grand strategy.  In an April 2002 
letter to President Bush, PNAC again insisted that activist democratisation was the 
best solution to the heightened dangers Iraq posed.64 The project's letter argued that 
“it is now common knowledge that Saddam... is a funder and supporter of terrorism 
against  Israel.  Iraq has harboured terrorists such as Abu Nidal in the past,  and it 
maintains links to the Al Qaeda network.”65 The project's letter again reiterated the 
centrality of regime change in Iraq to victory in the war on terrorism, contending that 
“the surest  path to peace in the Middle East lies not through the appeasement of 
Saddam and other local tyrants, but through a renewed commitment on our part... to 
the birth of freedom and democratic government in the Islamic world.”66 
The idea of fighting the war on terrorism by promoting democracy in Iraq was 
particularly championed by the chair of the Project for a New American Century, 
William Kristol. In Kristol's view, regime change and democratisation in Iraq needed 
to  become  an  explicit  part  of  the  Bush  administration's  foreign  policies,  and 
intervention in Iraq would bring about a range of positive results for the Middle East 
and for  American security.  In  a  February 2002 congressional  hearing on foreign 
63 For further discussion of these aims by two neoconservatives closely associated with the Project 
for a New American Century, see Gary Schmitt, Thomas Donnelly, 'A War With Purpose'. The 
Weekly Standard, (24 Sept., 2001).
64 Project for a New American Century, 'Letter to President Bush on Israel, Arafat and the War on 
Terror'. Project for a New American Century, 3 April 2002. 
http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter-040302.htm, accessed 4 April 2008. 
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policy,  Kristol  asserted  that  “Iraq  is  next”  in  the  war  on  terrorism.67 Kristol 
commented that “the president has chosen to build a new world, not to rebuild the old 
one  that  existed  before September  11,  2001.  And after  uprooting  al  Qaeda  from 
Afghanistan, removing Saddam Hussein from power is the key step to building a 
freer, safer, more peaceful future.”68 According to Kristol, the United States could no 
longer tolerate the status quo and needed to pursue policies of democracy promotion, 
beginning in Iraq, thus fundamentally changing the domestic political systems of the 
regimes that  bred Jihadist  ideology.  Kristol  spoke with great  optimism about  the 
transformative potential of Iraq after democratisation, arguing that
A friendly, free, and oil-producing Iraq would leave Iran isolated and 
Syria cowed; the Palestinians more willing to negotiate seriously with 
Israel;  and Saudi Arabia with less leverage over policymakers here 
and in Europe. Removing Saddam Hussein and his henchmen from 
power  presents  a  genuine  opportunity...  to  transform  the  political 
landscape of the Middle East.69
Many elements of Kristol's argument emerged again in statements published 
by the Project for a New American Century as the invasion of Iraq began in March 
2003. PNAC's first statement on post-war Iraq held that “the removal of the present 
Iraqi regime from power will lay the foundation for... establishing a peaceful, stable 
democratic government in Iraq.”70 This in turn was key to fostering “the democratic 
development of the wider Middle East.”71 The signatories of the statement agreed 
that “regime change is not an end in itself but a means to an end – the establishment 
of a peaceful, stable, united, prosperous and democratic Iraq.” Indeed, the statement 
went on to advise the Bush administration that the United States 
Must  help  build  an  Iraq  that  is  governed  by  a  pluralistic  system 
representative of all Iraqis and that is fully committed to upholding the 
rule of law, the rights of all its citizens, and the betterment of all its 
people. The Iraqi people committed to a democratic future must be 
67 William Kristol, 'Next Phase of the War on Terrorism'. Congressional Testimony of William 
Kristol, Chairman of the Project for a New American Century, 7 February 2002.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid. Neoconservatives assumed that democratic Arab states would enhance American influence 
over oil and gas resources in the Gulf, as democratic regimes were apparently more predisposed 
towards upholding American hegemony. For discussion of the Bush administration's claim that 
democratisation would enhance American interests, see chapter three of this thesis.
70 Project for a New American Century, 'Statement on Post-War Iraq'. Project for a New American 
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integrally involved in this process in order for it to succeed. Such an 
Iraq  will  be  a  force  for  regional  stability  rather  than  conflict  and 
participate in the democratic development of the region.72 
The project's second statement on Iraq reaffirmed these aims and insisted that 
the transfer of power from an occupying force to an interim democratic regime be 
swift, allowing Iraqis themselves to determine the nature of the liberal democratic 
regime they would invariably construct.73 The signatories to the letter maintained, in 
line with their strong belief in the universal desires for freedom and the global appeal 
of liberalism, that the people of Iraq were inherently capable of constructing liberal 
state institutions and a progressive political and social order after their liberation by 
American military forces.74 The Project  for  a  New American Century's  statement 
concluded that “the successful disarming, rebuilding and democratic reform of Iraq 
can contribute decisively to the democratisation of the wider Middle East.”75 Echoing 
elements of the logic of democratic peace theory and the core neoconservative belief 
that America's values and interests were one in foreign policy, the project's statement 
held that democratisation in Iraq was “an objective of overriding strategic importance 
to the United States, as it  is to the rest  of the international community  – and its 
achievement will require an investment and commitment commensurate with that.”76 
The actions of PNAC to 2003 show the way in which neoconservative prescription 
for activist democratisation served as the bridge between neoconservative theory and 
the  key  assumptions  of  the  Bush  Doctrine.  The  continued  advocacy  of  specific 
interventionist policy after September 11 made the broader claims of neoconservative 
democratisation theory tangible as a guide to action, rendering it usable by policy 
makers as a framework for conceiving of armed democratisation as the cornerstone 
of the war on terrorism in the Middle East. 
The Prospects for Proxy War After September 11
In contrast to the increasing influence of the Project for a New American Century's 
72 Ibid. 
73 Project for a New American Century, 'Second Statement on Post-War Iraq'. Project for a New 
American Century, 28 March 2003. http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraq-20030328.htm, 
accessed 28 April 2008. 
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calls  for  direct  intervention  in  Iraq,  the  arguments  for  proxy  war  against  Iraq 
generally lost ground after the September 11 attacks. Wolfowitz, Khalilzad and Perle 
maintained close contact with Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress,77 and some 
serious  pre-war  planning  was  undertaken  by  Pentagon civilians  such  as  Douglas 
Feith  for  utilising  Iraqi  National  Congress  members  as  proxy  fighters  in  Iraq.78 
However,  the views of those in  favour  of  proxy war  hardened as  a  result  of  the 
September 11 attacks, as they too came to advocate direct intervention as the most 
effective solution to the danger Iraq posed; relegating the idea of supporting proxy 
forces to a secondary strategy more exclusively tied to democratisation subsequent to 
forcible regime change. 
Paul Wolfowitz's views were most indicative of this changing outlook among 
the  proponents  of  proxy  intervention.  Until  the  September  11  attacks  and  the 
declaration of the war on terrorism, Wolfowitz generally held that proxy war was the 
most effective way to deal with Saddam Hussein.79 Wolfowitz's advocacy for a proxy 
war against Saddam Hussein developed during the 1990's as a response to what he 
viewed as the Clinton administration's seemingly inept handling of the containment 
of  Iraq,  and  owing  to  his  close  connection  with  Chalabi  and  the  Iraqi  National 
Congress.80 In addition, Wolfowitz's existing views about the universality of freedom 
and the  importance of  democracy  as  a  moral  and strategic  concern in  Iraq  were 
further emboldened by Chalabi's assurances that his organisation would bring liberal 
democracy to the state. 
As a result of the September 11 attacks, Wolfowitz began to view military 
intervention  as  the  best  solution  to  the  dangers  posed  by  Iraq.  According  to 
Wolfowitz,  a  break  in  his  thinking  occurred  because  the  September  11  attacks 
increased his perception of the potential threats posed by Saddam Hussein.81 In a 
2005 interview, Wolfowitz asserted that 
Contrary to the myth that I have been waiting all along for an excuse 
to invade Iraq, before [September 11] I really didn't want to even think 
about sending in U.S. ground forces. I had always thought the idea of 
occupying Baghdad was both unnecessary and a mistake. What was 
77 Richard Perle, 'Next Stop, Iraq'. National Post, (7 Dec., 2001), A16.
78 Feith, pp. 255-8, 279-81.
79 Mann, pp. 235-7.
80 Ibid; See also Dorrien, Imperial Designs, pp. 66-8; Bill Keller, 'The Sunshine Warrior'. The New 
York Times, (22 Sept., 2002).
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needed was to arm and train the Iraqis to do the job themselves – the 
way, in effect, the Afghans did [in 2001] by taking advantage of the 
fact  that  a  third  of  the  country  was already  liberated.  I  advocated 
supporting them with air power if necessary.82 
Wolfowitz was content to support regime change through the Iraqi National Congress 
during the 1990's; but he now interpreted the threat of Saddam Hussein through the 
prism of the war on terrorism, and believed that  the need to reform the political 
systems  of  the  Arab  Middle  East  had  become  so  pressing  as  to  require  direct 
American military intervention.83 Thus, Wolfowitz's advocacy for proxy war against 
Iraq became a secondary issue after 2001. Iraqi opposition forces still managed to 
retain  a  somewhat  important  place in  the conceptions  of  activist  democratisation 
proposed  by  the  proponents  of  proxy  intervention;  especially  in  the  assumptions 
made  about  the  formation  of  a  new  Iraqi  government  after  regime  change. 
Nonetheless, the role of proxy forces in leading regime change in Iraq became a 
lesser concern shortly after the start of the war on terrorism. 
The Calls for Democratic Revolution
The September 11 attacks and declaration of the war on terrorism encouraged some 
neoconservatives  to  advocate  wide-ranging  policies  of  regime  change  and 
democratisation that encompassed not only Iraq, but most states of the Arab world. 
Extrapolating from the logic expressed by their peers about the importance of regime 
change and democratisation in Iraq, some neoconservative writers argued that while 
intervention there was important to winning the war on terrorism, this alone was not 
enough. Making a number of connections between hostile states, terrorist groups and 
a political malaise which they view as responsible for fostering Jihadist ideology, 
select neoconservatives held that in order to prevent another terrorist attack against 
the United States,  it  was essential to transform the entire Arab world through an 
expansive strategy of armed democracy promotion.
One of the leading arguments for a wide-ranging regional policy of regime 
change and democratisation was made by the American Enterprise Institute scholar, 
Michael  Ledeen.  Beginning in the weeks after  the September 11 attacks,  Ledeen 
82 Bowden, 'Wolfowitz: The Exit Interviews'.
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consistently put forward arguments calling for intervention against what he labelled 
the  “terror  masters.”84 In  a  September  2001  National  Review article,  Ledeen 
contended  that  the  United  States  should  engage  in  “creative  destruction”  in  the 
Middle  East,  using  military  force  to  annihilate  the  terrorists  and  bring  about 
democratic  revolution.85 Ledeen argued that  Jihadist  terrorism was not  a  stateless 
phenomenon, but was backed by regimes like Iraq, Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. This 
meant  that  in  its  war  on  terrorism  the  United  States  had  “a  dual  task:  kill  the 
terrorists, and destroy the regimes that provide them with the critical infrastructure – 
training, safe havens, travel documents, technology, and all the rest  – they need to 
operate.”86 In  the  most  controversial  and  frequently-cited  passage  of  his  article, 
Ledeen admonished the United States that 
We should have no misgivings about our ability to destroy tyrannies. 
It is what we do best. It comes naturally to us, for we are the one truly 
revolutionary country in the world, as we have been for more than 200 
years.  Creative  destruction  is  our  middle  name.  We  do  it 
automatically, and that is precisely why the tyrants hate us, and are 
driven to attack us.87
Ledeen effectively held that the United States should act as the 'vanguard' of 
democracy,  promoting this  'universal  right'  in  the Arab world through successive 
military interventions and occupations. This was an argument that Claes Ryn, of the 
Catholic University of America, has identified as a form of “neo-Jacobinism” in its 
belief  in  the  revolutionary  power  of  the  United  States  and  its  ability  to  spread 
freedom through acts of violence.88 Ledeen's interventionist prescriptions were more 
expansive than those of the Clean Break report or much of the material produced by 
PNAC. While shared by only a minority of neoconservatives, these were ideas not 
without some influence over the actions of the Bush administration in the Middle 
East.89
Alongside  Ledeen,  first-generation  neoconservative  intellectual  Norman 
84 For Ledeen's most detailed exposition of his argument, see Michael Leeden, The War Against the 
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Podhoretz also penned a strong argument for an expansive anti-terrorism strategy of 
regime change and activist democracy promotion throughout the Arab world. Having 
been among the most hardline of the neoconservative 'Cold Warriors' during the Cold 
War,  Podhoretz  re-emerged  after  the  September  11  attacks  with  an  argument 
claiming that “the great struggle into which the United States was plunged by 9/11 
can only be understood if we think of it as WWIV.”90 Podhoretz believed that the 
Cold War was actually  WWIII,  and therefore  the  war  on  terrorism was WWIV; 
another titanic global war that could last more than forty years.91 As with WWII and 
WWIII, Podhoretz argued that in WWIV the United States again faced a determined 
totalitarian enemy, this time in the form of what he labelled “Islamo-Fascism.” This 
ideology fused together religious and secular totalitarianism, held global messianic 
ambitions and was heir to the totalitarians of the twentieth century.92 Podhoretz even 
contended that “it can plausibly be argued that [the Islamo-Fascists] are even more 
dangerous  and  difficult  to  beat  that  their  totalitarian  predecessors  of  WWII  and 
WWIII,”  as  Islamo-Fascism was an ideology with deep  cultural  roots  and  found 
support  from  over  200  million  people,  which  was  more  than  either  Fascism  or 
Communism ever attained.93
Podhoretz  believed  that  the  most  effective  strategy  for  defeating  “Islamo-
Fascism” was a policy of systematic regime change and democratisation across the 
Middle East. Podhoretz saw that the regime of Saddam Hussein represented one of 
the  most  malign  forms  of  Islamo-Fascism,  but  that  regime  change in  Iraq  alone 
would not defeat this menace. Only through the co-ordinated rollback of all of its 
enemies in the Middle East could the United States win this great struggle against the 
new totalitarian enemy. Writing in early 2002, shortly after President Bush's 'axis of 
evil' speech, Podhoretz outlined an expansive agenda for an anti-terrorism policy of 
regime change in the Arab Middle East, as he contended that
The regimes that richly deserve to be overthrown and replaced are not 
confined to the three singled-out members of the axis of evil.  At a 
minimum, the axis should extend to Syria and Lebanon and Libya, as 
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well as "friends" of America like the Saudi royal family and Egypt's 
Hosni Mubarak, along with the Palestinian Authority, whether headed 
by Arafat or one of his henchmen.94 
Podhoretz held that despite the opposition of realist naysayers, democratic regimes 
would triumph in the Arab world, as they had in much of the rest of the world.95 
While Podhoretz's views did not have wide appeal in official policy making circles, 
they  were  again  indicative  of  the  way  in  which  broader  historical  'lessons'  and 
theoretical concepts of the neoconservative paradigm of democratisation influenced 
specific interventionist prescriptions for Middle East democratisation. 
Conclusion
From  the  mid  1990's  to  the  Bush  administration's  decision  to  invade  Iraq, 
neoconservatives  put  forward a  comprehensive  set  of  arguments  for  Middle  East 
democratisation, focusing above all on regime change and democracy promotion in 
Iraq as integral to a strategy of regional political  transformation. Neoconservative 
policy advocacy about the need for armed democratisation in the Middle East served 
as the link between the broader neoconservative paradigm of armed democratisation 
and the specific interventionist propositions of the Bush Doctrine itself.  After the 
September 11 attacks, neoconservative policy frameworks quickly became the prism 
through  which  the  Bush  administration  understood  the  causes  of  terrorism  and 
formulated  its  grand  strategy  for  dealing  with  this  threat  through  the  political 
transformation of the Arab world.96 Examining the development of neoconservative 
prescriptions for rollback, regime change and democratisation makes it possible to 
comprehend how it was that neoconservative foreign policy thinking transferred from 
a largely theoretical level to one where it could be utilised as a framework for a grand 
strategy of activist democratisation. 
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Chapter Three
The Bush Doctrine's Middle East Democratisation Policies: 
A Neoconservative Paradigm
The Bush administration's Middle East democratisation policies centred around six 
interrelating  propositions  that  laid  out  an  internally  logical  and  sophisticated 
argument for promoting democracy through armed intervention against authoritarian 
regimes. Each of these propositions drew extensively from neoconservative policy 
advocacy  during  the  1990's,  as  from  many  of  the  assumptions  of  the  broader 
neoconservative democratisation paradigm.  The six  key propositions  of  the  Bush 
Doctrine's Middle East democratisation policies were that:
● Freedom is the universal right of all people
● Free people will  always choose to live in a liberal  political and economic 
order
● Authoritarianism fosters terrorism, while democracy will undermine terrorism
● Democracy in Iraq will engender a democratic domino effect in the Middle 
East
● A democratic Middle East will be peaceful
● Middle East  democratisation will  enhance  American  security  and  national 
interests
Together these six propositions formed a foreign policy doctrine that justified regime 
change and democratisation in Iraq as the centrepiece of a post-September 11 grand 
strategy to transform the Middle East for its own benefit and to enhance American 
interests  and  security.  These  propositions  serve  as  the  basis  on  which  the  Bush 
Doctrine, and by its close association, neoconservative assumptions and claims, are 
critically assessed later in this thesis. 
As with neoconservative arguments, the propositions about democratisation 
expressed in terms of the Bush Doctrine need to be taken seriously and studied on 
their own terms, rather than to speculate on potential hidden agendas behind such 
assertions. The most comprehensive articulation of the Bush Doctrine's Middle East 
67
democratisation policies are contained in the Bush administration's National Security 
Strategy documents of September 2002 and March 2006. The Bush Doctrine was 
also outlined in a number of speeches, especially President Bush's West Point speech, 
re-inauguration speech and State  of the Union addresses,  as  well  as in numerous 
policy documents, fact sheets, articles and testimonies produced by senior advisers 
over the eight years of the administration. This provides a rich primary document 
record through which the assumptions of armed democratisation can be examined. 
Assessing the Bush Doctrine's propositions about democratisation lays out the key 
claims and justifications put forward for intervention in the Middle East, and also 
shows  the  large  extent  to  which  these  propositions  were  closely  related  to  the 
neoconservative paradigm of democratisation. 
The Universality of Freedom
At the core of the Bush Doctrine was a fundamental claim that all  people had a 
natural right to freedom. Senior members of the Bush cabinet held as an article of 
faith that all people wished to live in freedom, able to decide for themselves their 
own form of government and society.1 According to President Bush, people liberated 
from repression and authoritarian rule would chose freedom, liberal institutions and 
ultimately democracy as their form of government.2 Such ideas about the universality 
of  freedom were  consistently  applied by the  Bush administration  to  Middle East 
democratisation from 2001.
As with many aspects of the Bush Doctrine, the case for the universality of 
freedom  was  stated  most  succinctly  in  the  September  2002  National  Security 
Strategy.  In  the  introduction  to  the  National  Security  Strategy, President  Bush 
asserted that “freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright 
of every person – in every civilisation.”3 The President's introduction contended that
Liberty and justice... are right and true for all people everywhere. No 
nation owns these aspirations,  and no nation is  exempt from them. 
1 The White House, 'The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002'. 
Washington, 17 September 2002, p. iii. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html, accessed 1 May 
2007.
2 Ibid; For critical analysis of these claims, see Ryn, pp. 7-9.
3 NSS 2002, p. iii.
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Fathers and mothers in all societies want their children to be educated 
and to live free of poverty and violence. No people on earth yearn to 
be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock 
of the secret police.4 
This notion of the universality of freedom played an integral part in the Bush 
administration's  foreign  policy  outlook  from  the  time  it  assumed  office.  In  his 
inaugural address of January 2001, President Bush championed the universality of 
freedom, expressing a strong belief that within every person there existed an innate 
desire for freedom.5 President Bush claimed that it  was the aim of United States 
foreign policy to help people throughout the world realise this desire, utilising the 
many instruments of its national power to advance freedom; including its military 
power  where  it  deemed  necessary.6 As  the  benevolent  hegemon,  it  was  the 
responsibility  of  the  United  States  to  champion universal  rights  applicable  to  all 
people.  Further,  the  United  States  government  determined  that  freedom,  as  it 
conceived of the concept, was always in the best interests of people in other nations.
The  conception  of  universal  freedom  expressed  by  a  number  of  Bush 
administration  officials  was  most  strongly  associated  with  the  need  to  promote 
democracy in the Middle East.7 In his  June 2002 West  Point  graduation address, 
which stood as the first  systematic  public  articulation of  the  Bush Doctrine as  a 
whole, President Bush argued that 
When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women, 
there is no clash of civilizations. The requirements of freedom apply 
fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world. The 
peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms 
and opportunities as people in every nation. And their governments 
should listen to their hopes.8
Such  thinking  was  also  regularly  articulated  by  second-term  Secretary  of  State 
Condoleezza  Rice.  In  a  December  2005  article,  Rice  wrote  that  the  desire  for 
freedom was universal, and that “our power gains its greatest legitimacy when we 
support the natural right of all people, even those who disagree with us, to govern 
4 Ibid.
5 'Inaugural Address of George W. Bush'. United States Capitol, 20 January 2001. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural-address.html, accessed 21 April 2008. 
6 Ibid. 
7 'President Bush Presses for Peace in the Middle East'. Remarks by the President in 
Commencement Address at the University of South Carolina, 9 May 2003. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030509-11.html, accessed 20 February 2007.
8 'President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point'.
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themselves  in  liberty.”9 Elsewhere,  Rice  was  more  categorical,  contending  in  a 
speech  in  mid-2005  that  “liberty  is  the  universal  longing  of  every  soul,  and 
democracy is the ideal path for every nation,” and this included all people of the 
Middle East.10 Thus Rice, like Bush and most other officials in the top echelons of 
the State and Defence Departments, claimed that freedom was the natural condition 
of  the Arab world,  and that  the  primary obstacle  to  its  realisation there was the 
existence  of  tyranny  bent  on  preventing  those  it  repressed  from  gaining  and 
expressing their freedom.
In their support for spreading freedom to the Middle East, President Bush and 
others attempted to confront what they characterised as the argument of some critics 
that Arabs did not want to live in freedom and that it was ill-conceived to promote 
freedom  in  a  region  with  a  history  of  authoritarian  rule  and  strong  religious 
traditions.  President  Bush  claimed  that  those  who  did  not  share  in  the  'freedom 
agenda' for the Arab world were, at best, cultural relativists who wrongly believed 
that Arabs were incapable of living in freedom.11 In perhaps the most frequently-cited 
articulation of this argument, President Bush claimed in a speech to the American 
Enterprise Institute in February 2003 that
It is presumptuous and insulting to suggest that a whole region of the 
world  – or the one-fifth of humanity that  is Muslim  – is somehow 
untouched by the most basic aspirations of life. Human cultures can be 
vastly different. Yet the human heart desires the same good things, 
everywhere on Earth. In our desire to be safe from brutal and bullying 
oppression, human beings are the same. In our desire to care for our 
children and give them a better life, we are the same.12
The president expanded on this theme again in a speech in May 2003, pointing out 
that during WWII and the Cold War, some critics questioned the appeal of freedom 
in countries like Fascist Japan or in the Soviet Union and its satellites, but history 
time and again proved these naysayers wrong as freedom took root in such formerly 
9 Condoleezza Rice, 'The Promise of Democratic Peace'. Opinion Editorial. The Washington Post, 
(11 Dec., 2005).
10 'Remarks at the American University in Cairo'. Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Cairo, Egypt
20 June 2005. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48328.htm, accessed 5 May 2008. 
11 'President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East'. Remarks by the President at the 20th 
Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, United States Chamber of Commerce, 
Washington, D.C., 6 November 2003. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html, accessed 21 April 2008.
12 'President Discusses the Future of Iraq'. Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., 26 February 
2003. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-11.html, accessed 2 February 
2007. 
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totalitarian states. Applying this argument to the Middle East, Bush declared that “the 
history of the modern world offers a lesson for the skeptics: do not bet against the 
success of freedom.”13 Just as it had transformed the Axis powers and the USSR, the 
United  States  would  spearhead  the  emergence  of  freedom in  Arab  Middle  East, 
helping its people to realise their long-held aspirations for freedom that had been 
stifled by decades of authoritarian rule.14
Liberalism and Democratisation
The propositions put  forward in the Bush Doctrine about  spreading freedom and 
democracy were overtly liberal in nature. Liberal ideas profoundly shaped the Bush 
administration's  interventionist  arguments  and  its  conceptions  of  the  democratic 
regimes it sought to encourage in the Middle East. The Bush Doctrine's underlying 
liberal outlook was influenced by the activist liberal international relations theories 
interpreted and expressed by democratic globalists, as examined in chapter one, as 
well as by the heightened optimism about the global appeal of liberalism engendered 
by the collapse of communism and spread of democracy in the 1990's. This fostered a 
rationale for intervention centred on the claims that the United States alone held the 
sole remaining prescription for successful liberal societies, and that one of the most 
effective ways to promote liberal democracy in non-liberal states was through armed 
action.15 
Liberalism as The End of History
The Bush Doctrine claimed that a liberal political, economic and social order was the 
sole remaining way in which people throughout the world could organise their lives 
13 'President Bush Presses for Peace in the Middle East'. See the discussion in chapter four of this 
thesis on the way in which the Bush administration linked democratisation in Iraq to the examples 
of post-war Germany and Japan.
14 This idea closely reflected the claims of Paul Wolfowitz, Paula Dobriansky and others, examined 
in chapter one of this thesis, where each claimed that freedom had universal appeal and it was 
imperative to encourage freedom in authoritarian societies. Wolfowitz and Dobriansky assumed 
important positions in the Bush administration and it is quite likely that their ideas about the 
universality of freedom helped to influence the claims expressed in the Bush Doctrine itself. 
15 Jedediah Purdy, 'Liberal Empire: Assessing the Arguments'. Carnegie Council on Ethics and 
International Affairs, (Apr., 2003), pp. 2-3. 
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and governments. In his West Point speech, President Bush asserted that  “the 20th 
century  ended with  a  single  surviving  model  of  human progress,  based  on  non-
negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the 
state, respect for women and private property and free speech and equal justice and 
religious  tolerance.”16 In  the  subsequent  National  Security  Strategy of  September 
2002,  the  Bush  administration  argued  that  with  the  defeat  of  communist 
totalitarianism, and in the absence of any other challengers, liberal ideology was now 
the single means by which humanity could achieve lasting freedom and peace.17 The 
National Security Strategy claimed that the United States sought “to create a balance 
of power that favours human freedom,” aiming to foster “conditions in which all 
nations  and  societies  can  choose  for  themselves  the  rewards  and  challenges  of 
political and economic liberty.”18 President Bush argued that the United States did 
not seek to impose liberal values on other people, but rather that it would give all 
people the option to choose liberalism – confident that when given this freedom of 
choice, individuals and groups throughout the world would embrace liberal values as 
these  were  intuitively  the  “single  sustainable  model”  of  government,  economic 
development and social order in the twenty-first century.19 
This conception of the teleological direction and universalism of liberalism 
derived in large part from the neoconservative reading of Francis Fukuyama's 'End of 
History' argument. Distilled and simplified by neoconservative intellectuals, the End 
of  History  teleology  expressed  in  the  National  Security  Strategy,  and  in  other 
documents, lacked probabilistic qualification and was a reified version of the theory. 
Many senior foreign policy making officials of the Bush administration conceived of 
the End of History as a simple linear process that often required speeding up through 
the agency of American military power.20 Some in the Bush administration sought to 
operationalise Fukuyama's  theory as part  of the United States'  post-September 11 
grand strategy in the Middle East,  expanding the boundaries of the liberal  world 
through force “with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world,”21 in order to 
16 'President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point'.
17 NSS 2002, p. i.
18 Ibid, p. 1.
19 Ibid; For detailed criticism of this key assumption, see chapter four of this thesis. 
20 For critical analysis of this key aspect of the Bush Doctrine's outlook and its implications, see 
Fukuyama, After the Neocons, pp. 54-5.
21 For President Bush's first and most sweeping articulation of this goal, see 'President Bush Sworn 
into Second Term'. Washington, 20 January 2005. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural/index.html, accessed 2 August 2007. 
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help make the  'end  of  history'  a  reality.  The  essence  of  the  democratic  globalist 
interpretation  of  Fukuyama's  argument  about  the  teleological  direction  of  liberal 
development became a guiding framework for the Bush Doctrine's conceptions for 
understanding  and  promoting  a  liberal  democratic  order  in  foreign  states  after 
September 11 2001. 
Examining  the  National  Security  Strategy's  claims,  Carnegie  Endowment 
democratisation scholar Jedediah Purdy aptly captures the Bush Doctrine's faith in 
this teleological direction of liberalism. Purdy writes that to the policy makers that 
influenced the formulation of the doctrine, “the fall of Marxist-Leninist governments 
across Eastern Europe and then the Soviet Union seemed mightily to confirm that 
people everywhere really do want the same things: personal liberty and security, a 
measure  of  comfort  and  opportunity,  and  the  privilege  of  feeling  at  home  in  a 
“normal country.””22 Purdy contends that the spread of liberal democracy during the 
1990's reinforced for neoconservatives “the idea that, given the choice, all cultures 
would  converge  on  a  roughly  American  set  of  tastes  and  aspirations.”23 This 
heightened  sense  of  optimism,  combined  with  the  activist  variations  of  liberal 
international relations theory and practice that developed in the 1990's, engendered a 
sense that liberalism was truly the only way forward – the ideology that would soon 
govern the world and bring about the end of history.24 These ideas coalesced in the 
Bush Doctrine into an almost unassailable faith in the future of liberalism as the sole 
remaining  model  of  progress,  and  encouraged  the  idea  that  accelerating  liberal 
development through intervention was an eminently realistic foreign policy with a 
range of beneficial results. 
Democracy For All
The two National Security Strategies and related documents not only articulated a 
faith in liberalism in broad theoretical terms, but also laid out in some detail what the 
United  States  government  believed  a  liberal  state  and  society  should  constitute. 
According to President Bush and most other cabinet officials around him, the United 
States  held  a  set  of  universally  applicable  prescriptions  for  liberal  democracy, 
22 Purdy, p. 10. 
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid. 
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economic  development  and  social  order,  and  it  therefore  best  understood  the 
requirements for liberal democracy in other countries. The introduction of the 2002 
National Security Strategy contended that the United States would “actively work to 
bring  the  hope  of  democracy  and  development  to  every  corner  of  the  world.”25 
Indeed, the document declared, “only nations that share a commitment to protecting 
basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to 
unleash the potential of their people and ensure their future prosperity.”26 Hence, only 
through a commitment to liberal democracy could countries progress, and the United 
States offered the best, and indeed, the only, prescription for a democratic order and a 
successful liberal society more generally.27
Expanding on many of these ideas,  the Bush administration's  March 2006 
National Security Strategy outlined in some detail what the United States government 
considered  the  key  elements  of  liberal  democracy.  The  2006  National  Security 
Strategy  emphasised  the  need  for  the  United  States  to  “promote  effective 
democracies” abroad.28 According to the strategy document, “effective democracies:”
● Honour and uphold basic human rights, including freedom of 
religion,  consciousness,  speech,  assembly,  association  and 
press. 
● Are responsive to their citizens, submitting to the will of the 
people,  especially  when  people  vote  to  change  their 
government.
● Exercise  effective  sovereignty  and  maintain  order  within 
their borders, protect  independent and impartial systems of 
justice,  punish  crime,  embrace  the  rule  of  law  and  resist 
corruption and;
● Limit  the  reach  of  government,  protect  the  institutions  of 
civil  society,  including  the  family,  religious  communities, 
voluntary  associations,  private  property,  independent 
business and a market economy.29 
25 NSS 2002, p. i; For the Bush administration's first articulation of this key claim of its doctrine, see 
'President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point'.
26 NSS 2002, p. i. 
27 For critical discussion of this logic, see Paul T. McCartney, 'American Nationalism and US 
Foreign Policy From September 11 to the Iraq War'. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 3, 
(Fall 2004), p. 407; See also Jonathan  Monten, 'The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, 
Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy'. International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4, 
(2005), p. 143.
28 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006'. (Hereafter NSS 
2006) Washington, The White House, 16 March 2006, pp. 4-5. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006, accessed 2 August 2007. 
29 Ibid.
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 The National Security Strategy noted that “elections are the most visible sign 
of a free society and can play a critical role in advancing effective democracy. But 
elections alone are not enough – they must be reinforced by other values, rights, and 
institutions to bring about lasting freedom. Our goal is human liberty protected by 
democratic  institutions.”30 Thus,  checks  and  balances  between  the  branches  of 
government were essential to establishing and upholding effective liberal democracy, 
as was the rule of law, equality of all citizens, independent media and civil society 
organisations that could lobby the government.31 In addition, free market economies 
were integral to maintaining a liberal democratic order and ensuring prosperity. The 
neoliberal  model  apparently  proved  to  be  the  most  effective  way  to  overcome 
poverty,  create  wealth  and  foster  healthy  competition  in  both  a  domestic  and 
international  economy.32 The  Bush  Doctrine  articulated  a  prescription  for  liberal 
democracy and society that was effectively identical to the existing structures and 
norms of liberal society in the United States, Western Europe and other liberal states, 
and it held that every state and people had the capacity to realise what it deemed to 
be the last remaining viable system of government and society.
The prescriptions for liberal democracy outlined by the Bush Doctrine were 
strongly  supported  by  neoconservatives.  Leading  neoconservatives  in  the  Bush 
administration, such as Wolfowitz and Perle, and influential figures outside of the 
administration such as Kristol and Kagan, consistently backed the Bush Doctrine's 
claims about liberal democracy. However, the lesser-known neoconservative, Paula 
Dobriansky,  stood  out  within  the  Bush  administration  as  one  of  the  most 
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid; See also 'President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East'. The Bush 
administration also launched a variety of aid programs to assist the development of civil society, 
women's groups, education and enterprise in Arab states. Especially important were the Middle 
East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative 
(BMENA). While this is what Thomas Carothers has labelled a “soft” approach to democratisation 
which does in its own right have some importance, it is not considered here as a part of activist 
democratisation for three reasons: it is not a justification for interventionist democratisation; it is in 
many ways a continuation of civil society aid programs pursued by the Clinton administration and 
organisations such as the United Nations; and it is not a policy generally favoured by 
neoconservatives as it is too gradualist and can reinforce the political status quo. For the text of 
MEPI, see 'The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative: Expanding Political Opportunity'. Bureau 
of Near Eastern Affairs Washington, DC, 18 June 2003. http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22251.htm, 
accessed 6 May 2008; For critical discussion of MEPI, BMENA and the merits and pitfalls of a 
“soft” approach to democratisation, see Thomas Carothers 'Choosing a Strategy' in Thomas 
Carothers, Marina Ottaway (Eds), Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East. 
Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, pp. 193-4; See also Sami E. 
Baroudi, 'Arab Intellectuals and the Bush Administration's Campaign for Democracy: The Case of 
the Greater Middle East Initiative'. Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 3, (Summer 2007), pp. 390- 
418.
32 NSS 2006, pp. 25-7.
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sophisticated proponents of the claims put forward by the Bush Doctrine. Dobriansky 
served as the Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs and Democracy, acting in 
this position to reinforce calls for the spread of liberal democracy. In an article in The 
National Interest in 2004, Dobriansky emphasised the need for liberal institutions 
and  civil  society  to  encourage  the  development  of  successful  democracy.33 
Dobriansky wrote that 
Democracy-building  is  a  protracted  process,  and  one  or  two  free 
elections do not make a democracy. A mature democracy requires far 
more than periodic holding of even free and fair elections. It calls for 
limited government, with many of the economic, social and cultural 
issues  being  handled  within  a  private  sphere.  The  rule  of  law  is 
another must,  with a  particular emphasis on ensuring governmental 
accountability.34
Dobriansky recognised that while elections were integral to the process of democracy 
building, it was essential that liberal institutions be constructed first, that checks and 
balances on the power of the government be enshrined in law, and that the rights of 
all minorities within the state were guaranteed.35
Dobriansky emphasised that while the United States was “happy to share our 
experience, promoting democracy does not mean imposing the American political 
and constitutional model on other countries.”36 Dobriansky insisted that the United 
States government believed that “citizens in emerging democracies must be free to 
develop institutions compatible with their own cultures and experiences,” and that 
while “the desire for freedom, the rule of law and a vibrant civil society, and for a 
voice in one's government, is universal,” this did not mean that all liberal democratic 
systems would  necessarily  resemble  the  American  system.37 Liberal  development 
would  thus  not  necessarily  be  even,  but  it  will  occur,  as  no  other  model  of 
government  could  offer  a  viable  alternative  to  the  values,  institutions  and  order 
33 Dobriansky, 'Advancing Democracy', p. 72.
34 Ibid.
35 While this more complete package of liberal institution building, rule of law and constitutionalism 
was emphasised in theory by Dobriansky and the Bush administration more generally, discussion 
in chapter four of this thesis shows that in practice, the administration appeared to go against its 
own advice as it pushed for rapid elections in the Middle East after 2003, helping to engender a 
number of problems in the process. 
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid; For further discussion by Dobriansky on the key requirements of effective liberal democratic 
governments and the ways in which this can vary between nations, see Paula J. Dobriansky, 
'Strategies on Democracy Promotion'. Remarks to the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, 20 June 
2005. http://www.state.gov/g/rls/rm/2005/48394.htm, accessed 29 April 2008. 
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offered by liberal democracy.38
The Bush Doctrine's faith in the future of liberalism and its strong support for 
the promotion of democracy was intimately related to its justifications for armed 
intervention  in  the  Middle  East.  While  President  Bush  proclaimed  a  general 
commitment to promoting and sustaining a liberal world order by force, such ideas 
were  applied  most  frequently  to  the  Arab  Middle  East.  Purdy  writes  that  in  the 
Middle East especially, “the Bush Doctrine stakes its case” for intervention “on the 
idea that [liberal] values can be effectively achieved by imperial intervention. The 
basis of this idea... is the belief that top-down American competence and bottom-up 
local spontaneous order will meet to produce a market economy, stable democratic 
institutions, and a civil society that protects basic liberty and security.”39 The Bush 
Doctrine aimed, through promoting liberal democracy by acts of military intervention 
in the Middle East, to defeat threats to the United States, secure freedom and peace in 
the  region,  and  enhance  American  security  and  material  interests.  Each  of  the 
remaining propositions made by the Bush Doctrine for armed democratisation in the 
Middle  East  reflected  key  elements  of  its  liberal  interventionist  thinking.  The 
defining feature of this logic was the need for regime change and democracy in Iraq 
as the first step towards bringing about a liberal democratic order across the Arab 
world,  transforming  it  from  a  'historic'  to  a  'post-historic'  region  that  would  be 
terrorist-free, pro-American, secure, and at peace.  
Authoritarianism and Jihadist Terrorism: Democracy as the Cure
One of the Bush Doctrine's strongest and most frequently invoked justifications for 
activist democracy promotion in the Middle East was that establishing democracy in 
the region was integral to defeating Jihadist terrorism. Senior foreign policy figures 
of  the administration  contended that  the  presence  of  authoritarian  regimes in  the 
Middle East bred Jihadist terrorism against the United States, and the cure to this 
38 Paula J. Dobriansky, 'Promoting Democracy in the 21st Century: An Essential Tool Against 
Terrorism'. Remarks to the Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs, Baltimore, Maryland, 9 
February 2004. http://www.state.gov/g/rls/rm/2004/29184.htm, accessed 29 April 2008. For 
critical discussion of the problems of assuming that all Arab states will invariably become liberal 
democracies, see discussion in chapter four of this thesis. 
39 Purdy, p. 12. 
77
violent  ideology  was  to  'drain  the  swamp'  in  which  it  grew  by  transforming 
authoritarian  Arab  states  into  democracies  by  force  where  necessary.  The  Bush 
Doctrine's claim that armed democratisation was essential to defeating terrorism and 
authoritarianism  was  drawn  from  some  important  elements  of  neoconservative 
thinking,  especially  the  neoconservative  emphasis  on  the  links  between 
totalitarianism and conflict, and their confidence that, as American power helped to 
shatter the status quo of the Cold War, so too could it fundamentally change the 
violent status quo of the Middle East.
The Problem of Authoritarianism
A  number  of  senior  figures  of  the  Bush  administration  argued  that  it  was  the 
authoritarian status quo of the Arab Middle East that bore large responsibility for the 
attacks  of  September  11  and the  fostering  of  Jihadist  ideology.40 President  Bush 
argued frequently that authoritarian Arab regimes created breeding grounds in which 
Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism grew, as people denied their freedom turned to 
violent extremism.41 In a speech in March 2005, President Bush laid out this logic in 
perhaps its most succinct form when he argued that
Our strategy to keep the peace in the longer term is to help change the 
conditions  that  give rise  to  extremism and terror,  especially  in  the 
broader  Middle  East.  Parts  of  that  region  have  been  caught  for 
generations in a cycle of tyranny and despair and radicalism. When a 
dictatorship  controls  the  political  life  of  a  country,  responsible 
opposition  cannot  develop,  and  dissent  is  driven  underground  and 
toward the extreme. And to draw attention away from their social and 
economic failures, dictators place blame on other countries and other 
races,  and stir  the hatred that leads to violence.  This status quo of 
despotism and anger cannot be ignored or appeased, kept in a box or 
bought off, because we have witnessed how the violence in that region 
can reach easily across borders and oceans. The entire world has an 
urgent interest in the progress, and hope, of freedom in the broader 
40 For a good discussion of the way in which the Bush administration, taking its cue from 
neoconservatives, conceived of the political status quo of the Arab world as the primary cause of 
Jihadist terrorism, see Amy Hawethorn, 'The New Reform Ferment' in  Carothers, Ottaway (Eds), 
pp. 60-2. 
41 'Fact Sheet: Winning the Struggle Between Freedom and Terror in the Middle East'. The White 
House, 31 August 2006. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060831.html, 
accessed 2 February 2007; For discussion of the key elements of the propositions made in this 
document and others, see Packer, pp. 50-2. 
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Middle East.42 
President  Bush  and other  officials,  such  as  Condoleezza  Rice  and Dick  Cheney, 
consistently reiterated their belief that the terrorist-breeding status quo of the Middle 
East  was  no  longer  acceptable.  Rather  than ignoring this  problem or  refusing  to 
attack its root cause out of a desire to maintain 'stability', the United States now faced 
the  necessary  task  of  removing  the  regimes  responsible  for  generating  this 
radicalism.43 
President  Bush  claimed  that  his  administration  explicitly  broke  with  the 
policies of its predecessors by opting for democratic transformation in the Middle 
East.  In a speech to the National Endowment for Democracy in November 2003, 
Bush contended that “sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating 
the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe – because in the 
long run,  stability  cannot  be purchased at  the expense of liberty.  As long as the 
Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place 
of  stagnation,  resentment,  and  violence  ready  for  export.”44 Bush  reiterated  this 
theme in greater detail later in the same month in a speech at Whitehall Palace in 
London, contending that
We must shake off decades of failed policy in the Middle East. [We 
have]  in  the  past...  been  willing  to  make  a  bargain,  to  tolerate 
oppression for the sake of stability. Longstanding ties often led us to 
overlook  the  faults  of  local  elites.  Yet  this  bargain  did  not  bring 
stability  or  make  us  safe.  It  merely  bought  time,  while  problems 
festered and ideologies of violence took hold.  As recent history has 
shown,  we cannot  turn  a  blind  eye  to  oppression  just  because  the 
oppression is not in our own backyard.45 
The  2006  National  Security  Strategy  codified  this  thinking  further,  arguing  that 
“political alienation,” combined with domestic repression, a culture of violence and 
42 'President Discusses War on Terror'. National Defence University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, 8 March 
2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050308-3.html, accessed 20 February 
2007.
43 'Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union'. Washington, 20 
January 2006. http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006, accessed 12 February 2007; See 
also 'Vice President's Remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 2006 Policy 
Conference'. The Washington D.C. Convention Center, Washington, D.C., 7 March 2006. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060307-1.html, accessed 3 February 2007.
44 'President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East'.
45 'President Bush Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London'. Remarks by the President at 
Whitehall Palace, Royal Banqueting House-Whitehall Palace, London, England, 19 November 
2003. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031119-1.html, accessed 2 February 
2007. 
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severe  restrictions  on  freedom,  drove  some disenchanted  individuals  in  the  Arab 
world  towards  terrorism  and  political  extremism.46 Echoing  a  key  claim  of 
neoconservatism, the Bush Doctrine argued that advancing democracy in the Middle 
East also advanced American security, while to continue with the realist pursuit of 
'stability'  at  the  expense  of  freedom  would  only  generate  further  anger  and 
resentment.47
In making its claims about the links between authoritarianism and terrorism, 
the Bush administration was in some ways echoing elements of the neoconservative 
interpretation  of  totalitarian  theory.  Columbia  University  international  relations 
professor  Robert  Jervis  notes  that  President  Bush  and  many  of  his  top  advisers 
subscribed  to  the  idea  that  regime  type  played  a  highly  significant  role  in 
international relations.48 The Bush Doctrine expressed the idea that an authoritarian 
regime would foster an ideology of violence by virtue of being a repressive state, and 
that the straightforward solution to this problem was to transform such a state into a 
democracy.49 Leading neoconservative writers and policy makers often articulated 
these  ideas  and  implicitly  linked  them  to  the  tradition  of  totalitarian  theory  in 
neoconservative  thought.  Joshua  Muravchik  contended  in  a  December  2007 
interview that in the neoconservative analysis of the roots of Jihadist terrorism
The  problem  lay  in  the  political  culture  of  the  Middle  East.  The 
question was how to change it. One of the defining features of that 
political culture was tyrannical government. We argued that if we can 
spread democracy as a form of government in that region, then the 
process of socialisation that occurs in democracies will lead people 
away from thinking murder and suicide are the way to carry on an 
argument, and foster more political and peaceful ways.50
Murvachik  held  that  explanations  for  terrorism  that  focused  on  poverty  or  the 
grievances Jihadists  claimed to hold against  the United States and its  allies  were 
spurious; what mattered most was the political climate of fear and repression caused 
by  Arab  authoritarianism  which  drove  frustrated  individuals  into  the  arms  of 
46 NSS 2006, p. 4.
47 Compare this claim, regularly made from 2002 to 2006 with those made in 2008, as examined in 
the conclusion of this thesis, where President Bush and others now regularly emphasise the 
importance of regional stability over democratic change. 
48 Jervis, 'Understanding the Bush Doctrine', p. 371; For further discussion of this crucial assumption 
in the Bush Doctrine, see Robert Jervis, 'Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot be Sustained'. Political  
Science Quarterly, Vol. 120, No. 3, (Fall 2005), pp. 365-6.
49 Jervis, 'Understanding the Bush Doctrine', p. 371.
50 Muravchik, Johnson, 'The Neoconservative Persuasion and Foreign Policy'.
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extremists.51 Similarly, Paula Dobriansky argued that Middle East authoritarianism 
bore prime responsibility for generating Jihadist ideology and violence. Dobriansky 
held that in the Middle East “the danger to America comes not exclusively from 
dictators  who  make  war  directly  upon  us,  our  allies,  and  our  interests  –  it  also 
emanates from dictators who create an atmosphere so poisonous and so brutal that 
evil  sprouts  and motivates  a  small  but  radicalized cadre to  terrorism.”52 Only by 
sweeping  away  this  status  quo  in  the  Middle  East  through  the  process  of 
democratisation  could  the  United  States  fundamentally  undermine  terrorism  and 
ensure its security into the future.53
Democracy as the Panacea
Leading foreign policy officials of the Bush administration placed such emphasis on 
democratisation as the best strategy for overcoming terrorism that this idea became 
what Katerina Dalacoura, of the London School of Economic and Political Science, 
labels  “something  that  would  put  right  all  troubles  – a  panacea.”54 Encouraging 
democracy  was  conceived  as  among  the  most  important  weapon  in  the  war  on 
terrorism, as democratic values were seen as the very antithesis of Jihadism.55 In his 
January 2005 re-inauguration speech, widely seen as the most sweeping affirmation 
of the Bush Doctrine's “freedom agenda,” President Bush asserted that 
As  long  as  whole  regions  of  the  world  simmer  in  resentment  and 
tyranny  – prone to ideologies that feed hatred and excuse murder  – 
violence will gather, and multiply in destructive power, and cross the 
most defended borders, and raise a mortal threat. There is only one 
force of history that can break the reign of hatred and resentment, and 
expose the pretensions of tyrants, and reward the hopes of the decent 
and tolerant, and that is the force of human freedom.56 
Further, Bush stated that “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the 
growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with 
the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”57 In the President's view, this task 
51 Ibid. For critical analysis of this claim, see chapter five of this thesis. 
52 Dobriansky, 'Promoting Democracy in the 21st Century'.
53 Ibid.
54 Katerina Dalacoura, 'US Democracy Promotion in the Middle East Since 11 September 2001: A 
Critique'. International Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 5, (2005), p. 974. 
55 Ibid. 
56 'President Bush Sworn into Second Term'.
57 Ibid.
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had special salience in the Middle East, as it was there that the forces of terrorism 
and  tyranny  were  most  malignant  and  where  the  need  for  democracy  was  most 
pressing.58 
Key  foreign  policy  documents  released  by  the  Bush  administration 
consistently  maintained  that  democracy  provided  freedom,  representation  and 
prospects  for  the  future  to  those  who  would  otherwise  become  alienated  and 
susceptible  to  extremism.  The  2006  National  Security  Strategy  claimed  that 
democracy was integral  to undermining the resentment that fed Jihadist  ideology. 
According to the strategy document “in the place of alienation, democracy offers an 
ownership stake in society, a chance to shape one's own future,” and that “in the 
place  of  festering  grievances,  democracy  offers  the  rule  of  law,  the  peaceful 
resolution of disputes, and the habits of advancing interests through compromises.”59 
Elsewhere, President Bush argued that democratic regimes were inimical to Jihadist 
ideology and that encouraging democratic development and elections in the Arab 
Middle  East  struck  a  blow against  the  enemy.  In  his  November  2003 speech  at 
Whitehall, President Bush claimed that 
In democratic and successful societies, men and women do not swear 
allegiance to malcontents and murderers;  they turn their hearts and 
labor  to  building better  lives.  And democratic  governments  do  not 
shelter terrorist camps or attack their peaceful neighbors; they honor 
the aspirations and dignity of their own people. In our conflict with 
terror and tyranny, we have an unmatched advantage,  a power that 
cannot be resisted, and that is the appeal of freedom to all mankind.60 
Invoking both the universal desire for freedom and the apparently inherent pacifying 
effects of elections and representative government on political extremism, the Bush 
administration consistently held as an article of faith that democracy represented the 
single best solution to the problem of authoritarianism and Jihadist terrorism, as it 
alone  could  resolve  all  of  the  problems  that  encouraged  the  growth  of  Jihadist 
ideology.61
58 Ibid. 
59 NSS 2006, pp. 10-11.
60 'President Bush Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London'. 
61 'President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy'. Ronald Reagan 
Building and International Trade Center, Washington, D.C., 6 October 2005. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-3.html, accessed 15 February 2007.
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The Case of Iraq
The  proposition  contained  within  the  Bush  Doctrine  that  authoritarian  regimes 
fostered Jihadist terrorism and that democracy was the panacea to this problem was 
most  consistently  linked to  regime change in  Iraq.62 A  large  number  of  scholars 
critical of regime change in Iraq have pointed out that many influential foreign policy 
makers  linked Saddam Hussein's  regime to  Jihadist  terrorism from the time they 
assumed  office.  Influential  non-neoconservative  figures,  such  as  Rumsfeld  and 
Cheney, and senior neoconservative policymakers and advisors such as Wolfowitz, 
Feith  and  Perle,  had  been  pushing  for  regime  change  in  Iraq  since  the  Bush 
administration's first National Security Council meeting in January 2001.63 A number 
of these individuals brought into government many aspects of the policy advocacy 
they had pursued at the Project for a New American Century and in neoconservative 
journals  in  the  1990's.64 In  the  nine  months  before  the  September  11  attacks, 
neoconservatives  within  and  outside  of  government  were  frustrated  at  the 
administration's  lack  of  decisive  action  on  Iraq,  and  again  repeated  their  long-
standing warnings from the late 1990's about the dangers Saddam Hussein posed and 
the opportunities for regional political transformation the demise of his regime would 
bring. 
After the September 11 attacks, many neoconservatives and their allies in the 
administration  pushed  hard  for  the  adoption  of  policies  of  regime  change  and 
democratisation in Iraq as the top priority of the war on terrorism.65 James Bamford 
points out that notes of Donald Rumsfeld's conversations with his staff late in the day 
of September 11 2001 read that he wanted the “best info fast: judge whether good 
enough to hit  S.H [Saddam Hussein]  at  same time.  Not  only U.B.L [Osama Bin 
Laden].” “Go massive... sweep it all up. Things related, and not.”66 Shortly after the 
attacks, Paul Wolfowitz similarly began pressing the apparent linkages between Iraq, 
62 For the Bush administration's conceptualisation of the dangers of Iraq, see National Security 
Advisor Condoleezza Rice, 'Principals Committee Review of Iraq Policy Paper'. The Situation 
Room, The White House, 29 October 2002, pp. 2-3, published in Feith, appendix five, pp. 541-3. 
63 Bamford, pp. 284-5; Packer, pp. 39-41. 
64 Packer, pp. 39-41. 
65 For a good example of pre-September 11 planning on options for dealing with the threat of Iraq, 
see Donald Rumsfeld, 'Memo on Iraq: Working Paper. Close Hold, Secret/Noforn'. Department of 
Defence, 27 July 2001, published in Feith, appendix 3, pp. 535-8. For critical discussion of 
neoconservative planning for regime change in Iraq before September 11, and the way in which 
this intensified following the attacks, see Glenn Greenwald, A Tragic Legacy: How a Good Vs.  
Evil Mentality Destroyed the Bush Presidency. New York, Crown Publishers, 2007, pp. 97-100; 
Packer, pp. 41-5. 
66 Bamford, pp. 285-6.
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Al  Qaeda  and,  implicitly,  the  events  of  September  11,  especially  at  a  keynote 
National Security Council meeting on the war on terrorism held at Camp David a 
week  after  the  attacks.67 Former  Bush  administration  Counter-Terrorism  chief, 
Richard Clarke, claims in Against All Enemies that Wolfowitz was especially eager 
to target Iraq first as a response to the terrorist attacks, believing that this, and not 
Afghanistan, was where the war on terrorism should begin.68 Furthermore, according 
to  Bob  Woodward's  account  in  Plan  of  Attack,  Rumsfeld  and  Feith  agreed  in 
principle with the idea of regime change in Iraq as the first response to the attacks, 
but this was opposed by Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice and George Tenet, who 
convinced President Bush to put such an option aside for the time being.69 Recent 
publications have revealed that despite regime change then being officially off the 
table, planning for military action against Iraq nonetheless began in late September 
2001, with Rumsfeld directing his military chiefs to begin drawing up new war plans 
for  Iraq  and  to  reconsider  their  assumptions  about  the  overall  threat  of  Saddam 
Hussein in light of the terrorist attacks.70 This showed that among neoconservatives 
and their allies there was a significant sense of urgency immediately after September 
11 that striking Saddam Hussein was key to the regional political transformation they 
believed was required to defeat terrorism in the Middle East.71
67 Ibid; For a sympathetic assessment of Wolfowitz's argument at Camp David, see Feith, pp. 48-52, 
passim; For brief critical appraisals, see Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military 
Adventure in Iraq. London, Penguin Books, 2007, pp. 30-1; See also Lawrence Freedman, A 
Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2008, 
p. 7.  
68 Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror. New York, Free Press, 
2004, pp. 231-2, 237-8; For additional discussion of some of the issues Clarke raises, see Keller, 
'The Sunshine Warrior'. 
69 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack. New York, Simon and Schuster, 2004, pp. 22, 25-6; Douglas 
Feith also offers a similar account of the meeting at Camp David, and although his apparent aim is 
to paint his civilian peers of the Defence Department as wise pragmatists aware of the risks of 
action and inaction regarding Iraq, his narrative reinforces that produced by Woodward, Clarke 
and others critics, as it shows that neoconservatives at the Pentagon were in fact pressing for 
regime change in Iraq only a week after the attacks. See Feith, pp. 48-52. 
70 Feith, pp. 14-16.
71 Although Douglas Feith repeatedly claims in his memoir, War and Decision, that detailed planning 
on regime change in Iraq had not commenced until some time after the September 11 attacks, and 
that no decisions had been made on this action, he provides a narrative where Rumsfeld asks for 
military options for an invasion of Iraq on September 29 2001 – mere weeks after the September 
11 attacks.  Furthermore, Feith actually reinforces the claims of critics like Woodward and Clarke 
when he recounts how the potential for military action against Iraq came up repeatedly in one of 
the first National Security Council meetings after September 11, not because any planners believed 
Iraq was directly linked to the attacks, but because it was believed only days removed from the 
attacks that regime change in Iraq would be key to victory in the war on terrorism. These examples 
contradict Feith's own assertions later in his memoir where he claims that Iraq was only later 
conceived as a threat and that war was only decided upon in late 2002. This reinforces again the 
fact that neoconservatives with prescriptions for regime change in Iraq that were formulated in the 
late 1990's were indeed intent on implementing these aims shortly after the terrorist attacks. See 
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As 'phase one'  of  the war on terrorism commenced in Afghanistan in late 
2001,  neoconservatives  within  the  Bush  administration  turned  their  focus  onto 
conceptually linking Iraq to the war on terrorism and the need to promote democracy 
through regime change. In November 2001, Paul Wolfowitz convened a meeting of a 
group of neoconservative and conservative foreign policy intellectuals involved with 
think  tanks  such  as  the  Project  for  a  New American  Century  and the  American 
Enterprise Institute, in order to assess the scope of the war on terror in the Arab 
Middle East.72 Calling themselves “Bletchley II,” after the name “Bletchley” used by 
the  program which  broke  the  German  secret  codes  of  WWII,  this  group,  which 
included Fareed Zakaria,  Bernard Lewis,  Fouad Ajami,  Mark Palmer,  Ruel  Marc 
Gerecht and James Q Wilson, produced a paper entitled “The Delta of Terrorism.”73 
The  Bletchley  II  group  argued  that  Jihadist  terrorism  was  an  existential  threat 
comparable to Soviet communism during the Cold War, and that the nexus of this 
threat lay in belligerent authoritarian regimes such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq.74 Most 
participants in Bletchley II agreed that overthrowing Saddam Hussein was key to 
winning the war on terrorism, and that replacing his regime with a liberal democracy 
would fatally undermine Jihadist  ideology.75 The “Delta of Terrorism” paper was 
presented  to  President  Bush  and  his  national  security  team  in  December  2001, 
impressing Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Rice alike. This paper helped to influence 
the  formulation  of  the  Bush  Doctrine's  interventionist  rationales  towards  Iraq, 
providing additional concepts that emerged as policy over the following year.76
To some extent, the linkages made between the war on terrorism and regime 
change  and  democratisation  in  Iraq  were  also  influenced  by  the  interventionist 
thinking of neoconservatives outside of the government. Senior policy makers and 
the  President  himself  appeared  to  have  embraced  many elements  of  the  policies 
advocated after September 11 by the Project for a New American Century and The 
Weekly  Standard.  President  Bush  stated  as  he  declared  the  war  on  terrorism  in 
September 2001 that “any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will 
Feith, pp. 14-16, 48-9, 51-2,  218-21.
72 For the most detailed discussion to date of the Blectchly II meeting, see Bob Woodward, State of  
Denial: Bush at War Part III. New York, Simon and Schuster, 2006, pp. 83-4, 498-9. Fukuyama 
also makes implicit mention of the Bletchley II meeting in After the Neocons, although he was not 
involved in this meeting, and Feith too makes brief mention of this meeting in War and Decision, 
but neither go into the detail Woodward offers in his account.
73 Woodward, State of Denial, pp. 83-4.
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
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be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”77 Through this and similar 
statements, the Bush administration expanded the scope of the war on terrorism to 
include states deemed responsible for this menace;  just  as  the Project for a  New 
American Century had demanded in its letter published on 20 September, and as a 
number  of  writers  at  the  Weekly  Standard then  advocated  as  well.78 As  they 
developed their case for regime change in Iraq, President Bush and his foreign policy 
advisers also increased their repetition of the argument that it was Saddam Hussein's 
despotism that was primarily responsible for fostering terrorism in the region. Such 
statements again ran parallel to the arguments repeatedly made by the Project for a 
New American Century.79 Neoconservatives outside of the Bush administration did 
not have wide-ranging influence on thinking about Iraq. Nonetheless, these groups 
did provide a number of additional policy prescriptions for intervention that were 
often carried into official policy making and reinforced by the arguments of their 
neoconservative peers within the government.
Following  its  invasion  of  Iraq  in  March  2003,  the  Bush  administration 
consistently reiterated the centrality of democratisation in the state to winning the 
war on terrorism. The theme of Iraq as the front line of the battle of ideas for the 
future  of  the  world  gained  increased  prominence  in  the  explanations  offered  by 
President Bush for the growing violence in Iraq. In a speech in March 2006, the 
President asserted that “the terrorists and Saddamists have been brutal in the pursuit 
of [their] strategy. They target innocent civilians; they blow up police officers; they 
attack mosques; and they commit other acts of horrific violence for the cameras. 
Their  objective  is  to  stop  Iraq's  democratic  progress.”80 The  President  regularly 
linked the war in Iraq to what he conceived as the wider battle between the forces of 
freedom and tyranny in the Middle East. Thus, Bush claimed in a June 2007 speech 
that the on-going Jihadist violence in Iraq was a part of a wider conflict against the 
77 'Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People'. United States Capitol, 
Washington, D.C., 20 September 2001.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
78 Project for a New American Century, 'Letter to President Bush on War on Terrorism'. Many 
signatories of this letter also regularly wrote in the Weekly Standard in the months after the 
September 11 attacks.
79 Kristol, 'Next Phase of the War on Terrorism'; For good analysis of neoconservative thinking on 
Iraq within the Bush administration, and some of the ways that this was reinforced by thinking 
external to the administration, see Mann, chapter 21, passim. 
80 'President Discusses Democracy in Iraq with Freedom House'. Hyatt Regency Capitol Hill,
Washington, D.C., 29 March 2006. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060329-
6.html, accessed 2 February 2007.
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evil forces of the region.81 President Bush argued that the victory of democracy in 
Iraq was closely linked to stemming violence elsewhere, especially that emanating 
from  Hezbollah  and  Hamas,  as  well  as  to  pressuring  Syria  to  cease  supporting 
terrorism and to challenging Iran's machinations in the region.82 Each of these issues 
was repackaged as part of the same monolithic threat of authoritarian regimes linked 
to terrorism, and the Bush administration often continued to insist in its last year in 
power that by promoting democracy, Jihadist terrorism in the Middle East could be 
undermined. 
The 'Democratic Domino Effect'
Present in a number of the documents that make up the Bush Doctrine, such as the 
two  National  Security  Strategy  documents  and  President  Bush's  re-inauguration 
speech, was the claim that as a result  of regime change and the establishment of 
democracy in Iraq,  a 'democratic domino effect'  would occur in the Arab Middle 
East.  President Bush and his foreign policy advisers  confidently claimed that the 
example of successful liberal democracy in Iraq would help to bring about popular 
pressure for change and reform in authoritarian Arab states, including 'rogue' regimes 
like Syria,  as well  as  American allies like Saudi Arabia,  Jordan and Egypt.  This 
would lead to a wave of change reminiscent to that which swept Eastern Europe and 
the  Soviet  Union at  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  with  the  peaceful  dismantling  of 
authoritarian governments again giving repressed people the freedom they desired, 
allowing  for  the  construction  of  liberal  democracies  and  enhancing  security  and 
peace.83 
81 'President Bush Visits Naval War College, Discusses Iraq, War on Terror'. Spruance Auditorium, 
Newport, Rhode Island, 28 June 2007. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070628-14.html, accessed 3 November 
2007. 
82 Ibid.
83 For useful discussion of the way that some key policy makers of the Bush administration 
conceived of the spread of democracy in the Arab world as analogous to the collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, see Thomas Carothers, Marina Ottaway, 'Conclusion: 
Getting to the Core' in Carothers, Ottaway (Eds), p. 266. 
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The Bush Administration's Argument
Key figures in the Bush administration, such as President Bush, Paul Wolfowitz and 
Condoleezza Rice, regularly argued that the establishment of democracy in Iraq was 
the key to unleashing a wave of democratic transformation in the Middle East and to 
resolving long-standing conflicts in the region. From this perspective, the emergence 
of liberal democracy in Iraq would have a large and beneficial demonstration effect 
on the region,  as it  would pressure other regimes to dismantle their  authoritarian 
systems. This would do much to undermine the root cause of terrorism and conflict 
and help to bring freedom to millions of Arab people.84 In his 2004 State of the Union 
Address, President Bush claimed that democracy in Iraq would “light the way for 
others, and help transform a troubled part of the world.”85 Indeed, “the victory of 
freedom in Iraq” would “bring more hope and progress to a troubled region,” as it 
would cause a wave of democratic change to sweep the Middle East.86 Similarly, in 
an  April  2006  speech,  President  Bush  declared  that  “a  free  Iraq  will  inspire 
democratic reformers from Damascus to Tehran, and send a signal across the broader 
Middle East that the future belongs not to terrorism but to freedom.”87
Some other influential members of the Bush administration similarly held that 
promoting  democracy  in  Iraq  would  foster  a  regional  democratic  domino  effect. 
Condoleezza Rice consistently argued that promoting democracy in Iraq was integral 
to fundamentally changing the political order of the Middle East. In her confirmation 
hearing as Secretary of State in January 2005, Rice contended that 
The  success  of  freedom  in...  Iraq  will  give  strength  and  hope  to 
reformers throughout the region, and accelerate the pace of reforms 
already underway. From Morocco to Jordan to Bahrain, we are seeing 
elections  and  new  protections  for  women  and  minorities,  and  the 
beginnings of political pluralism. Political, civil, and business leaders 
have issued stirring calls  for political,  economic and social change. 
Increasingly, the people are speaking, and their message is clear: the 
future of the region is to live in liberty.88
84 For good discussion of this aspect of the Bush Doctrine's thinking, see Packer, pp. 57-8. 
85 'State of the Union Address'.
86 'State of the Union Address'. Chamber of the U.S. House of Representatives, The United States 
Capitol Washington, D.C., 2 February 2005.
87 'President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror'.
88 'Opening Remarks by Secretary of State-Designate Dr. Condoleezza Rice'. Secretary Condoleezza 
Rice, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC., 18 January 2005. 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/40991.htm, accessed 29 April 2008.
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Relating democratic change in the Middle East  to the collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe,  Rice  held that  people should not  doubt  that  similar  monumental 
political changes could also be brought about in a short period in the Arab world.89 In 
a similar vein to Rice, Paul Wolfowitz argued that “success in Iraq would demoralize 
those  who  preach  doctrines  of  hatred  and  oppression  and  subjugation.  It  would 
encourage those who dream the ancient dream, the ageless desire for freedom.”90 
Wolfowitz claimed that the United States could bring democracy to the Middle East 
by  establishing  a  model  regime  in  Iraq,  as  this  would  bring  about  significant 
clamouring for democracy in authoritarian states and thereby spark rapid political 
changes across the region.91
Initiating a regional democratic domino effect through armed democratisation 
in Iraq was viewed by President Bush and others as the key to resolving the Israel-
Palestine  conflict.  The  establishment  of  democracy  in  the  Palestinian  territories 
would apparently undermine the appeal of extremism, provide a firm basis for the 
“Roadmap  for  Peace”  and  ensure  a  two-state  solution  to  the  conflict.92 In  his 
February 2003 speech to the American Enterprise Institute, President Bush linked 
regime change and democratisation in Iraq to the resolution of the Israel-Palestine 
conflict, arguing that 
Success  in  Iraq  could  also  begin  a  new  stage  for  Middle  Eastern 
peace,  and  set  in  motion  progress  towards  a  truly  democratic 
Palestinian  state.  The  passing  of  Saddam  Hussein's  regime  will 
deprive terrorist networks of a wealthy patron that pays for terrorist 
training, and offers rewards to families of suicide bombers. And other 
regimes will be given a clear warning that support for terror will not 
be tolerated.93
President  Bush  claimed  that  the  first  step  towards  resolving  the  Israel-Palestine 
conflict was not to confront issues such as the status of Jerusalem, the positioning of 
borders,  the  nature  of  right  of  return  and  the  problem of  Israeli  settlements  on 
occupied land, but rather “the serious work of economic development, and political 
89 Ibid. 
90 'On Iraq'. Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Washington, D.C., 
Wednesday, 16 October 2002. http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=295, 
accessed 13 May 2008.
91 Ibid. 
92 'President Discusses Roadmap for Peace in the Middle East'. Remarks by the President on the 
Middle East, The Rose Garden, 14 March 2003. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030314-4.html, accessed 21 April 2008. For 
critical assessment of these claims, see chapter four and the conclusion of this thesis. 
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reform, and reconciliation” in the Palestinian territories.94 According to Bush,  the 
“end of the present regime in Iraq would create such an opportunity” to change the 
dynamics of the conflict,  as  it  would press the Palestinians to democratise.95 The 
clamouring for democratic change in the region engendered by regime change in Iraq 
would have a rapid, positive effect on the climate of authoritarianism and despair that 
drove Palestinians to political extremism and undermined previous hopes for peace.96 
This  thinking  reflected  what  Jonathan  Monten  of  Harvard  University  labels  a 
“bandwagoning” logic, where through American leadership and the example of Iraqi 
democracy, Palestinians would realise that peace and self-determination were best 
achieved  through  democracy.97 Accordingly,  they  would  dismantle  their  existing 
authoritarian government and rally behind democratic change.98 
The Bush administration also claimed in more general terms that the example 
of  successful  liberal  democracy  in  Iraq  would  radiate  across  the  Middle  East. 
Democratisation in Iraq would place the Syrian Ba'ath Party under pressure to reform 
or eventually be overthrown, and would compel Iran to cease its support for terrorism 
and to  reform its  highly  illiberal  domestic  political  system.99 Democratic  change 
would also sweep America's Arab allies, as the example of Iraqi democracy would 
bring about clamouring for liberalisation and elections in Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf 
States  and even Saudi  Arabia.  This  process  was to  be  analogous to  the wave of 
democratisation  many  neoconservatives  believe  was  engendered  by  the  Reagan 
administration's  support  for  democracy  in  the  late  1980's,  where  authoritarian 
American  allies  such  as  South  Korea,  Chile,  the  Philippines  and  South  Africa 
liberalised their governments under American pressure.100 A repeat of such dramatic 
changes in the context of the Middle East would strike at the roots of terrorism, give 
the  people  of  the  Arab  world  their  freedom and  allow for  the  normalisation  of 
relations between Israel and Arab states.101 Thus, regime change and democratisation 
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid.
97 Monten, p. 150. 
98 Ibid. 
99 'President Addresses Nation, Discusses Iraq, War on Terror'. Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 28 June 
2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050628-7.html, accessed 3 February 
2007; See also Richard N. Haass, 'Towards Greater Democracy in the Muslim World: Remarks to 
the Council on Foreign Relations'. Washington, D.C., 4 December, 2002. 
http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/15686.htm, accessed 16 May 2007.  
100 For discussion of this view, see chapter one of this thesis. 
101 For a critical appraisal of this thinking, see Rachelle Marshall, 'Bush Promises Democracy But 
Iraqis and Palestinians Aren't Cheering'. The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Vol. 23, 
No. 3, (Apr., 2004), pp. 7-8.
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in Iraq could fundamentally alter Arab domestic political landscapes and the present 
condition of the region for the better.  
The 'Arab Spring' of 2005
President Bush and senior cabinet officials confidently asserted by 2005 that their 
propositions about an Arab democratic domino effect had been vindicated. Events in 
the Middle East during 2005 seemed to strongly suggest that democratisation in Iraq 
had  indeed  initiated  a  wave  of  democratic  change  in  the  region,  fostering  a 
heightened sense  of  optimism among senior  Bush  administration  figures  that  the 
Bush Doctrine's freedom agenda had come to fruition and that an “Arab Spring” had 
arrived. 
In a March 2005 speech devoted to discussing democracy in the Middle East, 
President  Bush  outlined  how  influential  calls  for  reform  and  liberalisation  were 
spreading throughout the region. President Bush commented that 
Progress in the broader Middle East has seemed frozen in place for 
decades. Yet at last, clearly and suddenly, the thaw has begun. The 
people of Afghanistan have embraced free government, after suffering 
under one of the most backward tyrannies on earth. The voters in Iraq 
defied threats of murder, and have set their country on a path to full 
democracy. The people of the Palestinian Territories cast their ballots 
against violence and corruption of the past. And any who doubt the 
appeal of freedom in the Middle East can look to Lebanon, where the 
Lebanese people are demanding a free and independent nation. In the 
words of one Lebanese observer, "Democracy is knocking at the door 
of this country and, if it's successful in Lebanon, it is going to ring the 
doors of every Arab regime."102 
The President especially emphasised the political progress he saw occurring in the 
Palestinian territories and in Lebanon in early 2005. Following the death of Yassir 
Arafat in November 2004, Palestinian presidential elections took place in January 
2005 and the “moderate” Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas came to power, initiating 
reforms in  the Palestinian Authority  while  also expressly rejecting terrorism as a 
tactic.103 Meanwhile,  following  the  assassination  of  their  popular  former  Prime 
Minister Rafiq al Hariri in February 2005, the people of Lebanon threw out almost 
102 'President Discusses War on Terror'.
103 Ibid.
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thirty years of Syrian occupation in April 2005 through the “Cedar revolution;” a 
largely peaceful uprising that some compared to the beginning of the collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe.104 President Bush strongly supported such changes in 
Lebanon, stating in soaring language common at the time that 
All  the  world  is  witnessing  your  great  movement  of  conscience. 
Lebanon's  future  belongs  in  your  hands,  and  by  your  courage, 
Lebanon's future will be in your hands. The American people are on 
your side. Millions across the earth are on your side. The momentum 
of freedom is on your side, and freedom will prevail in Lebanon.105
President Bush and other senior officials  also asserted that  the democratic 
domino effect was bringing about beneficial political changes among America's long-
time Arab allies. Bush claimed in his March 2005 speech, as with many subsequent 
speeches during the year, that the example of Iraq was influencing changes in states 
such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf States.106 Egypt was set to hold its 
first  competitive  presidential  election  during  2005,  Saudi  Arabia  was  to  hold 
staggered  municipal  elections  with  male  suffrage,  and  electoral  reforms  and 
enfranchisement was increasingly occurring in the Gulf monarchies and Jordan.107 
Condoleezza Rice emphasised these apparent movements towards democratic change 
and pressed for further reform in a speech at the American University of Cairo in 
June  2005.  Rice  outlined  the  changes  that  had  occurred  in  the  region  to  date, 
especially elections in Iraq and Palestine,  and political  developments in Lebanon, 
before  publicly  pressuring  the  regime  of  Hosni  Mubarak  to  hold  free  and  fair 
elections.108 Rice argued that 
President Mubarak’s decision to amend the country’s constitution and 
hold  multiparty  elections  is  encouraging.  President  Mubarak  has 
unlocked the door for change. Now, the Egyptian Government must 
put its faith in its own people. We are all concerned for the future of 
Egypt’s reforms when peaceful supporters of democracy  – men and 
women – are not free from violence. The day must come when the rule 
of  law  replaces  emergency  decrees  – and  when  the  independent 
judiciary replaces arbitrary justice.109 
Rice emphasised that Mubarak needed to “meet objective standards that define every 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid.
108 'Remarks at the American University in Cairo'.
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free election,” and to accept the outcome of the vote, even if this cost him power.110 
This was an unusual position, as previous American administrations refrained from 
publicly pressuring their Arab allies into democratic reform in such a way.111 This 
reflected two key concepts of the Bush Doctrine: that the authoritarian status quo of 
the Middle East needed to be fundamentally reformed, and that contrary to realist 
claims, promoting democratic values, even among close authoritarian allies, would 
inherently enhance American security and national interests.112
The “Promise of Democratic Peace” in the Middle East
Present in the terms of many of the documents that constitute the Bush Doctrine was 
the claim that the unfolding of a democratic domino effect outwards from Iraq would 
lead to the spread of democratic peace in the Middle East. Leading foreign policy 
authorities in the Bush administration asserted as an article of faith that democratic 
regimes did not fight with one another and did not breed ideologies of violence.113 
According to these figures,  the growth of democracy would have a  wide-ranging 
pacifying  effect  on  conflict  and  extremism  in  the  Middle  East.  Embracing  the 
simplified  neoconservative  version  of  democratic  peace,  the  Bush  administration 
asserted that democracies were inherently pacific in nature and that for this very 
reason it was imperative to encourage the spread of democracy in the Middle East.
The democratic peace theory was consistently invoked by President Bush and 
his advisers as the cornerstone of a strategy to pacify the Middle East and ensure its 
security into the future.114 The 2006 National Security Strategy captured succinctly 
this belief in the importance of democratic peace when it argued that  
Governments that honour their citizens' dignity and desire for freedom 
tend  to  uphold  responsible  conduct  towards  other  nations,  while 
governments that brutalise their people also threaten the security and 
110 Ibid.
111 For good discussion of Rice's positions on spreading democracy to America's authoritarian Arab 
allies, see Marcus Mabry, Condoleezza Rice: Naked Ambition. London, Gibson Square, 2007, pp. 
264-5. 
112 These claims are critically assessed in some detail in chapter five and the conclusion of this thesis. 
113 For critical analysis of the Bush administration's faith in democratic peace, see Owen, 'Iraq and the 
Democratic Peace'; See also Shalom, 'The Civilisation of Clashes', p. 549; Desch, 'America's 
Liberal Illiberalism', p. 22; Moses, pp. 49-50. 
114 For an examination of this logic, see Monten, p. 112.
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peace of other nations. Because democracies are the most responsible 
members  of  the  international  system,  promoting  democracy  is  the 
most  effective  long-term  measure  for  strengthening  international 
stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-
supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity.115 
The  National  Security  Strategy  document  asserted  that  “peace  and  international 
stability  are  most  reliably  built  on  a  foundation  of  freedom.”116 As  regime  type 
determined a state's foreign policy, an Arab world comprising of a community of 
democratic  states  would  be  peaceful,  as  it  had  been  empirically  proven  beyond 
question that democracies did not engage in aggression with one another. 
 Echoing neoconservative intellectuals and the activist liberal thinkers from 
which  they  derived  the  theory,  many  in  the  Bush  administration  simplified 
democratic  peace  theory  into  an  equation  whereby  the  creation  of  successful 
democracies in the Arab world would inevitably bring about peace.117 President Bush 
contended in  his  2005 State  of  the Union address  that  the  growth of  democratic 
regimes would be advantageous for the advancement of peace “because democracies 
respect their own people and their neighbours” and thus “the advance of freedom will 
lead  to  peace.”118 Indeed,  Bush  held  that dictatorship  inexorably  led  to  foreign 
policies of aggression and brinksmanship, while democracy ensured benign relations 
and the defusing of regional tensions. As President Bush made clear in a speech in 
May 2003, “the expansion of liberty throughout the world is the best guarantee of 
security throughout the world. Freedom is the way to peace.”119
Arguments in favour of bringing about a democratic peace in the Middle East 
were  regularly  articulated  by  leading  neoconservative  and  non-neoconservative 
figures of the Bush administration alike. In a Senate committee testimony in May 
2005, Paula Dobriansky argued that “we know now more than ever that the way a 
government treats its own people bears directly on how it acts in the international 
arena. We know that the best defense of our own borders comes from the growth of 
freedom abroad,”  and this  was  particularly true in relation to  the Middle East.120 
115 NSS 2006, p. 3. 
116 Ibid, p. iii. 
117 For discussion of the version of democratic peace theory expressed by the Bush administration, see 
Shalom, 'For a Democratic Peace of Mind'.
118 'State of the Union Address'.
119 'President Bush Presses for Peace in the Middle East'.
120 Paula J. Dobriansky, 'Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy'. Testimony before the House 
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Dobriansky held that from the outset of the war on terrorism, President Bush had 
been committed to a policy of activist democracy promotion in the Middle East, and 
always conceived the spread of democratic peace to be integral to the security and 
future  of  the  region.121 Dobriansky contended that  the  conclusions  of  democratic 
peace theory made it imperative that the United States encourage the development of 
democracy in the Middle East, as this by definition would ensure the advancement of 
peace. 
The aim of bringing about a democratic peace in the Middle East was also a 
common theme expressed by Condoleezza Rice. As an academic, Rice had been a 
foreign policy realist and had often discounted the influence of regime type on a 
state's foreign policy. Following the September 11 attacks, however, Rice came to 
embrace the idea that regime type did matter in international relations. According to 
her  biographer,  Marcus  Mabry,  after  September  11  Rice  underwent  a 
“metamorphosis” from being a “George Herbert Walker Bush Republican to being a 
George W. Bush Republican,” casting aside much of her realist thinking in favour of 
a new and more 'transformational'  outlook.122 Rice now believed that encouraging 
democratic peace was key to American security and the resolution of long-standing 
conflicts.123 In a December 2005  Washington Post  article, Rice expressed her new-
found  support  for  democratic  peace  when  she  argued  that  the  threats  and 
opportunities of the post-September 11 world
Lead us to conclude that the fundamental character of regimes matters 
more  today  than  the  international  distribution  of  power.  Insisting 
otherwise is imprudent and impractical. The goal of our statecraft is to 
help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet 
the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the 
international system. Attempting to draw neat, clean lines between our 
security interests and our democratic ideals does not reflect the reality 
of today's world. Supporting the growth of democratic institutions in 
all nations is not some moralistic flight of fancy; it is the only realistic 
response to our present challenges.124 
121 Ibid. Dobriansky's claim that the Bush administration was consistent in its beliefs about the need to 
promote democracy in the Middle East contradicts Feith's claims that these ideas did not 
significantly motivate the Bush administration, or that they existed as interventionist justifications 
well before the war in 2003. This reinforces the post-facto nature of Feith's claims and shows the 
way in which omissions in his memoir paint an inaccurate picture of the Bush administration's 
thinking. 
122 Mabry, pp. 182-3.
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124 Rice, 'The Promise of Democratic Peace'; For discussion of this thinking, see Mabry, pp. 182-3. 
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Rice argued that  securing a democratic peace in the Middle East would help the 
United States to win the war on terrorism, ensure American security, and improve the 
present condition of the Arab world.125 Rice wrote “our statecraft must now be guided 
by the undeniable truth that democracy is the only assurance of lasting peace and 
security between states, because it is the only guarantee of freedom and justice within 
states.”126 According to Rice, regime type primarily defined a state's foreign policy, 
not its relative power or other materialist factors. Thus, a Middle East dominated by 
democracies would be considerably more peaceful and secure than the authoritarian 
order so long tolerated in the past by the United States.127
Middle East Democratisation and American Strategic Interests
In their numerous speeches and policy papers on democratisation in the Middle East, 
the  leading  foreign  policy  figures  of  the  Bush  administration  argued  that,  as  a 
cumulative result of the success of each of their previous propositions about regime 
change and democracy promotion, the United States' material strategic interests in 
the  Middle  East  and  overall  national  security  would  be  enhanced.  This  thinking 
reflected  the  core  tenet  of  neoconservatism  that  promoting  moral  causes  abroad 
advanced  American  national  interests,  as  there  was  no  separating  realism  and 
idealism  in  American  foreign  policy  since  the  United  States  was  a  uniquely 
benevolent and self-interested power at once.
The Bush administration claimed that  the United States  could advance its 
national  interests  and  democratic  values  in  the  Middle  East  simultaneously. 
Democratisation in Iraq and the region was conceived as integral to expanding and 
maintaining  American  hegemonic power.  With  reference to  the Middle East,  the 
2006 National Security Strategy claimed that “the United States has long championed 
freedom because doing so reflects our values and advances our interests.”128 Indeed, 
pushing  for  democracy  in  the  Middle  East  “advances  our  interests  because  the 
survival of liberty at home increasingly depends on the success of liberty abroad.”129 
125 Rice, 'The Promise of Democratic Peace'. 
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Condoleezza Rice similarly contended that only the fusion of values and interests, 
which  she  labelled  “practical  idealism,”  could  serve  as  an  effective  basis  for 
American foreign policy.130 Rice was adamant that in the Middle East this meant 
promoting liberal  democracy was the most  effective way of  advancing American 
interests, security and power.131  
According  to  the  two  National  Security  Strategies  and  other  documents, 
democratic Arab regimes would be inherently pro-American and would therefore act 
in accordance with American interests. A democratic Iraqi government would ensure 
the security of its oil and the territorial integrity of the Iraqi state, would allow basing 
rights for the United States in order for it to fight the war on terrorism and project its 
power  into  the  Middle  East,  and  would  generally  support  the  consolidation  of  a 
regional Pax Americana.132 Moreover, once regional democratisation took hold, other 
Arab states, both enemies like Syria, and troubled allies like Saudi Arabia, would 
also fall in line behind American regional dominance and would work closely with 
the United States to uphold its power and its material interests in the region.133 The 
logic  of  “bandwagoning”  was  apparent  here  once  again,  as  it  was  assumed  that 
democratic Arab states would rally behind American leadership because they held 
the same democratic values as the hegemon and understood that maintaining stability 
advanced the common interests they shared with the United States.134
Some members of the Bush administration claimed that alongside upholding 
American  regional  hegemony  and  joining  in  the  'war  of  ideas'  against  Jihadist 
ideology,  Arab democracies  would  also become close  allies  in  the  military fight 
against terrorism. In a December 2005 Foreign Affairs article, Paula Dobriansky and 
Henry Crumpton, then the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism at the State 
Department, contended that in the Middle East 
New and emerging democracies not  only provide viable,  legitimate 
recourse  for  their  own  citizens'  grievances,  but  also  offer  greater 
opportunities  for  counterterrorism  partnerships  with  other 
130 Rice, 'The Promise of Democratic Peace'. 
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democracies.  Interdependent,  networked  liberal  institutions 
throughout  the  globe,  reinforced  by  the  structure  of  democratic 
governments,  provide  the  best  means  to  defeat  the  interdependent, 
networked  terrorist  cells  of  radical  extremists  who seek  to  destroy 
democracy and, in fact, the nation-state system itself.135
In a region as crucial to American national security as the Middle East, Dobriansky 
and Crumpton claimed that winning the war on terror required democratic allies. 
Such partners allowed for the most effective anti-terrorism strategy, owing to higher 
levels  of  trust  and  co-operation  prevalent  in  relations  between  democracies,  and 
because of their shared sense of the threat posed by Jihadists and tyrants.136 President 
Bush consistently framed his support of democracy in Iraq in this manner, arguing 
that by standing by Iraqi democracy, the United States could help turn Iraq into a 
leading ally against terrorism.137 Democracy in the Arab world was thus viewed as 
integral to enhancing American security and national interests, as democratic Arab 
states would share the same outlook as the United States on important issues, and 
would be willing to uphold a regional Pax Americana that was beneficial to both 
their interests and those of the United States.
Conclusion
The Bush Doctrine's armed democratisation policies were the cornerstone of a post-
September 11 grand strategy aimed at transforming the political malaise of the Arab 
Middle East from which the Bush administration determined that Jihadist terrorism 
had emerged. The interventionist policies championed by the Bush Doctrine were 
intimately related to the justifications for regime change and democracy promotion in 
Iraq. Installing a new regime in Baghdad was seen as integral  to confronting the 
authoritarian roots of terrorism, to fostering a democratic domino effect in the region, 
to encouraging a democratic peace and to advancing American interests and security. 
Framing these policy assumptions were a set of broader theoretical claims about the 
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universal appeal of freedom and liberalism, the notion that in some instances where 
recalcitrant regimes resisted history's  arrow, a liberal  order needed to be brought 
about through the agency of American military power, and optimism that the large-
scale transformation of the Middle East was within the United States'  power and 
would bring about a range of positive results.
The Bush Doctrine's interventionist democratisation strategy represented the 
ascendancy  of  neoconservatism  to  the  heart  of  American  foreign  policy.  The 
confluence  of  neoconservative  influence  within  the  Bush  administration  and  the 
September 11 attacks created unique conditions that allowed for the formulation of a 
highly  ambitious  foreign  policy  of  interventionist  democracy  promotion  in  the 
Middle East. Neoconservative influence was by no means been absolute of course, 
and elements of the Bush Doctrine were shaped by the ideas of key figures such as 
Rice, as by Rumsfeld and Cheney, who shared much of the neoconservative outlook 
while in office but who were not,  strictly speaking,  neoconservatives themselves. 
Nonetheless, neoconservatives within and outside the administration offered the most 
compelling interventionist framework for understanding and dealing with the dangers 
the  United  States  faced  after  September  11,  providing  the  most  influential 
prescriptions  for  overcoming  the  terrorist  threat  through  the  democratic 
transformation of the Arab world by American power.
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Chapter Four
Theoretical Critiques of the Bush Doctrine
As  the  previous  chapter  helps  to  demonstrate,  the  Bush  administration  based  a 
number of its propositions about interventionist democratisation in the Middle East 
on  the  'activist'  version  of  liberal  international  relations  theory  expressed  by 
neoconservatives. These theories shaped democratisation policies which claimed that 
freedom, as understood in a western sense, was a universal aspiration, that liberal 
political,  economic  and  social  order  represented  the  'end  of  history,'  and  that 
democracy always equalled peace. Liberal theory provided the backbone on which 
the  Bush  Doctrine's  policies  were  built,  informing  the  Bush  administration's 
underlying propositions about how democracy would emerge in the Middle East. 
Since the announcement of the Bush Doctrine, a number of scholars have 
offered critical assessments of the theoretical propositions made in the speeches and 
policy documents that comprise this grand strategy. Why is it that scholars often find 
the  Bush  Doctrine's  theoretical  claims  problematic?  In  examining  the  critical 
literature, three broad avenues of argument are apparent. The first of these is that 
some scholars  believe the claims made in  the Bush Doctrine  are  often based on 
dubious  assumptions  about  the  universal  appeal  of  liberal  values  and  democratic 
government.  Secondly,  some  view  the  claims  made  by  President  Bush  and  his 
foreign policy advisers as contradictory, especially concerning the idea of fostering 
democracy through a top-down process of regime change and occupation in select 
states.  Finally,  there  is  a  view that  the  claims made in  the  Bush Doctrine  about 
democracy and peace lack caution and nuance when applied to Iraq and the wider 
Arab world. While there is not necessarily consensus among scholars over these three 
avenues of argument, some important elements the literature produced on Middle 
East  democratisation  and  the  Bush  Doctrine  during  the  past  five  years  have 
nonetheless often given prominence to these aspects of theoretical criticism.
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The Questions of Universal Freedom and the Global Appeal of 
Liberal Democracy
The  Bush  administration's  2002  National  Security  Strategy  captured  the  Bush 
Doctrine's essential claims about freedom when it argued that  “freedom is the non-
negotiable  demand  of  human  dignity;  the  birthright  of  every  person  – in  every 
civilisation.”1  On  this  basis,  President  Bush  and  senior  officials  around  him 
consistently maintained that 'freedom,' as the idea was conceived of in the United 
States,  was  universal  and  could  be  best  secured  and  upheld  through  liberal 
democratic  government.2 Yet  since  2002,  scholars  who  are  critical  of  the  Bush 
Doctrine  have  brought  into  question  the  idea  that  there  exists  a  shared  global 
understanding of freedom which inexorably lends itself  to the adoption of liberal 
values and democratic government. 
Universal Freedom?
In  his  critical  analysis  of  the  Bush  Doctrine,  published  in  2004,  University  of 
Richmond professor of political science Paul T. McCartney argues that “any abstract 
term such as freedom can only have a substantive meaning that is determined by its 
cultural context.”3 McCartney notes that “in the United States, the meaning of the 
term  “freedom”  has  evolved  as  American  notions  of  justice  have  changed  over 
time.”4 Thus, McCartney argues, the idea of freedom expressed by President Bush 
and others does not have a fixed or immutable state, since freedom as understood 
within the United States is itself shaped by the political and social contexts in which 
it emerged.5 If the meaning and value of 'freedom' is primarily determined in such a 
way, why would other societies conceive of freedom in inherently the same fashion 
as the American government  – especially owing to their  widely diverse histories, 
1 The White House, 'The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002'. 
Washington, 17 September 2002, p. iii. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html, accessed 1 May 
2007.
2 See discussion of the Bush Doctrine's claims about freedom in the first section of chapter three of 
this thesis.
3 McCartney, p. 422.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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traditions and norms? From differing conceptions of freedom, different varieties of 
political and social order can develop, each designed to uphold and advance the form 
of 'freedom' people chose to adopt.6 In this sense, 'freedom' and the political systems 
that are formulated to protect and advance it,  emerge out of an agreed collective 
understanding  of  the  values  ascribed  to  this  term in  a  given  social  and  cultural 
context, not from a universally-shared or innate conception of the idea.7 
The fact that the Bush Doctrine's definition of freedom is not universal brings 
into  question  a  guiding  assumption  of  the  Bush  administration's  democratisation 
policies.  President  Bush  and  his  foreign  policy  advisors  conflate  freedom  and 
democracy,  ignoring  that  simply  because  a  country  embraces  some  form  of 
democratic  practice  does  not  mean  that  its  people  now automatically  understand 
freedom in the same sense as the leaders of the United States. Moreover, while it is 
quite likely that people in authoritarian states often desire 'freedom' of some form, 
this  does  not  mean  they  inherently  have  in  mind  the  types  of  freedom deemed 
universal  by  the  Bush  administration,  or,  crucially,  that  they  will  protect  their 
understanding of freedom through political institutions familiar to the United States 
government.
The Problems of Liberal Universalism
One of the most problematic claims made in the documents that constitute the Bush 
Doctrine  was  the  idea  that  having  gained  freedom,  all  people  would  inherently 
choose political liberalism and its values system.8 In an article published in early 
2003, Edward Rhodes, the director of the Centre for Global Security and Democracy 
at Rutgers University, makes a strong and convincing case against this key claim. 
Rhodes  argues  that  in  President  Bush's  West  Point  speech  and  the  subsequent 
September  2002  National  Security  Strategy,  “the  Bush  administration  fails  to 
acknowledge the possibility that individuals who are free to choose may not choose 
what we believe is best for them – or indeed what, by some objective manner (if such 
a thing is conceivable) – is in fact best for them.”9 President Bush and other senior 
6 Shalom, 'Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism', p. 568.
7 Ibid.
8 For examples of this claim, see NSS 2002, pp. i-iii; NSS 2006, introduction; 'President Bush 
Sworn into Second Term'.
9 Rhodes, pp. 144-5.
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officials argued that the United States sought to encourage conditions through which 
all people would be given the opportunity to embrace liberal values and institutions, 
confident that there would be unanimous acceptance of this choice as the only viable 
option.10 Yet  this  effectively  means  that  the  people  of  the  world  are,  in  Rhodes 
words, “free to choose, but only to choose liberalism.”11 This is in truth “no choice... 
whatsoever,”  as  the  Bush  Doctrine  was  seemingly  unwilling  or  unable  to 
acknowledge that  people might  rationally opt  for a differing values system when 
given the opportunity to do so.12 Rhodes writes that “by denying the possibility that 
tastes (or even nutritional needs) may vary across societies, or seasons, or ages of 
life,  crusading liberals  blind themselves to the possibility that a  menu that offers 
global diners a single choice is a dictation, not a liberation.”13
In order for people in other countries to embrace liberal ideology and accept it 
as a legitimate world view, Rhodes contends that they themselves have to come to 
accept its “rightness.”14 According to Rhodes, “liberalism is not simply the absence 
of  illiberal,  or  anti-liberal  institutions,  like  tyranny  and  terrorism.  Nor  even  is 
liberalism simply the existence of particular democratic and free-market institutions. 
Liberalism is a philosophy, a set of beliefs.”15 Accepting the philosophy of liberalism 
and the norms and institutions that come with this is “in the final analysis an internal 
matter within each individual and society.”16 This means that liberalism has to be 
chosen by people themselves, and this “happens – or fails to happen – not because a 
hegemon wills it, but because of organic developments within human consciousness 
and societal operations, developments that render liberalism's assumptions plausible 
and give evidence that its norms will yield the benefits claimed.”17 In this sense, a 
foreign societies' embrace of liberal ideology cannot easily be made to occur at a 
given time and place through the application of American military power,  but  is 
rather an organic process within the society itself; one of trial, error and perhaps the 
eventual acceptance of liberal ideas over time.18
Conceiving of the development of liberalism as an organic process allows for 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid, pp. 141-2.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid, p. 141.
18 Ibid.
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the possibility, not considered in the Bush Doctrine, that free people can rationally 
make illiberal political choices. While free people might be motivated by any number 
of good reasons to embrace liberal ideas and norms over time, it is not inevitable that 
they  do  so.  There  always  exists  the  possibility  that  illiberal  or  authoritarian 
tendencies  can  emerge  among  individuals  and  leaders  in  a  society  undergoing 
political  transformation.19 In a  chapter published in the collected work  The Right  
War?:  The  Conservative  Debate  on  Iraq,  Charles  Kesler,  a  senior  fellow at  the 
Claremont Institute, argues that it does not follow that people who chose to be 'free' 
will necessarily see it as being in their interests to embrace liberal norms.20 The Bush 
Doctrine  assumed  that  free  people  would  be  liberal  people,  content  to  see  their 
former enemies or those outside of their communal group gain and express the same 
freedoms  they  have  attained.21 Yet  as  Rhodes  points  out,  the  Bush  Doctrine's 
optimistic outlook on the universal appeal and adoption of liberal values “does not 
entertain the possibility that the human heart is divided, that human eyes suffer from 
myopia, and that the human mind is capable of passion and irrationality.”22 Further, 
the  Bush  administration's  view of  liberalism “does  not  admit  the  possibility  that 
humans can be moved by anger, vengeance or pique, and that they are susceptible to 
demagoguery. In other words, it fails to recognise that the threat to liberal values and 
liberal institutions lays within as well as outside of us.”23 Thus, the adoption of liberal 
ideas and norms is not usually a straightforward process, as when given the choice, 
liberal ideas will not necessarily be embraced by all. 
Democracy for All?
The Bush administration and its neoconservative supporters claimed that in the early 
twenty-first century, liberal democracy represented the only form of government left 
for states to embrace.24 While there are more democracies in the world at present than 
19 For a brief discussion of this issue in the context of democratisation in Iraq, see Larry Diamond, 
Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to 
Iraq. New York, Owl Books, 2005, p. 315. 
20 Charles R. Kesler, 'Democracy and The Bush Doctrine' in Gary Rosen (Ed), The Right War? The 
Conservative Debate on Iraq. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 228.
21 The Bush administration appeared to assume that the inherent appeal of liberal values would help 
to reconcile groups previously in conflict and would have a pacifying effect on society more 
generally. 
22 Rhodes, p. 145.
23 Ibid. 
24 See discussion on the Bush administration's claims about the globalisation of democracy in chapter 
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at any previous time, scholars of democratisation have pointed out that this does not 
mean all other models of government and social organisation are now discredited or 
defunct, nor that the predominance of liberal democracy is a permanent condition 
that cannot be challenged by competing illiberal or authoritarian forms of rule.25 
One of the leading scholars of democratisation, Thomas Carothers, offers an 
impressive  analysis  of  the  rise  of  challengers  to  liberal  democracy  in  a  report 
published  by  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace  in  late  2007.26 
Carothers examines the state of democracy globally since 2001, and finds that the 
norm of liberal democracy has been increasingly challenged by the rise of illiberal 
regimes and the so-called “stronghand” model of semi-authoritarian political rule.27 
Carothers contends that the models of China and Russia are gaining adherents in 
areas such as the Middle East, as they offer a way for incumbent regimes to give the 
appearance of reform while retaining the essence of the authoritarian state structure 
that  keeps  them in  power.28 The  rise  of  illiberal  systems  of  rule  has  also  been 
reinforced  by  the  high  energy  prices  of  the  2000's,  as  this  has  allowed  semi-
authoritarian regimes with oil or gas reserves sufficient funds to satisfy many of the 
economic  demands  of  their  people,  to  expand  their  military  forces  and  to  help 
reinforce  their  power  domestically.29 Perhaps  most  important,  however,  is  the 
mounting  evidence  that  the  Third  Wave  of  democratisation  has  ceased,  as  many 
states that democratised in the late 1980's and early 1990's have returned to some 
form of illiberal or heavy-handed rule. This shows that states with only a limited 
experience  in  democracy  are  often  prone  to  slipping  back  into  non-democratic 
practices, and that leading liberal states placed too great a faith in the inevitability of 
the  consolidation  of  democracy  after  the  Cold  War.30 These  factors  bring  into 
three of this thesis. 
25 For discussion of these critiques and their implications for the Bush Doctrine's claims, see Steven 
Heydemann, 'In the Shadow of Democracy'. The Middle East Journal, Vol. 60, No. 1, (Winter 
2006), p. 150. 
26 Thomas Carothers, 'US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush'. Washington, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, (2007).
27 Ibid, pp. 27-8. 
28 Ibid, p. 28. For a “reformed” neoconservative view on this development and its implications for 
liberal foreign policy assumptions, see Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of  
Dreams. New York, Knopf, 2008, pp. 67-71; For further discussion of Kagan, see the conclusion 
of this thesis. 
29 Carothers, p. 28. A good example of this phenomenon in the Middle East is Iran, where the 
government has become increasingly hardline as it has utilised its growing oil revenue to increase 
its influence in the Arab world. Examples from elsewhere include Venezuela and Russia, which 
have likewise become increasingly illiberal and belligerent from 2001-8.
30 Ibid. 
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question the assumption that democracy will inherently continue to spread, and point 
to the idea that despite the Bush administration's claims, alternatives to its liberal 
democratic model do retain credibility and influence in some important parts of the 
world. 
The prevalence of ideas about government and social order at variance to the 
liberal democratic model prescribed by the Bush administration is apparent in the 
Arab Middle East. The people of the Arab world are most certainly capable of liberal 
democracy; it  is  simply the case that  the most  influential,  popular and organised 
political movements outside of the ruling regime are usually illiberal Islamist parties 
at present.31 Models of Islamic government with indigenous credibility are offered by 
Sunni political movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots, Hamas 
and the Jordanian Islamic Action Front. Each of these groups stresses the importance 
of  Sharia and the Koran as the sources of law, legislation and social order, rather 
than secular and liberal ideas.32 While these groups have been willing to participate in 
elections and the formation of governments based on popular rule, attempts are often 
made  to  link  these  to  Islamic  concepts  of  Shura and  the  idea  of  a  Majlis,  (a 
consultative council), rather than to liberal conceptions of separation of power and 
checks  and  balances  between  sources  of  governmental  authority.33 Other  Islamic 
parties offer a variety of additional competing models of government and social order 
as well,  ranging from the theocratic  model  of  Iran,  to  the more apolitical  vision 
advocated by Grand Ayatollah Al Sistani in Iraq, to the populist models of Hezbollah 
31 For good discussion of Islamic movements and their attitudes towards democracy, see Graham 
Fuller 'Islamists and Democracy' in Carothers, Ottaway (Eds), pp. 37-55; See also Adam 
Garfinkle, 'The Impossible Imperative? Conjuring Arab Democracy'. The National Interest, No. 
69, (Fall 2002), pp. 164-5. For additional discussion of the growing influence of Islamists in the 
context of negative reactions against regime change in Iraq, see chapter five of this thesis. 
32 For discussion of Hamas's attitude towards democracy and liberal values, see Graham Usher, 'The 
New Hamas: Between Resistance and Participation'. Middle East Report Online, (21 Aug., 2005). 
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero082105.html, accessed 27 April 2006; Sara Roy, 'Hamas and the 
Transformation(s) of Political Islam in Palestine'. Current History, Vol. 102, No. 660, (Jan., 2003), 
pp. 13-21; For good discussion of the wider Muslim Brotherhood's notions of democracy, see John 
Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? New York, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 
184-90. 
33 Esposito, pp. 184-90; For further discussion of Islamic conceptions of government, see Suha Tah 
Farouki, 'Islamic State Theories and Contemporary Realities' in Abdel Salam Sidahmed, 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Eds), Islamic Fundamentalism. Boulder, Westview Press, 1996, pp. 35-
50; Charles Tripp, 'Islam and the Secular Logic of the State' in Sidahmed, Ehteshami (Eds), pp. 51-
69. For a more recent discussion of many of these themes of Islamic government, see Beverley 
Milton-Edwards, Islamic Fundamentalism Since 1945. London, Routledge, 2004. That these 
groups embrace elections as a route to power does not show that democracy is the only legitimate 
form of regime type which even seemingly non-democratic forces must invoke to justify their rule. 
Rather, these groups often utilise elections as a tactic for attaining power, and they otherwise hold 
ideas about government and politics that are at large variance to any liberal democratic models of 
government. 
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and the Mehdi Army, up to the highly authoritarian model of a restored Caliphate 
advocated by Jihadists.34 
 The fact that there exists such a variety of conceptions of government based 
on interpretations of Islam, rather than on secular liberal values, shows that in the 
Arab  world  alone  there  are  a  range  of  alternatives  to  the  supposedly  universal 
democratic model of government. Examining this development, Brookings Institute 
Middle East  scholar Kenneth Pollack argues that  in Arab societies which remain 
highly religious and wed to many of their traditional cultural practices, Islamic ideas 
of government and social order often appear more authentic than 'western' liberal 
forms of government.35 Eric Davis, of Rutgers University, adds that Islamic models 
of government have also been given a boost by the fact that many people in the Arab 
world  have  since  2003  frequently  come  to  associate  liberal  democracy  with 
American intervention and violence and destabilisation in Iraq.36 Not all  forms of 
Islamic government are inimical to democracy or liberal values in some form; it is 
simply that their current appeal and following suggests that liberal democracy, as 
conceived by the Bush Doctrine and its neoconservative supporters, is not the “single 
sustainable model” of government and development that will be inherently embraced 
by all.37
'Democratic Vanguardism' and the Bush Doctrine
On the basis of its claims about liberalism and democracy, as examined in chapter 
three and above, the Bush administration suggested that it was possible to expand the 
boundaries  of  the  liberal  world  to  the  Arab  Middle  East  through  the  agency  of 
American  military  power.  In  making  this  claim,  the  Bush  Doctrine  and  many 
34 Esposito, chapter six, passim; For an articulation of the Khomeini model of rule by Islamic jurists, 
see Imam Ruhullah Khomeini, 'The Pillars of an Islamic State' in Ruhullah Khomeini, Khomeini  
Speaks Revolution. Karachi, International Islamic Publications, 1981, pp. 14-19; For discussion of 
the Quietist model of rule advocated by Ayatollah Al Sistani in Iraq, see Ahmed H. al-Rahim, 'The 
Sistani Factor'. Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 3, (Jul., 2005), pp. 50-4; For discussion of the 
Caliphate model advocated by Jihadists, see Benjamin E. Schwartz, 'America's Struggle Against 
the Wahhabi/Neo-Salafi Movement'. Orbis, Vol. 51, No. 1, (Winter 2007), pp. 107-128. 
35 Kenneth Pollack et al, 'Imperial Ambitions: Can The Middle East be Transformed?' Middle East  
Policy, Vol. 10, No. 4, (Winter 2003), p. 9.
36 Eric Davis, 'History Matters: Past as Prologue in Building Democracy in Iraq'. Orbis, Vol. 49, No. 
2, (Spring 2005), p. 240. For further discussion of this issue, see chapter five of this thesis. 
37 NSS 2002, p. i. 
107
democratic globalists expressed what critics such as Francis Fukuyama, journalist 
George Packer and Claes Ryn view as a form of 'democratic vanguardism.'38 This is a 
modernised version of a notion that first  emerged among the Jacobins during the 
French Revolution; to bring about a new and more enlightened political order, the 
agency, organisation and leadership of an armed vanguard is required. Critics of the 
Bush administration often bring into doubt the idea that through armed intervention, 
the United  States  can unleash  a  democratic  revolution and thereby 'push'  history 
forward in the Middle East.
'Vanguardism' and the End of History
The Bush Doctrine's  'democratic  vanguardist'  claims have been most prominently 
criticised by Francis Fukuyama. In his book, After the Neocons,  Fukuyama argues 
that  democratic  globalists  and  the  Bush  administration  took  his  End  of  History 
teleology, which is premised on a gradual process of modernisation, and wrongly 
concluded  that  through  American  military  agency,  the  development  of  liberal 
democracy could be fast-tracked.39 Fukuyama favourably cites the view of Hoover 
Institute Professor, Ken Jowitt, who in Fukuyama's view correctly identifies this key 
problem of the Bush Doctrine's outlook when he argues in an April  2003  Policy 
Studies article that 
The  Bush  administration  has  concluded  that  Fukuyama's  historical 
timetable is too laissez-faire and not nearly attentive enough to the 
levers  of  historical  change.  History,  the  Bush  administration  has 
concluded, needs deliberate organization, leadership, and direction. In 
this irony of ironies, the Bush administration's identification of regime 
change as critical to its anti-terrorist policy and integral to its desire 
for  a  democratic  capitalist  world  has  led  to  an  active  "Leninist" 
foreign  policy  in  place  of  Fukuyama's  passive  "Marxist"  social 
teleology.40
Fukuyama writes that,  in effect,  the Bush Doctrine attempted to place the United 
States in the role of the vanguard of liberalism, as it  claimed to act as the guide 
through whom all people will come to realise and ultimately accept liberal values.41 
38 For critical discussion of 'democratic vanguardism', see Fukuyama, After the Neocons, pp. 50-60; 
Packer, pp. 390-1; Ryn, pp. 25-8.
39 Fukuyama, After the Neocons, pp. 54-5.
40 Ken Jowitt, 'Rage, Hubris and Regime Change'. Policy Review,  No. 118, (Apr/May 2003), p. 37.
41 Fukuyama, After the Neocons, pp. 54-5.
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Fukuyama  sees  this  belief  in  the  need  for  the  United  States  to  act  as  a 
vanguard  of  liberal  democracy  as  a  major  divergence  from  the  process  of 
modernisation  towards  democracy  expressed  in  the  End  of  History.42 Fukuyama 
writes that  “I did not like the original version of Leninism and was skeptical when 
the  Bush  administration  turned  Leninist.”43 Fukuyama  maintains  his  belief,  first 
detailed in the End of History, that “democracy in my view is likely to expand in the 
long  run.”44 However,  Fukuyama  notes  that  “whether  the  rapid  and  relatively 
peaceful transitions to democracy and free markets made by the Poles, Hungarians, 
or  even the Romanians can be quickly replicated in  other  parts  of  the  world,  or 
promoted through the application of power by outsiders at any given point in history, 
is open to doubt.”45 Thus, in Fukuyama's view
One can argue that there is a universal human desire to be free of 
tyranny and a universalism to the appeal of life in a prosperous liberal 
society. The problem is with the timeframe involved. It is one thing to 
say that there is a broad, centuries long trend towards the spread of 
democracy – something I myself have argued in the past – and another 
to  say  that  either  democracy  or  prosperity  can  emerge  in  a  given 
society at a given time.46
Fukuyama essentially argues that the Bush administration misunderstood the length 
of the modernisation process described in the End of History, as it casts aside the key 
observation that liberal political development can rarely be made to occur at a forced-
pace through military intervention.47
Fukuyama believes that the democratic globalist interpretation of the collapse 
of communism best explains how the End of History has been reconceived as a guide 
for  interventionist  democracy promotion.48 Fukuyama writes  that  to  the group of 
democratic globalists that came to dominate the neoconservative persuasion after the 
end  of  the  Cold  War,  “the  rapid,  unexpected  and  largely  peaceful  collapse  of 
communism validated the concept of regime change as an approach to international 
relations.”49 Yet “this  extraordinary validation laid the groundwork for the wrong 
turn taken by many neoconservatives in the decade following that  has had direct 
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid, p. 116. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid, pp. 52-3. 
49 Ibid.
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consequences  for  their  management  of  post-September  11  foreign  policy.”50 
Fukuyama contends that because the authors of the Bush Doctrine conceived of the 
collapse of  the Eastern Bloc as a  vindication of  the role  of  American agency in 
bringing about monumental changes in the world, the Bush administration's “belief in 
the possibility of linking power and morality was transformed into a tremendous 
overemphasis  on  the  role  of  power,  specifically  military  power,  as  a  means  of 
achieving  American  national  purposes.”51 Hence  the  Bush  administration 
questionably claimed that the active use of American military power was integral to 
the task of democratising the Middle East, as the United States apparently had the 
ability and vision required to act as the 'vanguard' of this transformational process.
The Utopianism of 'Democratic Vanguardism'
In an article published in the autumn 2005 edition of the  National Interest,  David 
Hendrickson of Colorado College and Robert  Tucker of John Hopkins University 
describe the claims made in the Bush Doctrine about  the need for United States' 
military agency in spreading democracy to the Middle East as an example of “utopia” 
in  American  foreign  policy.52 In  a  subsequent  symposium on the  Bush Doctrine 
published  in  the  following  edition  of  the  National  Interest,  Robert  Merry,  the 
president  of  Congressional  Quarterly, commends  Hendrickson  and  Tucker's 
characterisation  of  the  Bush  Doctrine's  'vanguardist'  claims  as  symptomatic  of 
“utopia.”53 Merry argues that this description aptly captures the grandiosity and lofty 
idealism of the Bush administration's ambitions for transforming the Middle East, 
and provides a new avenue for critical analysis of the Bush Doctrine.54
Many of  the documents  that  make up the Bush Doctrine implied that  the 
United  States  was  by  definition  a  benevolent  power,  and  as  a  result,  its  use  of 
military force to spread democracy was a beneficial form of violence necessary to 
sweep  away  authoritarianism and  bring  about  freedom and  peace  in  the  Middle 
East.55 Claes Ryn aptly captures the nature of this aspect Bush Doctrine's outlook 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid, p. 63. 
52 David C. Hendrickson, Robert W. Tucker, 'The Freedom Crusade'. The National Interest, No. 81, 
(Fall 2005), p. 19. 
53 Robert W. Merry in Leslie H. Gelb et al, 'The Freedom Crusade, Revisited: A Symposium'. The 
National Interest, No. 82, (Winter 2005/06), pp. 12-13.
54 Ibid. 
55 See especially the two National Security Strategies, NSS 2002, NSS 2006; See also 'President 
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when  he  labels  it  a  form of  “neo-Jacobinism.”56 Examining  the  Bush  Doctrine's 
claims about  interventionist  democratisation,  Ryn writes that  “the new Jacobin is 
convinced that he knows what is best for all mankind, and if much of mankind shows 
reluctance  to  follow his  lead,  it  is  to  him a  sign  that  injustice,  superstition,  and 
general backwardness or a misconceived modernistic radicalism is standing in the 
way of progress.”57 According to Ryn, “perhaps the most fundamental idea of the 
new Jacobinism is that the United States is an exceptional nation that was founded on 
universal principles and that all of mankind, heeding the American example, should 
adopt a single  model  of social  and political  life.”58 In Ryn's  reading of the Bush 
Doctrine, the Bush administration claimed to have determined that the interests of 
humanity were essentially in harmony with its interests. Through its leadership, all 
people would come to realise enlightenment under the liberal democratic order the 
United States determined is the future of the world.59
It is questionable that armed intervention in pursuit of democratic revolution 
would be regarded as enlightened or benign by those at the receiving end of such 
violence;  however well-intended such actions might  be.  Ryn makes an important 
observation  about  the  implications  of  the  Bush  Doctrine's  'vanguardist' 
democratisation posture when he notes that in considering the violence unleashed in 
Iraq in pursuit of a wide-ranging democratic transformation in the Middle East
A philosophically and historically inclined observer is reminded of the 
terrible and large-scale suffering that has been inflicted on mankind by 
power-seeking  sanctioned  or  inspired  by  one  or  another  kind  of 
Jacobin model and intellectual conceit. Communism, one of the most 
radical  and  pernicious  manifestations  of  the  Jacobin  spirit,  has 
disintegrated, at least as a major political force. But another panacea 
for the world is taking its place. The neo-Jacobin vision for how to 
redeem  humanity  may  be  less  obviously  utopian  than  that  of 
Communism.  It  may  strike  some  as  admirably  idealistic,  as  did 
Communism.  But  the  spirit  of  the  two  movements  is  similar,  and 
utopian  thinking  is  utopian  thinking,  fairly  innocuous  perhaps  if 
restricted to isolated dreamers and theoreticians, but dangerous to the 
extent that it inspires action in the real world.60 
Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point'. 
56 Ryn, pp. 20-1.
57 Ibid, pp. 25-6.
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Claes G. Ryn, 'The Ideology of American Empire'. Orbis, Vol. 47, No. 3, (Summer 2003), p. 396.
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The aims of the Bush Doctrine in the Middle East were of course not totalitarian in 
aspiration, as were those of communism in the parts of the world in which it held 
significant influence. Further, the Bush administration sought a future of freedom and 
democracy in the Arab world, rather than a 'dictatorship of the proletariat' or some 
other  authoritarian  order.  Where  the  “Jacobin  spirit”  was  strongest  in  the  Bush 
Doctrine was in its claims that the United States alone understood the direction of 
history and that the use of violence to spread democracy in the Middle East was in 
the greater good of peace, progress and security for all.61 Yet as analysis later in this 
thesis  makes  clear,  these  lofty  aims  have  repeatedly  come  into  conflict  with 
countervailing political conditions in the Middle East in such a way that even many 
of  their  proponents  have come to  acknowledge the  problems of  these theoretical 
notions in practice.62
“Imperial Democratisation”
The  Bush  Doctrine's  claims  about  liberal  values  and  the  spread  of  democratic 
government – particularly those relating to the possible need for an armed vanguard 
to promote democracy and that intervention in an authoritarian state will  unleash 
longings for democratic rule – lent themselves to the concept that, where necessary, 
democracy  could  be  brought  about  through  a  process  of  political  transformation 
under the aegis of American military occupation. Critics of the Bush Doctrine often 
argue  that  a  strategy  in  which  the  United  States  forcibly  overthrows  another 
sovereign  government,  occupies  the  state  and  attempts  to  construct  a  democratic 
regime from the top down, represents a policy of “imperial democratisation.”63
A number of democratisation scholars hold that “imperial democratisation” is 
usually an ineffective way in which to bring about democracy. The essential problem 
of  “imperial  democratisation”  is,  as  Bard  College  associate  professor  of  politics 
Omar G. Encarnacion writes, that attempting to encourage democracy by military 
intervention  “entails  creating  democracy  through  undemocratic  means.”64 
61 Smith, chapter seven, passim. 
62 See especially the conclusion of this thesis. 
63 For detailed discussion of “imperial democratisation” and its many critics, see Perry, passim. 
64 Omar G. Encarnación, 'The Follies of Democratic Imperialism'. World Policy Journal, Vol. 22, 
No. 1, (Spring 2005), p. 49.
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Encarnacion  contends  that  “imposing  democracy  requires  one  country  to  intrude 
itself in the political  affairs of another country, thereby robbing democracy of its 
indigenous legitimacy.”65 This in turn can often adversely affect the consolidation of 
stable  liberal  democracy  in  future.66 In  his  detailed  study  of  “imperial 
democratisation,”  University  of  Indiana  political  science  professor,  Glenn  Perry, 
expands upon Encarnacion's  critique when he argues that  “what  almost  everyone 
overlooks but which points to the most remarkable inconsistency of those who make 
“democracy” a universal demand on others, is the blatantly authoritarian nature of 
such calls.”67 According to Perry, the Bush Doctrine's assertion that the United States 
should encourage democracy by force of arms where necessary, and its claim that the 
best  way  to  establish  democracy  in  Iraq  was  through  coercive  regime  change, 
“violates the whole spirit of democracy.”68 In a similar vein, Edward Rhodes holds 
that bringing about democracy by force actually undermines “efforts to turn illiberal 
societies into liberal  ones.”69 Rhodes believes that  proclaiming the importance of 
liberal  ideas of popular rule,  self-determination and freedom from compulsion by 
violence, while simultaneously determining the nature and structure of democracy 
through foreign military occupation, is in most cases harmful to the values of liberal 
democracy itself.70
In  contrast  to  these  critiques,  Francis  Fukuyama  characterises  democracy 
promotion through military occupation as a form of social engineering.71 Fukuyama 
contends  that  first-generation  neoconservative  concerns  about  the  unanticipated 
effects of government social engineering in the United States “should have induced 
caution” among supporters of the Bush Doctrine regarding their “expectations for the 
kind of political transformation that would be possible in the Middle East, by, for 
example,  promoting  democracy.”72 Despite  this,  many  contemporary  democratic 
globalists seemingly failed to recognise that armed democratisation could represent 
an ambitious form of social engineering with an especially high chance of negative 
results.73 In a symposium on the Bush Doctrine published in Commentary  in late 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Perry, p. 82. 
68 Ibid.
69 Rhodes, pp. 147-8. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Fukuyama, After the Neocons, pp. 5-7.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid. 
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2005, Fukuyama writes that
Even if  one  accepted  the  view that  the  Middle  East  needed  to  be 
"fixed," it was hard to understand what made us think that we were 
capable of fixing it. So much of what neoconservatives have written 
over the past decades has concerned the unanticipated consequences 
of overly ambitious social engineering, and how the effort to get at 
root causes of social problems is a feckless task. If this has been true 
of  efforts  to  combat  crime  or  poverty  in  U.S.  cities,  why  should 
anyone have believed we could get at the root causes of alienation and 
terrorism in a part of the world that we didn't understand particularly 
well, and where our policy instruments were very limited?74
While  Fukuyama  believes  that  the  United  States  can  and  should  encourage 
democracy in the Middle East, he holds that a strategy of “imperial democratisation” 
is a risky and ineffective way in which to bring about democratic regimes. Fukuyama 
argues that democracy imposed from the outside usually lacks domestic legitimacy, 
and  that  without  a  nuanced  appreciation  of  local  politics,  culture  and  traditions, 
establishing effective democracy through intervention is a task usually fraught with 
difficulty.75
How did the Bush administration respond to such criticisms of its activist 
democratisation  stances?  Most  often,  President  Bush  and  leading  foreign  policy 
figures of his administration attempted to bolster the legitimacy of interventionist 
democratisation  by  invoking  select  examples  of  this  strategy  in  past  American 
foreign  policy.  The  Bush  administration  usually  referred  to  the  examples  of  the 
occupation  of  Germany  and  Japan  following  WWII  as  cases  of  successful 
democratisation that offered important lessons for the present. In a December 2005 
speech on the development  of  democracy in Iraq,  President  Bush articulated this 
often-repeated argument when he contended that
As we advance the cause of freedom in Iraq, our nation can proceed 
with confidence because we have done this kind of work before. After 
World War II, President Harry Truman believed that the way to help 
bring peace and prosperity to Asia was to plant the seeds of freedom 
and democracy in Japan. Like today, there were many skeptics and 
pessimists who said that the Japanese were not ready for democracy. 
Fortunately, President Harry Truman stuck to his guns. He believed, 
74 See Francis Fukuyama in 'Defending and Advancing Freedom: A Symposium'. Commentary, Vol. 
120, No. 4, (Nov., 2005), p. 27. 
75 Ibid. 
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as I do, in freedom's power to transform an adversary into an ally. And 
because he stayed true to his convictions, today Japan is one of the 
world's  freest  and  most  prosperous  nations,  and  one  of  America's 
closest allies in keeping the peace. The spread of freedom to Iraq and 
the Middle East requires the same confidence and persistence, and it 
will lead to the same results.76
President  Bush  claimed  that  the  task  of  democratising  Iraq  was  in  many  ways 
analogous to  that  of  democratising Japan after  WWII;  that  occupying  a  defeated 
adversary and in the process establishing the institutions and norms of democratic 
government was again integral to liberty and progress in the occupied state, as it was 
to the security of the United States itself. The occupation of Germany was similarly 
invoked as an example of successful democratisation that offers 'lessons' for United 
States foreign policy today.77 As President Bush argued in a May 2006 address, “just 
as  an  earlier  generation  of  Americans  helped  change  Germany  and  Japan  from 
conquered adversaries into democratic allies, today a new generation of Americans is 
helping Iraq... recover from the ruins of tyranny.”78
Critics of the Bush administration have brought this often-invoked analogy 
into question. In a 2005 article on the prospects for democracy in the Middle East, 
University of Swathmore professor James Kurth emphasises three key differences 
between the examples of post-war Germany and Japan, and contemporary Iraq. Kurth 
notes that Germany and Japan had some prior experience with democracy before the 
rise  of  Fascism  in  the  1930's,  that  both  states  were  in  large  part  ethnically 
homogeneous and therefore more domestically pacific as they democratised, and that 
both  states  faced  the  existential  threat  of  Soviet  communism,  which  helped 
encourage them to establish secure democratic governments.79 Iraq, by contrast, has 
virtually  no  prior  experience  in  democracy  and  liberal  ideas,  is  a  state  divided 
between  three  ethno-sectarian  groups  with  often-divergent  political  outlooks  that 
make democratisation more difficult, and is faced with external threats from Jihadists 
76 'President Discusses Iraqi Elections, Victory in the War on Terror'. The Woodrow Wilson Center
Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Washington, D.C, 14 December 2005. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051214-1.html, accessed 2 February 2007. 
77 'President Delivers Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy at West Point'. 
Mitchie Stadium, United States Military Academy at West Point, West Point, New York, 27 May 
2006. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/text/20060527-1.html, accessed 3 March 
2008. 
78 Ibid. 
79 James Kurth, 'Ignoring History: U.S. Democratization in the Muslim World'. Orbis, Vol. 49, No. 2, 
(Spring 2005), pp. 307-9.
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and  Iran  that  do  not  necessarily  encourage  the  construction  of  a  stable  liberal 
democratic regime.80 Kurth concludes that the examples of Germany and Japan are 
misleading when invoked in relation to democratisation in Iraq, and he argues that by 
drawing from a wider  variety  of  examples  in  American history,  a  more accurate 
account of the past successes and failures of interventionist democratisation can be 
assembled.81 
A variety of alternative historical analogies to those of Germany and Japan 
have been offered in the critical literature published on “imperial democratisation” 
since 2003. In his 2005 study of Middle East democratisation, Omar Encarnacion 
relates the examples of intervention and democratisation in Latin America during the 
presidencies of  Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson to that of contemporary 
Iraq.82 Encarnacion suggests that the experiences of countries such as Nicaragua, the 
Dominican Republic, Cuba and Haiti in the early twentieth century can point to some 
of  the  potential  unintended  consequences  of  interventionist  democratisation  that 
remain relevant today.83 Encarnacion emphasises that most of the democratic system 
then installed in Central  America by the United States later  decayed and became 
increasingly authoritarian, as democratic institutions and norms imposed from the 
outside  did  not  often  develop  deep  roots  in  these  societies.84 In  contrast  to 
Encarnacion,  neoconservative  writer  Max  Boot  contends  that  the  example  of 
democratisation in the Philippines at the turn of the twentieth century offers a good 
historical comparison to the Bush administration's policies in the Middle East.85 Boot 
argues that while the United States lost 4000 soldiers in the Philippines and fought a 
prolonged insurgency, it eventually constructed a democratic regime that lasted until 
the early 1970's  and was revived again in the mid-1980's.86 Boot  admits  that the 
example of the Philippines is far from ideal, but he holds that it is a more realistic 
historical  comparison  for  democratisation  in  Iraq  than  the  exceptional  cases  of 
Germany and Japan.87 
Finally, John Schmidt, a former Senior Analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research of the State Department, contends that the examples of humanitarian 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid, p. 309-10. 
82 Encarnacion, pp. 49-50. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid.
85 See Max Boot in 'Defending and Advancing Freedom: A Symposium', p. 2. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
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intervention in the Balkans during the 1990's are of use when considering precedents 
for  democratisation  in  Iraq.  Schmidt  believes  that  had  the  Bush  administration 
considered the cases of intervention and nation-building in Kosovo and Bosnia, it 
might have better  appreciated the difficulties of fostering democracy in a society 
riven with ethnic divisions and shattered by years of authoritarian rule.88 Schmidt 
notes  that  there  remains  many  figures  in  government  and  academia  who  were 
involved with intervention in the Balkans that can offer useful advice and ideas on 
how best  to proceed with democratisation and nation building in the Arab world 
today.89 Historical analogies must be treated cautiously, as it can be risky to seek 
broad 'lessons' for current policy from past precedents that themselves remain open to 
debate. Nonetheless, critically assessing the historical examples in which the Bush 
administration often grounds it claims about democratic transformation in the Middle 
East can offer a useful route for critiquing the concept of “imperial democratisation” 
expressed in the terms of the Bush Doctrine. 
The Reality of Democratic Peace in the Middle East
One of the Bush Doctrine's key theoretical assumptions, related to its broader claims 
about liberalism and interventionist democratisation examined in this chapter, was 
the idea that a democratic Middle East would be peaceful. Many senior figures of the 
Bush administration claimed that by spreading democracy through intervention in the 
Middle East, the United States would advance peace, as democratic states were by 
definition peaceful in their relations with one another.90 This core assumption, and 
some important elements of the theory on which it is based, have been challenged 
and brought into significant doubt by critics of the Bush Doctrine and by events in 
Iraq and the Palestinian Territories since 2003. Critics have also demonstrated the 
ways that neoconservatives and some liberal internationalists simplified what are in 
reality a contestable theoretical propositions that do not imply the need for a foreign 
88 John R. Schmidt, 'Can Outsiders Bring Democracy to Post-Conflict States?' Orbis, Vol. 52, No. 1, 
(Winter 2008), pp. 18-19. 
89 Ibid. 
90 For discussion of these claims, see the section of chapter three of this thesis that examines 
democratic peace theory and the Bush Doctrine. 
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policy of activist democracy promotion as a path to peace.91 
Weak Democratic Institutions and the Danger of War
The  Bush  Doctrine  put  forward  prescriptions  for  democratisation  that  in  theory 
stressed the importance of building strong institutions and checks and balances as the 
core of an effective democracy. Yet critics have noted that many of the documents 
which make up the Bush Doctrine also appeared to indicate that elections should 
come  early  in  the  democratisation  process,  and  that  the  construction  of  liberal 
institutions and the rule of law could be completed after enfranchisement.92 Critics 
argue that such “out of sequence”93 democratisation heightens the risk of conflict, as 
transitioning states with weak democratic institutions are often prone to aggression 
abroad.
The link between weak democratic  institutions  and inter-state  conflict  has 
been  best  elucidated  by  Edward  Mansfield  and  Jack  Snyder,  both  professors  of 
political science at Columbia University. In a number of studies published from the 
mid-1990's to 2007, including the books From Voting to Violence by Jack Snyder in 
2000, and Electing to Fight by Mansfield and Snyder in 2005, the authors regularly 
found that states in the early stages of democratisation were more likely to launch 
external  wars  of  aggression  and  act  in  a  belligerent  fashion  towards  their 
neighbours.94 In  their  original  1995  Foreign Affairs article  that  first  laid  out  this 
argument, Mansfield and Snyder write that although it appears mature democratic 
states are indeed less prone to external aggression,
Countries do not become mature democracies overnight. They usually 
go  through  a  rocky  transition,  where  mass  politics  mixes  with 
authoritarian  elite  politics  in  a  volatile  way.  Statistical  evidence 
covering the past two centuries shows that in this transitional phase of 
democratization,  countries  become more  aggressive  and war-prone, 
91 Shalom, 'Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism', p. 580. 
92 Edward D. Mansfield, Jack Snyder, 'The Sequencing Fallacy'. Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, No. 
3, (2007), pp. 5-10.
93 Ibid.
94 Edward D. Mansfield, Jack Snyder, 'Democratization and War'. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3, 
(May., 1995), pp. 79-98; Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratisation and Nationalist  
Conflict. New York, Norton, 2000; Edward D. Mansfield, Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why 
Emerging Democracies Go to War. Boston, MIT Press, 2005; Edward D. Mansfield, Jack Snyder, 
'Prone to Violence: The Paradox of the Democratic Peace'. The National Interest, No. 82, (Winter 
2005/2006), pp. 39-46; Mansfield, Snyder, 'The Sequencing Fallacy', pp. 5-10; For further 
discussion of the Mansfield-Snyder argument, see Owen, 'Iraq and the Democratic Peace', passim.
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not  less,  and  they  do  fight  wars  with  democratic  states.  In  fact, 
formerly authoritarian states where democratic participation is on the 
rise  are  more  likely  to  fight  wars  than  are  stable  democracies  or 
autocracies.95
Mansfield and Snyder note that their research indicates that “states that make the 
biggest leap from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy... are about twice as 
likely to  fight  wars  in  the decade after  democratization as  are  states  that  remain 
autocracies.”96 In  subsequent  works  published  since  1995,  Mansfield  and  Snyder 
have  maintained  that  there  exists  a  significant  danger  zone  where  formerly 
authoritarian states that have begun to establish the institutions of democracy are at 
an especially high risk of engaging in wars against  their  neighbours and regional 
powers.97
According to Mansfield and Snyder, a number of democratising states have 
enhanced  the  risks  of  becoming  engaged  in  an  inter-state  war  as  they  have 
constructed their democratic systems out of order. Many democratising states opt for 
early elections when the liberal  institutions,  rule of law and checks and balances 
required for effective democracy have not matured, or are not in place at all.98 In a 
2007 article in the  Journal of Democracy  that reiterates their main argument about 
democratisation and war made over the past decade, Mansfield and Snyder write that 
Countries  taking the initial  steps  from dictatorship toward electoral 
politics are especially prone to civil and international war. Yet states 
endowed  with  coherent  institutions  – such  as  a  functioning 
bureaucracy  and  the  elements  needed  to  construct  a  sound  legal 
system  – have  often  been  able  to  democratize  peacefully  and 
successfully.  Consequently,  whenever  possible,  efforts  to  promote 
democracy should try  to  follow a sequence  of  building institutions 
before encouraging mass competitive elections. Democratizing in the 
wrong sequence not only risks bloodshed in the short term, but also 
the mobilization of durable illiberal forces with the capacity to block 
democratic consolidation over the long term.99
Mansfield  and  Snyder  contend  that  the  danger  of  weak  institutions  is  two-fold. 
Firstly, weak institutions and a lack of effective constraints on government power can 
95 Mansfield, Snyder, 'Democratisation and War', p. 79. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid; See also Mansfield, Snyder, Electing to Fight; Mansfield, Snyder, 'Prone to Violence'.
98 Mansfield, Snyder, 'The Sequencing Fallacy', p. 5. 
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undermine longer-term prospects for stable democracy, locking states into an illiberal 
system  of  government  that  remains  prone  to  external  violence  for  a  number  of 
years.100 Secondly, weak institutions and an immature democratic order can make it 
easier for illiberal leaders to rally mass support behind their agendas to the extent that 
they  can  carry  their  state  into  popular  wars  of  aggression  against  neighbouring 
regimes.101
Other influential scholars of democratisation often agree with many aspects of 
Mansfield and Snyder's argument. Thomas Carothers emphasises that weak liberal 
political institutions pose a significant risk to regional stability, and that holding early 
elections before the rule of law develops often encourages increased belligerence 
abroad.102 Unlike Mansfield and Snyder, Carothers stresses the need for “democratic 
gradualism” rather than “sequencing” as the key to establishing a peaceful liberal 
democratic  government,  but  he  generally  agrees  that  the  presence  of  weak  and 
incomplete institutions in democratising states increases the likelihood of violence 
abroad.103 Meanwhile, Newsweek International editor and democratisation specialist, 
Fareed  Zakaria,  contends  that  illiberal  political  outcomes  are  more  likely  in 
democratising states that do not develop a sufficiently liberal constitutional order, 
and that elected illiberal leaders with few constraints on their power are much more 
likely to take hardline stances that increase the chances of inter-state war.104
The  problem  of  weak  liberal  institutions  that  heightened  the  risk  of  war 
during the transition towards democracy is evident in the case of democratisation in 
Iraq. According to some scholars, a democratising Iraq is a likely candidate to initiate 
wars against its neighbours and act in a belligerent fashion towards powerful states, 
including the United States.105 John Owen, an associate professor of politics at the 
University of Virginia, writes that “the Middle East could... become a much more 
dangerous  place  if  Washington  and  the  rest  of  the  world  settle  for  a  merely 
100 Ibid, p. 6. 
101 Ibid; For further discussion of this issue, see Owen, 'Iraq and the Democratic Peace', pp. 123-4.
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semidemocratic regime in Baghdad. Such an Iraq... would be uncommonly likely to 
start wars – a bull in the Middle Eastern china shop. Unfortunately, such an Iraq may 
also be just what we are likely to end up with.”106 Owen lays out a hypothesis in 
which Iraq develops only “anaemic” liberal  state  institutions that  can do little  to 
check  and  constrain  the  ability  of  elected  leaders  to  initiate  an  external  war  of 
aggression.107 Owen  holds  that  weak  state  institutions  and  ineffective  checks  on 
power would likely be unable to prevent leaders from rallying their sectarian group 
around the perceived need for military action against a supposed external threat. This 
could realistically lead to external aggression supported by a significant segment of 
the population.108 With this prospect in mind, Owen concludes that “an aggressive 
Iraq,  prone  to  attack  Kuwait,  Iran,  Saudi  Arabia,  Syria,  or  Israel,  is  in  no  one's 
interest,” and would be an outcome highly detrimental to the United States.109
 Owen's hypothesis helps to illustrate some of the potential problems of what 
Mansfield and Snyder call a “premature, out-of-sequence attempt to democratise.”110 
Assessing the elections held in Iraq during 2005, Mansfield and Snyder comment that 
“when elections are held in an institutional wasteland like Iraq... political competition 
typically  coalesces  around  and  reinforces  the  ethnic  and  sectarian  divisions  in 
traditional  society.  To  forge  liberal,  secular  coalitions  that  cut  across  cultural 
divisions, it is necessary to have impartial state institutions that provide a framework 
for civic action and a focal point for civic loyalty.”111 Without effective institutions to 
control,  constrain  and  mediate  the  various  interests  and  demands  of  competing 
communal groups, there remains a reasonably high risk that elected leaders could 
embrace belligerent foreign policy stances towards their neighbours. Thus, despite 
there  being  an  elected  government  in  Baghdad,  Iraqi  foreign  policies  could  still 
potentially remain aggressive in character.112
Democratisation, Nationalism and the Risks of War
A  second  major  criticism  levelled  at  the  version  of  democratic  peace  theory 
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expressed in the Bush Doctrine is that  it  does not account for the important role 
resurgent  nationalism  can  play  in  fostering  hostile  foreign  policies  in  newly 
democratising  states.  According  to  Mansfield  and  Snyder,  there  is  a  clear  link 
between democratisation in formerly authoritarian states and the increase of hardline 
nationalism. In concert with weak states institutions, resurgent nationalism further 
increases the chances that a democratising state experiencing a difficult transition 
will be prone to external violence. Examining the centrality of nationalism to the 
process of democratisation, Mansfield and Snyder write that 
From  the  French  Revolution  to  contemporary  Iraq,  the  beginning 
phase of democratization in unsettled circumstances has often spurred 
a rise in militant nationalism. Democracy means rule by the people, 
but when territorial control and popular loyalties are in flux, a prior 
question  has  to  be  settled:  Which  people  will  form  the  nation? 
Nationalist politicians vie for popular support to answer that question 
in a way that suits their purposes. When groups are at loggerheads and 
the rules guiding domestic  politics are unclear,  the answer is  more 
often  based  on  a  test  of  force  and  political  manipulation  than  on 
democratic procedures.113
In states transitioning away from authoritarian rule, various groups compete with one 
another  for  political  influence.  Old  elites  can  attempt  to  gain  support  from  the 
population  by  fostering  nationalist  sentiments,  while  newly-enfranchised  groups 
often  pursue  their  communal  or  ethnic  interests  within  the  emerging  system  of 
democracy,  frequently  framing  their  aims  in  ethno-nationalist  discourse  and 
advocating the use of violence to advance their ambitions.114
Variations of resurgent nationalism have emerged in Middle Eastern states 
where  attempts  have  been  made to  promote  democracy  since  2003,  significantly 
challenging  the  Bush  administration's  assumption  that  democracy  always  equals 
peace. One of the most prominent examples of this phenomenon is the election of 
Hamas in the January 2006 Palestinian elections. According to Middle East specialist 
Jean Francois Legrain, Hamas is the “heir of Palestinian nationalism” and represents 
the ascendancy of a hybrid form of Islamist nationalism to the heart of Palestinian 
politics.115 Critics  argue  that  it  is  simplistic  to  believe  that  a  truly  democratic 
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159-177.
122
Palestinian  government  would  be  peaceful  towards  Israel  and  the  United  States. 
Glenn Perry notes that in order to retain its popular support, a democratically-elected 
Hamas government must reflect the opinions and outlooks of those who elected it.116 
Hamas  represents  a  sizeable  segment  of  Palestinian  society  which  expresses  an 
Islamised form of nationalism and believes that 'Islamic resistance', including acts of 
violence, are one of the key ways to overcome occupation and achieve Palestinian 
statehood.117 Hamas channels the opposition towards Israel expressed by a number of 
Palestinians into hardline foreign policies against the state and its allies.118 This helps 
to  show that  where  populist  nationalist  aspirations  and  ideology  are  strong,  and 
where democracy is young, outcomes other than a democratic peace are often more 
likely. 
The  election  of  Hamas  also  serves  as  a  cautionary  example  of  the 
unanticipated  outcomes  that  can  result  from  the  promotion  of  democracy  in  a 
territory  dominated  by  resurgent  nationalism.  The  Hamas  government  opted  to 
engage in a brief civil war with the secular Fatah Party in June 2007, seizing the 
Gaza Strip by force and bringing about the sacking of its government. Following this, 
Hamas became isolated in the Gaza Strip and returned to launching rocket attacks on 
southern Israel, kidnapping Israeli soldiers and strengthening its ties with Hezbollah 
and Iran.119 In late December 2008, such actions resulted in the launching of a three-
week long Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip that sought to halt Hamas rocket attacks 
and significantly  weaken the  power  and capabilities  of  the  organisation.120 These 
events  help  to  make  clearer  some  of  the  problems  of  the  Bush  administration's 
assumptions  about  democratic  peace  in  the  Palestinian  Territories.  The  Bush 
administration appeared not to have considered the possibility that illiberal  forces 
committed to violence could be legitimately elected, and was for some time reluctant 
to acknowledge the challenge the election of Hamas posed to its underlying beliefs 
about the development of peace between Israel and the Palestinians.121
116 Perry, p. 82
117 Ibid; See also Roy, passim; For discussion of the development of Islamised Palestinian nationalism 
and the important role of Hamas in this process, see Meir Litvak, 'The Islamization of the 
Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: The Case of Hamas'. Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, (Jan., 
1998), pp. 148-164.
118 Perry, pp. 61-2.
119 Taghreed el-Khodary, 'A Year Reshapes Hamas and Gaza'. The New York Times, (15 Jun., 2008).
120 This war killed over 1300 Palestinians and 13 Israelis, and ended with a tenuous ceasefire on 17 
January 2009. 
121 For more on how the Bush administration dealt with the election of Hamas – particularly how this 
influenced the scaling back of most of the administration's talk about democratisation in the 
Palestinian territories by 2008 – see the conclusion of this thesis.
123
The  challenge  of  hybrid  forms  of  nationalism  to  the  Bush  Doctrine's 
propositions about democratic peace is also evident in the case of Iraq.  The Iraqi 
government has been dominated since the December 2005 elections by Shia leaders 
associated with the United Iraqi Alliance Party (UIA).122 Some groups within this 
party, particularly the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),123 
have sought closer ties with Iran and share its often-hostile attitude towards Saudi 
Arabia  and  the  Gulf  monarchies,  accusing  these  states  of  supporting  the  Sunni 
insurgency inside Iraq.124 The influence of sectarian identities and ethno-nationalism 
in Iraqi foreign policy is also apparent with regards to the Kurdish leaders in the 
government. In October-November 2007, Turkey launched a series of incursions into 
northern  Iraq  against  the  Kurdish  PKK  terrorist  group.125 Turkey  had  been 
conducting such raids since 2003; however only after the end of 2005 were Kurdish 
parties fully represented as a major bloc in Iraq's elected government and cabinet, 
and thus  able  to  influence  Iraqi  foreign  policy in  a  substantive  manner.  Kurdish 
leaders in the government harshly rebuked Turkish incursions into Iraq, stating that if 
Turkey interfered further  in  Kurdistan,  the Iraqi  government  would respond with 
violence.126 While this crisis  was only short-lived and did not result  in inter-state 
conflict,  it  points  to  one of  the ways in which the concerns  of  influential  ethno-
nationalist groups in a newly democratising state can be conflated with foreign policy 
to the extent that it heightens the risks of external war. 
122 Larry Diamond et al., 'What To Do In Iraq: A Roundtable'. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4, 
(Jul/Aug 2006), p. 157. 
123 This group was subsequently renamed the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) in 2007, but for 
accuracy will be referred to by its older name of SCIRI when discussing the years before it adopted 
a new title. 
124 For discussion of this, see Owen, 'Iraq and the Democratic Peace', p. 123.
125 Sebnem Arsu, Sabrina Tavernise, 'Turkey Authorises Troops to Enter Iraq to Fight Rebels'. The 
New York Times, (10 Oct., 2007), p. 10; Selcan Hacaoglu, David Rising, 'Turkish Troops Poised 
on Iraq Border'. Associated Press, (7 Nov., 2007); Norman Stone, 'Clouds Over Northern Iraq'. 
The Wall Street Journal Europe, (6 Nov., 2007), p. 14; Diana Elias, 'Iraqi President says Crisis 
with Turkey has Passed and Iraq Situation Better'. Associated Press, (14 Nov., 2007).
126 Stone, 'Clouds Over Northern Iraq'. This crisis raised briefly the prospect of war between Turkey 
and Iraq over the northern border of Kurdistan. The Iraqi government began to mobilise its army, 
the Kurds their Pesh Meaga militias, and Turkey over 10,000 troops on the frontier. While Turkey 
had been conducting limited raids against the PKK for a number of years prior to this crisis, it had 
not previously mobilised such a large number of troops, and the Iraqi government had not 
previously reacted so strongly against incursions aimed at the PKK. This crisis was eventually 
resolved in November 2007 through American mediation, but it demonstrated the real prospect of 
war between an immature and increasingly nationalist democracy and one of its powerful 
neighbours over the conflation of ethno-sectarian issues with foreign policy.
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Conclusion
Since the unveiling of the Bush Doctrine in 2002, a number of scholars have offered 
critical  assessments  of  the  theoretical  claims offered in  this  grand strategy  about 
promoting liberal democracy in the Middle East. There exists significant debate in 
the critical literature about the Bush administration's conception of the universality of 
liberal values, alongside its assumptions about the development of democracy and 
peace  in  the  Middle  East.  Among critics  of  the  Bush Doctrine  examined in  this 
chapter,  Edward  Rhodes  offers  perhaps  the most  effective  assessment  of  the 
problematic assumptions made by the Bush administration about the universal appeal 
of liberal values and the ability of the United States to foster these through the use of 
its military power. Approaching questions about regime change and democratisation 
from a similarly critical stance, scholars such as Omar Encarnacion and Glenn Perry 
make  important  points  about  the  problems  of  “imperial  democratisation”  as  the 
preferred strategy for  enacting the political  transformation of  states  such as  Iraq. 
More broadly, questions have been raised about the Bush Doctrine's propositions that 
the United States should assume what some critics view as a 'vanguardist' stance on 
democracy promotion, and that by spreading democracy, peace is inherently more 
assured. The range of criticisms made of the theoretical claims contained in the Bush 
Doctrine brings into doubt  many of its  guiding assumptions about liberalism and 
democracy. This in turn raises the question as to whether the practical application of 
these ideas since 2003 has been similarly problematic. 
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Chapter Five
From Theory to Practice: Democratisation in Iraq and the 
Broader Middle East
Since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 a number of important critiques have been 
made  of  the  implementation  and  outcomes  to  date  of  the  Bush  administration's 
democratisation strategy in the Arab world. As chapter three of this thesis details, 
President Bush and other senior cabinet officials and advisers repeatedly argued that 
through  intervention  in  Iraq,  a  stable  liberal  democratic  government  could  be 
established. This in turn would help to foster the democratic transformation of the 
wider Arab world through a 'domino effect,' and would thereby undermine the status 
quo  of  authoritarianism deemed  primarily  responsible  for  the  growth  of  Jihadist 
terrorism. Such claims were made in the two National Security Strategy documents 
and in numerous speeches given by President Bush and others in the run-up to the 
invasion of Iraq and in the years shortly after this. 
Examining  such  claims,  a  number  of  critics  argue  that  these  practical 
assumptions about democratisation and the policies that stem from them have often 
proven  to  be  problematic.  Many  scholars  have  focused  their  criticisms  on  the 
example of regime change and democratisation in Iraq, critically assessing the claims 
made in the Bush Doctrine against political developments in this state since 2003. 
Drawing upon these analyses, other critics have examined the effects of intervention 
in Iraq on the prospects of regional democratic transformation, while some have also 
assessed how this intervention has affected the threat posed by Jihadist terrorism. 
While the outcomes of activist democratisation in the Arab world cannot be assessed 
in  a  final  manner  as  yet,  a  significant  body of  critical  literature  has  nonetheless 
emerged  over  the  past  five  years  which  suggests  that  the  Bush  Doctrine's 
democratisation  policies  have  been  frequently  problematic  in  practice  and  faced 
significant unanticipated challenges to their assumptions and aims. 
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Democratisation in Iraq: The Early Years
Democracy promotion in Iraq in the years 2003 to 2005 serves as a useful case study 
of  many  of  the  Bush  Doctrine's  theoretical  claims  about  democratisation,  as 
examined in chapter four, in practice. Critics of intervention in Iraq often note that 
developments in the state during the first two years of occupation suggest that there 
are considerable limitations in practice over the ability of the United States to foster 
liberal  political  values  and  institutions  through  a  top-down  process  of 
democratisation. Further, the Bush administration's strategy of democracy promotion 
in Iraq faced considerable indigenous political obstacles that many observers argue 
played a key role in the formation of an elected government in 2005 unlike that 
which policy makers anticipated would be established in the months after regime 
change in 2003.
Pre-war Assumptions About Regime Change and Democratisation in Iraq
On the basis of its theoretical propositions about the appeal of liberal values and the 
development of democracy,  as discussed in chapter four,  the Bush administration 
made three practical assumptions about the process of democratic transformation in 
Iraq. The first of these was the idea that regime change would be a straightforward 
task.  In  a  press  conference  held  shortly  before  the  invasion  of  Iraq  commenced, 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman, pointed out that while 
regime change would involve doing away with some arms of the Ba'athist regime, it 
was  nonetheless  possible  to  retain  many  Iraqi  state  institutions  and  utilise  these 
during democratisation.1 In a press conference on the Bush administration's plans for 
post-war Iraq, Grossman told reporters that “you may go to the Ministry of Health, 
for example, and find there that if you took out the top one or two or three or four 
people, who are Saddam Hussein cronies or otherwise unacceptable to the coalition, 
you might find a whole rest of the ministry that could transit quite quickly back to 
Iraqi sovereignty.”2 Grossman believed that some ministries would remain intact to 
1 Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 'Assisting Iraqis With Their Future: 
Planning For Democracy'. Washington Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington, DC., 19 March 
2003. http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/18847.htm, accessed 4 March 2007. 
2 Ibid.
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the  extent  that  they  could  help  facilitate  democratisation,  maintaining  essential 
services  and  aiding  American  forces  in  establishing  a  provisional  government.3 
Similarly, Douglas Feith argues in his 2008 memoir, War and Decision, that while he 
and his Office of Special Plans in the Pentagon understood that a power vacuum 
would  emerge  in  post-Saddam  Iraq,  it  appeared  likely  that  many  of  the  Iraqi 
ministries could be easily purged of their Ba'athist leaders and thus quickly become 
part of an interim regime.4 Paul Wolfowitz, meanwhile, believed that Army Chief of 
Staff  Eric  Shinseki's  estimation  in  February  2003  that  the  United  States  would 
require up to “several hundred thousand troops” to secure Iraq after regime change 
was  “wildly  off  the  mark,”  as  130,000  would  be  sufficient.5 According  to 
Washington Post journalist, Thomas Ricks, Wolfowitz held that Iraq would present a 
relatively benign security environment following regime change,  as United States 
military personnel would be widely viewed as liberators, and that as an emerging 
democracy, Iraq would remain generally pacific during occupation.6
A  second  assumption  made  prior  to  regime  change  in  Iraq  was  that  the 
process  of  democratisation  would  be  led  by  exiled  Iraqi  political  leaders. 
Neoconservatives in  the Pentagon were particularly  adamant  that  democratisation 
should be led by secular pro-Western politicians primarily associated with Ahmed 
Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress.7 Investigative journalist  David Reiff points out 
that  in a number  of  ways,  the idea that  Chalabi  and the Iraqi National  Congress 
should spearhead democratisation in Iraq was a scaled-down version of the proxy 
war strategy proposed by neoconservative intellectuals such as Wolfowitz, Perle and 
Khalilzad  during  the  1990's.8 Since  this  policy  had  become less  viable  after  the 
September 11 attacks, its proponents now argued that while regime change in Iraq 
would be carried out by direct American military force, the Iraqi National Congress 
3 Ibid. 
4 Feith, p. 361. Feith also believed that the Iraqi military would remain intact in such a way that it 
would be a valuable asset for security and reconstruction purposes. 
5 For discussion of Wolfowitz's optimistic predictions about post-war Iraq, see Ricks, pp. 97-100. 
6 Ibid. 
7 For examples of this claim, see 'Deputy Defense Secretary Addresses Iraqi-Americans in 
Michigan';  Perle, 'Iraq Policy'; 'Under Secretary Feith Interview with Washington Post'. 21 
February 2003. http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1940, accessed 
13 May 2008; 'Under Secretary for Policy Douglas Feith remarks at the Council on Foreign 
Relations'. 13 November 2003. 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2932, accessed 13 May 2008; 
For critical discussion of these views, see Bamford, pp. 291-94.
8 David Rieff, 'Blueprint for a Mess: How the Bush Administration's Prewar Planners Bungled Post-
War Iraq'. New York Times Magazine, (2 Nov., 2003), p. 31; For an examination of 
neoconservative advocacy for proxy war prior to 2001, see chapter two of this thesis. 
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should  lead  the  democratic  regime  to  be  established  in  Baghdad.9 High-level 
Pentagon planners  believed  that  Iraqis  would  readily  embrace  the  Iraqi  National 
Congress, as this group was apparently viewed by a majority of the population as the 
most  viable  and  popular  option  for  establishing  a  provisional  democratic 
government.10 
In contrast to many of the 'conventional' narratives about intervention in Iraq, 
Douglas Feith attempts to refute the claim that he and leading Pentagon planners 
assumed that Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress would play a leading role in 
democratisation. In  War and Decision Feith writes that “some critics have charged 
that we were seduced by Ahmed Chalabi's predictions that Iraqis would rejoice when 
liberated from Saddam's tyranny,” and that democracy would be rapidly established 
by the Iraqi National Congress.11 According to Feith, “on each of these points, the 
critics are mistaken.”12 Feith's criticism has at least some merit, as some accounts of 
regime change and democratisation in Iraq do exaggerate the influence of the Office 
of Special Plans and make accusations about the influence of Chalabi that are at 
times too strong for the available evidence. However, as James Bamford points out, 
despite the hyperbole surrounding the question of Chalabi, it would be mistaken to 
believe that the Office of Special Plans and some other key elements of the Bush 
administration did not make a number of important assumptions about the central 
roles Chalabi and many of the exiles would play in democratisation.13 According to 
Bamford, Chalabi's claims about his popular following, about the way in which Iraqis 
would rapidly embrace liberal democratic ideas, and about the overall ease of regime 
change, encouraged the belief among some members of the Bush administration that 
through  installing  Iraqi  National  Congress  members  in  positions  of  power, 
democratisation would proceed quickly and smoothly with little cost to the United 
States.14
The third pre-war assumption made by the Bush administration,  stemming 
directly from the previous two, was the idea that a program of rapid democratisation 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Feith, pp. 263-5.
12 Ibid. Exactly who “the critics” constitute and the extent to which they “are mistaken” is not made 
at all clear by Feith. Such claims about critics are nonetheless repeated at various points in War 
and Decision, as Feith chastises the critical literature on regime change in Iraq without actually 
engaging with the evidence and debate it offers.
13 Bamford, pp. 291-4. 
14 Ibid. 
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was a realistic option for Iraq. The Bush administration's senior leaders, Colin Powell 
and Richard Armitage aside, generally believed that since regime change in Iraq was 
going  to  be  a  straightforward  task,  and  since  there  were  exiled  leaders  ready to 
assume control when Baghdad fell, the transition to democracy could occur quickly. 
In his memoir, Feith frequently discusses the initial plan for democratisation in Iraq, 
which was known as the Iraqi Interim Authority Plan.15 According to Feith, the Bush 
administration envisioned a three-stage process whereby a transitional regime led by 
exiles would be constructed immediately after regime change, after which power and 
responsibility would be given to a new government within months and Iraq would 
emerge as a secure, democratic and sovereign state within a year.16 In his 2005 study 
of democratisation in Iraq, entitled Squandered Victory, Larry Diamond writes that it 
was this  Iraqi  Interim Authority Plan that influenced the democratisation process 
championed  by  Jay  Garner,  the  retired  general  first  charged  with  leading  the 
occupation of Iraq.17 Garner aimed to appoint a government in May 2003, to appoint 
a  constitution-writing assembly  in  June,  and to  move towards  ratification  of  this 
constitution and then national elections by August 2003.18 Diamond views this as an 
extremely  ambitious  program  of  democratisation  that  exemplifies  the  Bush 
administration's  high  degree  of  confidence  that  political  outcomes  in  Iraq  would 
conform with each of its pre-war assumptions about democratic transformation in the 
state.19
The Coalition Provisional Authority and Democratisation in Iraq
Soon  after  the  removal  of  Saddam  Hussein's  regime,  the  Bush  administration 
established  an  occupation  authority  that  would  oversee  the  reconstruction  and 
democratisation of Iraq. In late April 2003, the Department of Defence established 
the Coalition Provisional  Authority  (CPA) in  Iraq,  and President  Bush appointed 
retired diplomat, Paul Bremer, to lead this organisation.20 In its fourteen months of 
existence from April 2003 to June 2004, the CPA attempted to control a top-down 
15 Feith, pp. 368-9, passim. 
16 Ibid; For further discussion of this plan, see Grossman, 'Assisting Iraqis With Their Future'.
17 Diamond, Squandered Victory, pp. 32-3. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. New York, 
Threshold Editions, 2006, pp. 10-12.
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process of political, economic and social reorganisation in Iraq. Paul Bremer and the 
CPA  sought  to  enact  policies  and  strategies  that  derived  from  the  pre-war 
assumptions examined above; in the process revealing many of the problems of these 
ideas in practice. 
The Coalition Provisional Authority quickly found that in practice, the pre-
war assumptions made about security and the continuity of government during and 
after regime change had been misplaced. In his 2004 study of regime change in Iraq, 
journalist James Fellows notes that the Iraqi regime, its military forces and the state 
in general suffered a total collapse as a result of the American invasion in March-
April 2003.21 This meant that there were no remaining state institutions or assets, 
such as local councils, police forces or government employees, which could aid the 
United States in securing Iraq and initiating a process of democratisation.22 A RAND 
Corporation study of intervention in Iraq, published in February 2005, notes that the 
Bush  administration's  assumptions  about  security,  stability  and  the  continuity  of 
government in Iraq often stemmed from overly-optimistic and simplistic assumptions 
about regime change; particularly a belief that state failure, chronic insecurity and 
lawlessness would not be major problems.23 The RAND study emphasises that in a 
post-war situation, power vacuums generally encourage disorder and violence, and in 
such cases, security should trump everything else. This means that sufficient troops 
should be deployed to secure the country, and that ambitious plans for building a new 
regime should be deferred until disorder has been contained.24 
Along with dire security issues, the CPA regularly faced the question of how 
to establish a stable democracy in Iraq. One of the most difficult tasks of this process 
was deciding when and how to hold elections. In his 2006 memoir, My Year in Iraq, 
Paul  Bremer  repeatedly  emphasises  his  opposition  to  the  ideas  about  rapid 
democratisation expressed in the Pentagon's Interim Iraqi Authority Plan.  Bremer 
writes that  talk  in Washington about  holding elections mere months after  regime 
change was a “reckless fantasy” that showed some planner's “aversions to nation-
building” and their misplaced assumptions that democratisation would not face any 
21 James Fallows, 'Blind Into Baghdad'. Atlantic Monthly, (Jan/Feb 2004). 
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200401/fallows, accessed 12 May 2008.
22 Ibid. 
23 The RAND Corporation, 'Iraq: Translating Lessons into Future DoD Policies'. The RAND 
Corporation, Santa Monica, California, February 2005, p. 6. 
24 Ibid. 
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significant obstacles in Iraq.25 Bremer argues that without effective security, and with 
the  total  collapse  of  Iraqi  state  institutions  and  basic  services,  pushing  for  early 
elections  was  simply  out  of  the  question.  Iraq  would  therefore  have  to  be  ruled 
through  the  CPA  for  an  extended  period.26 Critically  assessing  neoconservative 
support for the Iraqi Interim Authority plan, Bremer writes in his memoir that 
I came to realise that some folks in Washington underestimated the 
complexity  of  the  challenge  and  thought  we  could  solve  all  our 
problems by simply transferring authority  immediately  to  the  Iraqi 
Governing  Council,  as  if  this  group could somehow overcome the 
interconnected security-economic-political  problems we in the CPA 
could not. That kind of wishful thinking did not augur well.27 
Having  cast  aside  the  Iraqi  Interim Authority  Plan,  Bremer  and the  CPA 
attempted to devise an alternative strategy for building democracy in Iraq. George 
Packer, a journalist who covered the first years of occupation in Iraq, writes in his 
2006 book The Assassin's Gate that the CPA essentially sought to “fill all the blanks 
left  empty  back  in  Washington  by  the  war's  visionaries  who  had  imagined  that 
freedom and democracy would emerge spontaneously in Iraq.”28 Packer argues that it 
was  Bremer  and  the  CPA  which  spearheaded  plans  for  democratisation,  as  the 
realities of Iraq after regime change left many in the Bush administration temporarily 
unsure about how to establish democracy in any practical sense.29 Symptomatic of 
the CPA's dominance of policy in the early occupation period was Bremer's unilateral 
announcement of a “seven-step plan” of democratisation in September 2003.30 In his 
Washington Post article that outlined this plan, Bremer declares that “at the present 
elections  are  simply  not  possible.”31 Instead,  the  only  way  in  which  Iraq  could 
become democratic was through writing a constitution that would enshrine essential 
democratic  rights  and  establish  the  institutions  and  rule  of  law  required  for 
elections.32 Bremer argues that it would be necessary for constitution-writing to come 
before full elections, and he holds that despite this process resulting in the extension 
of  the  occupation  of  Iraq,  this  was  essential  in  order  to  bring  about  effective 
25 Bremer, p. 12. 
26 Ibid, p. 205. 
27 Ibid, p. 117. 
28 Packer, p. 187. 
29 Ibid. 
30 L. Paul Bremer III, 'Iraq's Path to Sovereignty'. Opinion Editorial, Washington Post, (8 Sept., 
2003).
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid.
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democracy.33 
Examining Bremer's “seven-step plan” and its consequences, Larry Diamond 
notes that the CPA faced considerable pressure from the Bush administration and 
Iraqi Governing Council members to adopt a modified plan of democratisation that 
would shorten the occupation and ensure the return of sovereignty during 2004.34 
After  some months of negotiation,  the CPA announced a revised democratisation 
strategy that became known as the “November 15 agreement.”35 This plan, signed on 
15 November 2003, called for a “Transitional Administration Law” (effectively an 
interim constitution) by March 2004, an interim government for the period June 2004 
to  January  2005,  an  election  in  January  2005,  the  national  ratification  of  a 
constitution by October  2005,  and elections  again in  December  2005.36 Diamond 
labels  this  process a  “formidable timetable” which assumed there would be little 
resistance among Iraqi political groups to forced-pace democratisation, and that the 
institutions  required  for  stable  democracy  could  be  established  in  such  a  short 
timeframe.37 The CPA, and its successor from June 2004, the American embassy in 
Baghdad, pressed ahead with this  plan,  holding all  of  the elections scheduled for 
2005. Nonetheless, this process faced significant challenges from indigenous Iraqi 
leaders and had unanticipated political outcomes in later years.38 
The Challenge of Ayatollah Al Sistani
The CPA and many members of President Bush's cabinet appeared to assume that 
Iraqi  political  leaders  would  be  generally  quiescent  towards  the  timetable  for 
democratisation established in 2003. Yet during 2003, the leader of the Shia in Iraq, 
Grand  Ayatollah  Al  Sistani,  increasingly  confounded  the  CPA's  plans  for 
democratisation  and  the  Bush  administration's  underlying  assumptions  about  the 
development  of  secular  liberal  democracy in  Iraq.  Sistani  repeatedly called for  a 
political process that centred on direct national elections; a process that would result 
33 Ibid. 
34 Diamond, Squandered Victory, pp. 153-5. 
35 'Agreement on Political Process'. Coalition Provisional Authority, 15 November 2003.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/1115nov15agreement.htm, 
accessed 27 June 2008.
36 Ibid; For discussion of the November 15 agreement, see Diamond, Squandered Victory, pp. 154-5. 
37 Diamond, Squandered Victory, pp. 154-5. 
38 For further analysis, see discussion in the next section of this chapter on democratisation and 
terrorism in Iraq. 
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in an elected government dominated by the majority religious Shia. Both the CPA 
and the Bush administration only belatedly realised the immense influence of Sistani, 
coming to understand over time that democratisation in Iraq could only succeed if 
they acceded to most of the Ayatollah's demands.
Ayatollah Al Sistani first stated his disagreement with the CPA's process of 
democratisation  through  a  fatwa released  in  June  2003.  In  his  fatwa,  Sistani 
expressed concern at the way in which the CPA sought to control the democratisation 
process,  and  he  called  for  progress  towards  direct  national  elections.39 Larry 
Diamond notes that the CPA initially ignored Al Sistani,  viewing him as merely 
another religious figure among many in Iraq. In Diamond's view, the CPA's dismissal 
of  Sistani  in  the  months  after  he  issued  his  fatwa had  “far  reaching,  ominous 
implications,  for  he  was  the  most  revered  moral  authority  in  Iraq.”40 As  Rajiv 
Chandrasekaran, a journalist who covered Iraq during the first years of occupation 
points out, Sistani commanded the support of a majority of Shia in Iraq and could 
mobilise millions by issuing fatwas and making public announcements on his views 
about democratisation.41 After the November 15 agreement had been signed, Sistani 
made his influence again known, as he stated that he was dissatisfied with the CPA's 
plan to appoint an interim regime without first completing a constitution written by 
an elected body.42 In Paul Bremer's account in his memoir, Sistani warned that if he 
remained displeased with the CPA's plans, he would issue another fatwa stating his 
opposition to the whole democratisation process.43 Bremer feared this would lead to 
widespread Shia rejection of the November 15 agreement, and would likely put the 
democratisation of Iraq in jeopardy.
It  was  at  this  point  that  the  CPA began to  realise  the  extent  of  Sistani's 
influence. Paul Bremer comments in his memoir that, facing the prospect of having 
the Shia majority come out in opposition to the November 15 agreement, the CPA 
39 For discussion of Sistani's fatwa and its implications for Iraqis and the CPA following its release, 
see 'Interview with Rajiv Chandrasekaran'. PBS, Iraq's Lost Year. (6 Aug., 2006). 
http://www.c.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/interviews/rajiv.html, accessed 27 June 
2008. 
40 Diamond, Squandered Victory, pp. 44-5. 
41 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Baghdad's Green Zone. London, 
Bloomsbury, 2006, pp. 88-9; See also 'Interview with Rajiv Chandrasekaran'.
42 'Interview with Rajiv Chandrasekaran'.
43 Bremer My Year in Iraq, pp. 211-12. Ayatollah Al Sistani refused to talk directly to the Coalition 
Provisional Authority, and instead communicated his ideas through either Shia members of the 
Governing Council close to the clerical establishment (such as those of the SCIRI Party), or 
through Muslim ambassadors sent to Sistani by Bremer. 
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acceded to a modified democratisation process.44 Discussing the changes made to the 
CPA's plans for democratisation in late 2003, Bremer writes that he and his advisers
Decided to float the idea of an interim constitution, which we hoped 
would get past the Sistani fatwa and allow us to transfer sovereignty to 
an  Iraqi  government  under  a  legal  framework  establishing  Iraq's 
political  institutions,  structure  and  democracy  while  protecting 
minority and human rights. But we would also agree to the conditions 
set forth in Sistani's fatwa – that elections be held as soon as possible 
for a body to draft Iraq's permanent constitution.45 
Assessing Bremer's account, Glenn Perry comments that the fact the CPA's plans for 
top-down democratisation were modified to  this  extent,  on the basis  of  demands 
made by one Shiite Ayatollah, showed the way in which the occupation authority 
was beginning to become “entrapped” in a process of democratisation considerably 
different  to  that  which  the  Bush  administration  had  envisioned  prior  to  regime 
change.46 Similarly, Chandrasekaran argues that by late 2003 the CPA had belatedly 
recognised that the democratisation process was coming to be dominated by religious 
Shia that were previously though to be apolitical in outlook and less popular than the 
secular exiled leaders who had returned to Iraq after regime change.47
In his 2006 study of Middle East democratisation, Glenn Perry argues that the 
CPA's  attempts  to  appease  Sistani  by  altering  elements  of  the  plan  for 
democratisation did not prevent him from pressing for direct national elections.48 In 
late 2003, the CPA proposed what it labelled a “caucus” system of indirect elections 
that  it  hoped  would  placate  Sistani's  demands  for  enfranchisement.  This  system 
would allow a CPA-controlled process of elections to occur at  local and regional 
levels in order to select suitable delegates for a national assembly of 'notables.'49 This 
assembly would then write the interim constitution demanded by Sistani.50  Shortly 
after the announcement of the caucus plan however, Sistani stated his opposition to 
this  election  process  and  continued  to  insist  on  direct  national  elections.  Sistani 
mobilised  over  one  hundred  thousand Shia  to  protest  against  the  caucus  plan  in 
January 2004; an act Perry argues was decisive in forcing the CPA to abandon this 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid, pp. 213-14. 
46 Perry, p. 70.
47 Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City, pp. 88-9.
48 Perry, pp. 70-1. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid.
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proposed election system.51 Similarly, during the writing of the interim constitution 
in early 2004, Sistani again challenged the CPA's plan for democratisation and forced 
further concessions before agreeing to the American-led political process.52 Sistani 
pushed the CPA and the Governing Council to include his demands regarding Islam 
and democracy in the constitution, and he again rallied many tens of thousands of 
Shia behind his calls for enfranchisement on his terms.53
The  actions  of  Sistani  from  2003  to  early  2005  caused  some  influential 
figures in the Bush administration to begin reconsidering their initial assumptions 
about the unfolding of democracy in Iraq. According to Bob Woodward's account in 
his 2006 book, State of Denial, President Bush and some top officials around him 
gradually realised that it  was Sistani, not secular pro-Western Iraqi exiles such as 
Chalabi, that were integral to the democratic future of Iraq.54 Woodward writes that 
in a December 2003 National Security Council meeting, Paul Bremer asked “are we 
going to let a 75 year old cleric decide what our policy is going to be in Iraq?”55 Vice 
President Dick Cheney responded by noting that he believed it was indeed necessary 
to “cultivate” Sistani, even if the CPA and Bush administration disliked Sistani or 
opposed  some  of  his  goals.56 At  another  meeting  in  early  2004,  President  Bush 
contended  that  “Sistani  is  right”  about  the  need  for  elections  in  Iraq.  Bush 
commented  that  he  had  “the  majority  community  wanting  elections,  and  I'm 
supposed to say no?”57 
Woodward notes that once policy planners realised how reliant the United 
States  had  become on Sistani  to  carry out  their  aims of  democratisation in  Iraq, 
“Sistani was the certified go-to cleric for the Bush administration. Whether cranky, 
Iranian or beloved, one thing was for sure: He had the power over millions.”58 The 
Bush administration's embrace of Sistani represented an important shift in practice 
from the ideas about  democratisation in  Iraq expressed in the terms of  the Bush 
Doctrine.  Entering Iraq in 2003 with a number of preconceived assumptions about 
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid, pp. 71-2. During the process of drafting Iraq's interim constitution, Sistani voiced his views 
on the role of Islam in the state, on the need for proportional representation of Iraq's various ethnic 
and sectarian groups, and on his concerns about the veto powers included in the interim 
constitution by the Kurds.
53 Ibid. 
54 Woodward, State of Denial, pp. 263-4. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid, pp. 370-1; For further discussion of Bush's position on elections in Iraq, see Gewen, p. 17.
58 Woodward, State of Denial, pp. 263-4. 
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the  development  of  liberal  democracy,  the  Bush administration  was pressured  in 
practice to carry out democratisation on Sistani's terms; even as it gradually realised 
that this would lead to the formation of a regime in 2005 quite unlike that which it 
had originally aimed to establish.59 
Democratisation and Terrorism
Many of the claims made in the Bush Doctrine about encouraging democracy as a 
route to overcoming terrorism have been brought into question by the case of regime 
change  and  democratisation  in  Iraq.  Critics  have  argued  that  interventionist 
democratisation in Iraq played a large role in enabling the growth of terrorism in the 
state. While the presence of democracy in Iraq is not in itself a cause of terrorism, 
critics often agree that regime change and the process of democratisation adopted by 
the  United  States  helped  to  embolden  Jihadists  and  facilitate  sectarian  terrorism 
between Iraqi communities. Further, events in Iraq have also led a number of critics 
to  question  the  Bush  Doctrine's  broader  propositions  about  the  links  between 
democratisation and the reduction of terrorism across the broader Middle East, as 
many  of  the  Bush  administration's  claims  have  been  seemingly  contradicted  in 
practice. 
Democratisation and Sectarian Terrorism in Iraq, 2003-6
Regime change and democratisation in Iraq played a major part in enabling sectarian 
terrorism  between  Iraq's  Shia  and  Sunni  communities.  Overthrowing  Saddam 
Hussein's  regime  unleashed  political  sectarianism,  while  democratic  elections 
codified  this  into  a  form  that  helped  to  facilitate  communal  violence.60 Adeed 
Dawisha argues that beginning in 2003 “ethnosectarian identities were reified into 
fixed  political  cleavages.  Particularistic  identities  were  fused  into  the  concept  of 
59 Perry, p. 69. 
60 The fact Iraq was held together under a dictatorship that stoked communalism for political ends 
fostered a strong sense of sectarian division among many Iraqi communities. In the chaos that 
followed regime change, people turned towards their communal and tribal groups for security, 
reifying these identities into fixed outlooks that many were willing to defend with violence.
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parties, so that national issues were now viewed from an ethnosectarian perspective, 
and sub-national concerns would generally define national policy.”61 On the basis of 
the idea that proportional representation by demography would ensure that all groups 
in Iraq would have a voice,  the CPA institutionalised a political  system in which 
sectarian identities  became the  primary  manner  by  which  groups  understood and 
expressed their political interests.62 This did much to facilitate sectarian violence, as 
it encouraged divisive identity politics and the belief that group interests could be 
advanced through force.63
The three elections held in Iraq during 2005 played a decisive part  in the 
consolidation  of  sectarianism  in  the  state.64 The  January  2005  election  for  a 
transitional assembly was, according to Adeed Dawisha and Larry Diamond, “almost 
purely a national-identity referendum.”65 The Shia United Iraqi Alliance Party gained 
the most votes in this first election, closely followed by the Kurdish Alliance and 
smaller religious parties generally associated with either of these two outlooks.66 A 
majority of Sunnis, meanwhile, boycotted this election and took up arms against the 
interim regime.67 Similarly, the outcome of the election to ratify Iraq's constitution in 
October 2005 was determined primarily by sectarian affiliations. A majority of Shia 
and Kurds voted in favour of a document that would give them significant power in 
Iraqi politics, while Sunnis came close to preventing the ratification of this document 
through their generally negative vote.68 This reinforces the fact that politics in Iraq 
had become essentially sectarian in character by this point, as groups viewed their 
interests primarily through sectarian lenses, not generally in terms of Iraqi national 
interests.  Finally,  the  December  2005 elections  for  a  full-term national  assembly 
completed the codification of sectarian politics in Iraq, as this election empowered 
the United Iraqi Alliance and its allies to form a Shia-dominated government.69 
The  consolidation  of  political  sectarianism  through  democratic  elections 
played a major role in fomenting the sectarian terrorism that engulfed much of Iraq in 
61 Adeed Dawisha, 'The Unravelling of Iraq: Ethnosectarian Preferences and State Performance in 
Historical Perspective'. The Middle East Journal, Vol. 62, No. 2, (Spring 2008), p. 223.
62 Ibid, p. 229. 
63 Ibid.
64 Adeed Dawisha, Larry Diamond, 'Iraq's Year of Voting Dangerously'. Journal of Democracy, Vol. 
17, No. 2, (Apr., 2006), p. 89. 
65 Ibid, p. 93. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid, pp. 93-4. 
68 Ibid, p. 94.
69 Ibid, p. 97.
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2006.70 Shia  militia  groups  rode  to  power with the  election  of  a  Shia-dominated 
regime, assuming important positions in the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of 
Defence, from which they could infiltrate the police forces and parts of the army.71 
Sectarian violence in Iraq became considerably worse during 2006 as a result of the 
bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samara in February that year, as this triggered 
repeated rounds of sectarian killings by Shia against Sunni and reprisal killings by 
Sunni death squads.72 This violence became so endemic that many observers feared 
at the time that Iraq could disintegrate into “communal cantons” through a process of 
large-scale ethnic cleansing.73 While Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki and the clerical 
establishment led by Sistani publicly denounced this explosion in sectarian violence, 
some major Shia parties in the government were in fact implicated in much of this 
violence. Many militia groups associated with the UIA, al Dawa and SCIRI parties 
achieved through the elections of 2005 a degree of influence that allowed them to use 
government resources to launch campaigns of terror against their enemies.74 In this 
way, the democratic elections consistently championed by the Bush administration 
actually played an important part in enabling sectarian terrorism in Iraq, rather than 
undermining the appeal and use of this form of political violence. 
Jihadist Terrorism in Iraq- 2003-6
A number of critics argue that contrary to the Bush administration's claims about 
undermining Jihadism through intervention in Iraq, regime change and events in the 
state from 2003 to 2006 actually played a key role in fostering Jihadist violence. It is 
not that democracy in Iraq itself encouraged Jihadism, but rather that through its 
actions, the Bush administration inadvertently established in Iraq an ideal breeding 
ground for this ideology. In the years prior to the change of American strategy in Iraq 
in early 2007,75 Jihadist terrorism was on the rise in the state, facilitated in large part 
70 Diamond, Squandered Victory, pp. 324-6.
71 Diamond et al, 'What to do in Iraq', pp. 156-7. 
72 Toby Dodge, 'The Causes of US Failure in Iraq'. Survival, Vol. 49, No. 1, (Mar., 2007), pp. 88-90; 
For further discussion of the rise of sectarian violence in Iraq in 2006, see Peter W. Galbraith, The 
End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End. New York, Simon and 
Schuster, 2006, pp. 1-3. 
73 See for example, Diamond et al., 'What To Do In Iraq', pp. 157-8. This article was published in 
August 2006 – a time when communal violence in Iraq continued to escalate almost weekly and 
many observers believed that Iraq was close to collapsing into three sectarian mini-states. 
74 Ibid. 
75 For discussion of this change in strategy and its effects, see the conclusion of this thesis. 
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by the insecurity and chaos resulting from regime change and its aftermath.
Some  agencies  of  the  United  States  government  have  acknowledged  the 
important role intervention in Iraq played in fostering Jihadist violence. According to 
an April 2006 CIA report entitled 'Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the 
United States,' regime change and democratisation in Iraq made the state “the “cause 
celebre” for Jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim 
world and cultivating support for the global Jihadist movement.”76 Indeed, the CIA 
report contends that “the Iraq Jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorists  and 
operatives”  and  that  “perceived  Jihadist  successes  [in  Iraq]  would  inspire  more 
fighters  to  continue  the  struggle  elsewhere.”77 Thus,  a  strong Al  Qaeda  presence 
developed in Iraq from 2003 owing in large part to regime change, whereas before 
the invasion, Jihadism was virtually non-existent in the state.78 In a similar vein to the 
CIA's assessment, a classified Joint Chiefs of Staff report dated May 2006 argues that 
Jihadists in Iraq “retain the resources and capability to sustain and even increase 
current levels of violence” throughout 2006 and into 2007.79 While Jihadist attacks 
were  at  a  near  all-time  high  in  Iraq  at  the  time  the  report  was  published,  its 
conclusion  that  a  primary  cause  of  this  violence  is  the  chaotic  security  situation 
resulting from the invasion of 2003 remains accurate.80
Critics have argued that through its invasion of Iraq and actions in the state to 
2007, the United States helped to embolden a more hardline form of Jihadism. In 
2004, Al Qaeda in Iraq was established under the leadership of the Jordanian Jihadist, 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.81 According to  Council on Foreign Relations scholar Greg 
Bruno, Zarqawi developed in Iraq a more extreme version of Jihadist ideology than 
that  of  Osama Bin  Laden,  in  which  'jihad'  was  not  only  carried  out  against  the 
76 'Declassified Key Judgements of National Intelligence Estimate “Trends in Global Terrorism: 
Implications for the United States” dated April 2006'. Washington, April 2006, p. 2. 
http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/trends.pdf, accessed 12 July 2007. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Mary Anne Weaver, 'The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi'. The Atlantic Monthly 
Online, (Jul/Aug 2006). http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200607/zarqawi, accessed 4 
September 2007. 
79 For discussion and further details of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's still-classified assessment, see 
Woodward, State of Denial, pp. 481-4. The report accurately predicted that levels of violence 
would increase: Jihadist attacks reached their all-time high in October and November 2006, and 
again reached extremely high levels in the first months of 2007, before being significantly 
undermined by the surge and the Sunni tribal rebellion against Al Qaeda in the second half of 
2007. For further discussion of the surge strategy, see the conclusion of this thesis.
80 Ibid. 
81 Greg Bruno, 'Profile: Al-Qaeda in Iraq (a.k.a. al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia)'. Council on Foreign 
Relations Online, (14 Dec., 2007). http://www.cfr.org/publication/14811/profile.html, accessed 12 
May 2008. 
140
occupiers  and  their  clients,  but  also  against  the  Shia  and  other  Muslim  groups 
Zarqawi deemed apostates.82 Al Qaeda in Iraq was likely responsible for a number of 
the most deadly bombings in Iraq carried out to 2007, including the bombing of the 
Jordanian embassy and the United Nations mission in Iraq in 2003, as well as the 
bombing of the Golden Mosque of Samara in February 2006, and the attack on a 
Yazidi village in northern Iraq in August 2007 that killed over 500 people.83 Zarqawi 
was also likely behind the bombings of three western hotels in Amman, Jordan, in 
November 2005, and there is evidence that Al Qaeda in Iraq also made links with 
other Jihadists in the Gulf, Lebanon and Egypt.84 While Al Qaeda in Iraq lost some of 
its organisational capability after Zarqawi was killed by an American airstrike in June 
2006, it  has remained what Brookings Institute Middle East scholar Bruce Riedel 
describes as the “cutting edge” of Jihadist ideology.85 Intervention in Iraq played a 
major role in fostering a new wave of Jihadism more extreme than that of the broader 
Al Qaeda network, and until the adoption of the “surge” strategy in 2007, the Bush 
administration's actions in Iraq contributed to a situation that was generally enabling, 
rather than undermining, this movement.86 
Reassessing the Roots of Terrorism
The practical application and consequences of activist democracy promotion in Iraq 
has  led  some  scholars  to  question  the  broader  assumptions  made  by  the  Bush 
administration  about  the  roots  of  terrorism.  While  President  Bush  consistently 
claimed that the authoritarian status quo of the Arab world was the primary source of 
Jihadist  ideology, and that spreading democracy was the key to undermining this 
threat,87 critics argue that these claims have often been contradicted and brought into 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid; See also Bruce Riedel, 'Al Qaeda Strikes Back'. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 3, (May/Jun 
2007), pp. 26-7. 
84 Thomas Hegghammer, 'Global Jihadism After the Iraq War'. The Middle East Journal, Vol. 60, No. 
1, (Winter 2006), p. 11; For further discussion of Zarqawi's regional strategy, see Brian Fishman, 
'After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and the Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq'. The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 
29, No. 4, (Autumn 2006), p. 23. The groups Zarqawi likely made connections with include Fatah 
al Islam in Lebanon, Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula in Saudi Arabia, and Jihadist groups in 
Egypt that splintered from the Muslim Brotherhood.
85 Bruce Riedel, 'The Return of the Knights: Al-Qaeda and the Fruits of Middle East Disorder'. 
Survival, Vol. 49, No. 3, (Sept., 2007), p. 115
86 Ibid; See also Riedel, 'Al Qaeda Strikes Back', p. 27. For discussion of the surge and the 
undermining of Al Qaeda in Iraq by 2008, see the conclusion of this thesis.
87 See discussion of authoritarianism and terrorism in chapter three of this thesis. 
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significant doubt in practice. 
A major criticism levelled at the Bush administration's propositions about the 
roots  of  terrorism  in  the  Middle  East  is  that  there  is  almost  no evidence  that 
authoritarian  regimes  are  the  primary,  or  even  an  important,  source  of  Jihadist 
violence.  In  a  September  2005  Foreign  Affairs  article,  University  of  Vermont 
political science professor, F. Gregory Gause, challenges the Bush Doctrine's claim 
that  there  is  undeniable  causation  between  authoritarianism  and  terrorism.88 
Examining a variety of scholarly and governmental sources on Jihadist terrorism in 
the  Arab  world,  Gause  writes  that  “although  what  is  known  about  terrorism  is 
admittedly  incomplete,  the  data  available  [does]  not  show  a  strong  relationship 
between democracy and an absence of or a reduction in terrorism. Terrorism appears 
to stem from factors much more specific than regime type.”89 Indeed, Gause contends 
that “there is... no solid empirical evidence for a strong link between democracy, or 
any other regime type, and terrorism.”90 Writing two years after the invasion of Iraq, 
Gause holds that there is still no “evidence that democracy in the Arab world will 
“drain the swamp,” eliminating soft  support  for terrorist  organizations among the 
Arab public and reducing the number of potential recruits for them.”91 In Gause's 
view, the case of Iraq appears to show that intervention in the Middle East can help to 
embolden  Jihadist  terrorism,  rather  than  eliminate  the  conditions  in  which  it 
apparently breeds.92
Critics  of  the  Bush  Doctrine  have  also  argued  since  2003  that  the  Bush 
administration's  explanation  for  the  origins  of  Jihadism  marginalises  compelling 
alternative explanations that can better  account  for the growth of this  ideology.93 
Examining the views of Islamic politics scholar Olivier Roy and others, Fukuyama 
88 F. Gregory Gause III, 'Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, (Sept/Oct 
2005), p. 62.
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid, p. 65. 
92 Ibid, p. 62. 
93 Fukuyama, After the Neocons, pp. 74-6; Richard Crockatt, America Embattled: September 11, 
anti-Americanism and the Global Order. London, Routledge, 2003, pp. 94-6. Fukuyama and 
Crockatt note that some critics argue that the Bush administration might  have deliberately 
marginalised alternative explanations for Jihadism. Some critics hold that the Bush administration 
did not wish to acknowledge that past and current American policies might have played a role in 
fostering Jihadist ideology, as to admit this would not be consistent with the Bush administration's 
own virtuous self-image, and would contradict its rationales for activist democracy promotion. 
According to such critics, this meant that an alternative explanation for Jihadist terrorism had to be 
offered. Despite such claims, there is little evidence at present that the Bush administration merely 
offers its explanation for Jihadist terrorism to remain cognitively consistent. 
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argues that “there is considerable evidence that a large number of Muslims in the 
world, including many living in very traditional Muslim societies, do not hate the 
United States, modernisation or “freedom.”94 Fukuyama contends that most people in 
the Middle East “don't dislike the United States or the West as such but rather dislike 
American foreign policy. They believe that the United States supports Israel one-
sidedly against the Palestinians, and supports Arab dictators like Egypt's Mubarak or 
the Saudi royal family at the expense of democracy.”95 Similarly, Richard Crockatt, 
of the University of East Anglia, points out that Islamic fundamentalists view conflict 
in Iraq and between Israel and the Palestinians as a  cause for Jihad,  and see the 
alliances between the United States and authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia  as  affronts  to  Islam that  require  a  violent  response.96 Believing that  their 
religion remains under siege, Jihadist groups have continued since the invasion of 
Iraq with what they view as a global insurgency against American foreign policies in 
the Middle East.97 
In the view of a number of scholars, the example of Iraq can help to show that 
armed  democracy  promotion  is  an  ineffective  way  to  deal  with  the  problem  of 
terrorism.98 Writing in the context of escalating violence in Iraq in 2006, Fukuyama 
argues  that  “the  long-term problem is...  not  somehow “fixing”  the  Middle  East” 
through democratisation, but rather seriously examining the resentment of American 
foreign policy that seems to have done so much to exacerbate Jihadist ideology.99 
Addressing the idea, often expressed by President Bush, that democratic elections in 
a state such as Iraq would undermine Jihadist ideology, Gregory Gause writes that in 
reality it is “logical to assume that terrorists, who rarely represent political agendas 
that could mobilize electoral majorities, would reject the very principles of majority 
rule and minority rights on which liberal democracy is based.”100 Bruce Riedel and 
others suggest that this is what occurred in Iraq following its three elections in 2005, 
as  Jihadists  sought  to  disrupt  and  undermine  democratisation  by  increasing  the 
number and severity of attacks against civilians and the government in Baghdad.101 A 
number of critics have concluded from the example of Iraq that, despite the Bush 
94 Fukuyama, After the Neocons, pp. 74-6. 
95 Ibid.
96 Crockatt, pp. 94-5.
97 Ibid. 
98 For discussion of this important argument, see Halper, Clarke, pp. 282-3. 
99 Fukuyama, After the Neocons, pp. 74-5. 
100 Gause, p. 66. 
101 Riedel, 'Al Qaeda Strikes Back', passim. 
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Doctrine's claims, the presence of a democratic regime does not necessarily mean 
that Jihadist ideology will be undermined, and that the link between authoritarianism 
and Jihadist ideology is most often tenuous at best.
The Dominoes that did not Fall
The Bush administration consistently linked the promotion of democracy in Iraq to 
its wider aim of regional democratic transformation in the Arab world. In practice, 
however, developments in the Middle East since 2003 have roundly challenged this 
notion.  A  number  of  critics  have  noted  that  when  faced  with  the  example  of 
democratisation and its consequences in Iraq, the United States' authoritarian Arab 
allies have dug in their heels against change and have successfully deflected most 
pressure for reform. In addition, critics often note that where democratic elections 
have occurred in the Arab world, these have frequently resulted in the rise of Islamist 
political  parties  that  challenge  many  key  elements  of  the  Bush  administration's 
assumptions about liberal  democratic development.102 While it  is still  too soon to 
assess the longer-term effects of democratisation in Iraq on the wider Middle East, it 
is apparent that the outcomes to date have been generally negative and a 'democratic 
domino effect' has not occurred.
The Entrenchment of Authoritarian Allies
Contrary  to  the  assumptions  made  by  senior  policy  makers  of  the  Bush 
administration,  democracy  promotion  in  Iraq  has  not  encouraged  the  democratic 
transformation  of  America's  Arab  allies.103 Examining  the  regional  effects  of 
democratisation in Iraq, Council on Foreign Relations fellow Stephen Cook writes 
that 
It is far from clear... that the war [in Iraq] has contributed anything to 
the drive for democracy in places such as Amman, Cairo, Damascus, 
or Riyadh. The arrival of U.S. troops in Iraq may alter the behaviour 
102 Thomas Carothers, 'Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror'. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1, 
(Jan/Feb 2003), p. 89. 
103 Carothers, 'US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush', p. 6. 
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of some states on the country's borders, but this does not mean that the 
new Iraq will somehow act as a catalyst for political liberalization and 
democracy in the region.104 
Similarly, in a 2007 article on the potential for political change in the Gulf States, 
Anoushiraven Ehteshami and Steven Wright, both of Durham University, comment 
that “the heightened level of insecurity in Iraq is now serving as a barrier for future 
reform” in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia.105 This is “the exact opposite of what was 
intended by Washington.”106 Ehteshami and Wright hold that regular “coverage of the 
near-daily  carnage  within  Iraq”  by  Arab  press  “is  increasingly  being  cited  by 
opponents to reform as an example of where reform will lead.”107 Events in Iraq have 
often reinforced an already-strong reluctance among authoritarian leaders to engage 
in anything more than the most piecemeal reforms that do not fundamentally alter the 
status quo.108
In  the  view of  some critics,  the  entrenchment  of  authoritarianism among 
America's  Arab  allies  demonstrates  that  such  regimes  continue  to  be  adept  at 
deflecting and marginalising external  pressure for  reform. Georgetown University 
political science professor Steven Heydemann notes that many of the authoritarian 
regimes the Bush administration seeks to transform are “more broadly consolidated 
than is  often acknowledged.”109 Arab leaders have been able  to weather previous 
external  pressure  for  change,  such  as  that  brought  about  by  the  collapse  of 
communism and the Third Wave of  democratisation,  through initiating piecemeal 
reform programs  and  by  manipulating  state  structures  to  give  the  appearance  of 
liberalisation, but to control this process to the extent that no substantive changes 
take place.110 This is what Marina Ottaway, a leading Middle East specialist at the 
Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  calls  the  development  of  a  “semi-
authoritarian” model of reform.111 Under this model, a regime opens up to the extent 
that the slightest degree of liberalisation does occur; however this process is totally 
104 Steven A. Cook, 'The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform'. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2, 
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controlled from the top and often reversed after a short period of time out of a fear 
that  reform could  impede  regime  survival  if  any  form of  genuine  democracy  is 
allowed  to  develop.112 In  this  way,  authoritarian  Arab  states  have  been  able  to 
marginalise substantive reform to the extent that such regimes are more stable and 
entrenched than authoritarian governments in most other parts of the world today. 
Reform among  'friendly'  authoritarian  regimes  has  also  been  significantly 
impeded by a widespread perception among such governments and their populations 
that  the  United  States  lacks  the  credibility  to  promote  democratic  change  in  the 
Middle East. Marina Ottaway comments that Arab populations are well aware that 
the United States has for decades stood behind their authoritarian leaders as it sought 
to maintain the status quo.113 There is therefore a great deal of cynicism and hostility 
towards  the  idea  that  the  Bush  administration  has  now  decided  to  support  real 
democratic change.114 In addition, Thomas Carothers writes that to many Arab elites 
and  the  wider  population,  the  idea  of  democratisation  has  since  2003  been 
“contaminated” by its association with American intervention in Iraq.115 American-
backed democratisation has consistently lacked credibility in Arab eyes when voiced 
by an administration which speaks in lofty terms about democratic change, but which 
nonetheless  appears  through  its  invasion  of  Iraq  to  remain  most  interested  in 
upholding  American  regional  power,  ensuring  Israel's  security  and  protecting  the 
United  States'  economic  interests  in  the  Arab  world.116 Accordingly,  many 
authoritarian regimes are reluctant to be seen undertaking substantive reform at the 
behest of an external power they and most of their populations believe has very little 
credibility or genuine will to push for wide-ranging democratic transformation.117 
As the 'friendly' authoritarian states of the Middle East have entrenched their 
positions in the face of pressure for change, some critics have noted a gradual shift in 
the Bush administration's policies in practice. Thomas Carothers writes that despite 
its strong statements about the need for extensive political transformation in the Arab 
world, in practice the Bush administration has exhibited a “split personality” towards 
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Ottaway (Eds), pp. 252-3. 
114 Ottaway, 'Promoting Democracy in the Middle East', p. 9. 
115 Carothers, 'US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush', p. 6. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Husam A. Mohamad, 'Democracy Promotion in Arab Politics'. Journal of International and Area 
Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, (Dec., 2007), p. 112. 
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its Arab allies since 2003.118 President Bush and other have pushed for democratic 
change, but have also started to become more aware that enacting such a policy is 
neither easy nor always beneficial in practice.119 Examining this tension in the Bush 
administration's policies, Carothers and Ottaway contend that 
Although  [the]  desire  for  democracy  may  be  heartfelt,  the  United 
States has a lengthy laundry list of other priorities in the region: access 
to oil, cooperation and assistance on counterterrorism, fostering peace 
between  Israel  and  its  neighbors,  stemming  the  proliferation  of 
weapons of mass destruction, and preventing Islamist radicals from 
seizing power.120 
Some  policy  makers  have  belatedly  realised  that  pushing  the  United  States' 
authoritarian allies to democratise at a rapid pace is not the panacea to all of the 
problems of the Middle East, and could actually be detrimental to the pursuit of other 
American interests.121 As Carothers notes, breaking down the long-standing client-
patron structure that serves as a pillar of American regional power is not in practice 
nearly as simple as establishing a model democracy in Iraq that will inspire wide-
ranging democratic change among America's Arab allies.122 In reality there is usually 
tension,  rather  than  harmony,  between  the  United  States'  desire  to  democratise 
authoritarian client regimes and its reliance on the stability of such regimes to uphold 
its regional influence.123
How  might  have  the  Bush  administration  resolved  this  apparent  tension 
between its statements about overturning the authoritarian status quo of the Middle 
East and the difficulties these policies face in practice? Some scholars have suggested 
that the most effective policy of democratisation for the Middle East is a gradualist 
process of “liberal autocracy reform.”124 Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev of the 
Nixon Centre contend that “rather than blindly prop up authoritarian rulers or gamble 
on  democracy,  the  American  empire  has  to  opt  for  a  middle  course  and aim to 
produce  liberal  autocracies  capable  of  managing  rather  than  suppressing 
pluralism.”125 Takeyh and Gvosdev hold that “ideally, the United States would hope 
118 Carothers, 'Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror', p. 89. 
119 Ibid.
120 Marina Ottaway, Thomas Carothers, 'Middle East Democracy'. Foreign Policy, No. 145, (Nov/Dec 
2004), p. 23. 
121 See discussion in the conclusion of this thesis. 
122 Carothers, 'US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush', p. 6.
123 Ibid; For further discussion, see Perry, pp. 66-7. 
124 Ray Takeyh, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, 'Democratic Impulses versus Imperial Interests: America’s New 
Mid-East Conundrum'. Orbis, Vol. 47, No. 3, (Summer 2003), p. 419. 
125 Ibid, p. 425.
147
to  engender  Arab  versions  of  Vladimir  Putin  –  a  pragmatic  realist  capable  of 
cooperating with the United States while effectively managing popular discontent 
with American policies.”126 This is essentially a prescription for fostering illiberal 
democrats  that  are  sufficiently  co-operative  as  to  allow  for  some  degree  of 
liberalisation that does not harm American interests or cause turmoil in Arab states.127
While this notion of “liberal autocracy reform” appears a compelling option 
for  the  Arab  world,  it  is  not  without  problems.  Georgetown  University 
democratisation  scholar,  Daniel  Brumberg,  warns  that  despite  its  allure,  “liberal 
autocracy reform” can be a  “transition to  nowhere.”128 Too often,  this  process of 
reform does not fundamentally alter key authoritarian state structures of control and 
repression. An incumbent authoritarian leader can easily enough manipulate national 
law and place stringent limits on politics and civil society if they believe that reform 
is getting out of hand.129 Similarly, Thomas Carothers questions whether “liberalising 
autocrats” can be trusted to implement fully the reforms they claim to champion.130 
Carothers writes that “for every Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore there have been dozens 
or even hundreds of rapacious, repressive autocrats posing as reformers, leaders for 
whom the rule of law represents a straitjacket to be avoided at all costs.”131 In these 
ways, while liberal autocracy reform is most certainly a more prudent and realistic 
policy than promoting Middle East democracy through a 'domino effect,' this policy 
could nonetheless lead to outcomes almost as mixed as those of the Bush Doctrine's 
attempts to democratise its authoritarian allies from 2003 to 2008.
'Negative Contagion'
The claims  made in  the Bush Doctrine  about  the  practical  unfolding  of  regional 
democratic transformation in the Middle East have also been brought into significant 
doubt as when democratic elections have been held since 2003, they have generally 
resulted in strong victories for Islamist political parties. To some extent, this reflects 
126 Ibid. If the United States did manage to foster an Arab Putin, it would likely be dissatisfied with 
the outcome – an assertive illiberal nationalist leader intent on engaging in revisionist actions 
abroad to strengthen the power and security of his state.
127 Ibid. 
128 Daniel Brumberg, 'Liberalization versus Democracy' in Carothers, Ottaway (Eds), p. 30.
129 Ibid.
130 Carothers, 'The "Sequencing" Fallacy', pp. 13-14.
131 Ibid.
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what Robert Jervis labels “negative contagion” in the international system.132 This is 
when an event in one part of the system, such as regime change and democratisation 
in Iraq, has unforeseen “feedback” in other states, fostering political developments 
that were seemingly unanticipated by an external actor when it first intervened.133 
While it is difficult to assess presently what longer-term effects events in Iraq 
might have on the development of democracy in the Arab world, it is at least clear 
that  developments  to  2008  have  run  contrary  to  those  anticipated  in  the  Bush 
Doctrine. In March 2003, journalist Greg Miller, of the Los Angeles Times, reported 
that the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research had produced a report 
critical of the supposed regional benefits of promoting democracy in Iraq.134 Entitled 
“Iraq, the Middle East and Change: No Dominoes,” the report argued that it was “not 
credible”  that  the  Bush  administration  could  bring  about  the  democratic 
transformation  of  the  Arab  world  though  the  invasion  of  Iraq.135 The  State 
Department report contended that “electoral democracy, were it to emerge” in Arab 
states  “could  well  be  subject  to  exploitation  by  anti-American  elements.”136 The 
invasion of Iraq and American actions in the state have indeed helped to energise a 
strong anti-American backlash. As Thomas Carothers notes, Islamist groups, being 
the most organised and influential political force outside of the ruling regime, have 
spearheaded this backlash and as a result have expanded their base of popular support 
to the extent that they have risen to positions of influence in many states.137 This 
process has only been accelerated as a result  of the election of a Shia-dominated 
regime in Iraq, as this has played an important role in encouraging Shia groups from 
Lebanon to the Gulf States to become more politically assertive.138 
This development of unanticipated “feedback” stemming from regime change 
in Iraq is most evident in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories. Critics have argued 
that while Islamist groups in this area have risen to power for a variety of reasons, 
there  is  nonetheless  a  connection  between  the  election  of  Islamists  in  Iraq  and 
increased Islamist political participation in this region. The 2006 election of Hamas 
132 Jervis, 'Understanding the Bush Doctrine', p. 369. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Greg Miller. 'Democracy Domino Theory “Not Credible”'. Los Angeles Times, (14 Mar., 2003), p. 
1.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Carothers, 'US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush', p. 14. 
138 Gilbert Achcar, 'Arab Spring: Late and Cold'. Le Monde Diplomatique, (Jul., 2005). 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/intervention/2005/07arapspring.htm, accessed 8 May 2007.
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confounded the Bush administration's consistent claims that democratisation in the 
Palestinian  Territories  would  result  in  a  pro-American  and  pro-Israeli  liberal 
democratic government.139 Dennis Ross, of the Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, contends that “the Hamas victory should compel Washington to reconsider its 
approach to promoting democracy in the Middle East.”140 According to Ross,  the 
Bush administration needs to understand that despite its optimism about the universal 
appeal of liberal democracy, it is always possible that hostile illiberal political forces 
can come to power through legitimate democratic elections.141 While Hamas rose to 
power  primarily  owing  to  domestic  political  changes  within  the  Palestinian 
territories,  Ross  observes  that  its  decision  to  stand  in  elections  was  nonetheless 
influenced to some extent by the fact  that  Islamist  groups have been empowered 
through elections in Iraq, and as Islamists in other Arab states were making important 
political gains by choosing participation over rejectionism.142
A similar dynamic also encouraged Hezbollah of Lebanon to participate in 
democratic elections. Emboldened by growing Shia political power in Iraq and the 
general  revival  of Shia  political  activism since 2003, Hezbollah gained increased 
influence  through  elections  in  Lebanon  in  2005.  With  popular  support  from  its 
constituencies,  Hezbollah  launched  an  attack  against  Israel  in  mid-July  2006, 
resulting in a major Israeli counter-strike that escalated into the Israel-Hezbollah war. 
According to investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, the fact that a freely elected 
party of Lebanon's government launched an attack against Israel undercut entirely the 
Bush administration's previously strong support for the  spread of the 'Arab spring' 
and  the  'Cedar  Revolution'  in  Lebanon.143 Seeking  now  to  encourage  an  Israeli 
'rollback' of Hezbollah in a manner not dissimilar to the strategy advocated in the 
139 'President Discusses the Future of Iraq'. 
140 Denis Ross, 'From Washington to Hamas: Change or Fail' in Robert Satloff (Ed), 'Hamas 
Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economics and Strategy'. Washington Institute  
For Near East Policy, Policy Focus No. 53, (Feb., 2006) p. 47. 
141 Ibid. The classic example of the phenomenon was the democratic election of the Nazi Party in 
Germany in April 1933. Hitler was legitimately elected as Chancellor and the Nazi Party assumed 
a majority in the Reichstag, using this new-found position of power to dismantle German 
democracy and establish a one-party state. 
142 Ibid. This again does not imply that such groups are embracing democracy as the “single 
sustainable model” of political order in the twenty-first century, but rather shows that such groups 
are pragmatic enough to utilise democratic institutions and elections as a route to power. Once in 
power, they often do not move in a liberal democratic direction. As the example of the rise and fall 
of Hamas shows, such parties can remain illiberal and violent to the extent that they undermine 
their own power through their actions. 
143 Seymour M. Hersh, 'Watching Lebanon: Washington's Interests in Israel's War'. The New Yorker, 
Vol. 82, No. 25, (21 Aug., 2006), p. 33.
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Clean  Break  report  published  ten  years  earlier,  some in  the  Bush administration 
appeared  to  have  belatedly  realised  in  July-August  2006  that  early  democratic 
elections  in  divided  religious  societies  could  embolden  hostile  political  forces 
contrary to American aims.144 Thus, rather than foster the emergence of benign liberal 
democratic groups in the Arab world, the invasion and democratisation of Iraq has to 
2008  played  an  important  part  in  doing  just  the  opposite,  helping  to  empower 
political forces often antithetical to the Bush Doctrine's assumption and detrimental 
to its goals. 
Conclusion
Through studying the development of democracy in Iraq and its effects on the region 
to 2008, a number of scholars have concluded that the practical application of the 
propositions about democracy promotion made in the Bush Doctrine are often highly 
problematic. While the Bush administration entered Iraq with preconceived notions 
of how democracy was likely to unfold, these were quickly challenged in practice by 
state collapse and the chronic insecurity that followed regime change. Moreover, as 
Glenn Perry and others show, the Bush administration did not anticipate the key role 
influential indigenous actors, above all Ayatollah Al Sistani, would play in forcing 
considerable changes to democratisation which resulted in a regime different to that 
expected in 2003. Examining the broader unintended consequences that stem from 
regime change and democratisation in Iraq, Gregory Gause and others observe that 
intervention in the state helped to embolden Jihadist and sectarian terrorism in the 
period  2003-6,  rather  than  diminish  such  forms  of  political  violence.  Thomas 
Carothers and Marina Ottaway, meanwhile, hold that the example of Iraq has been 
detrimental to liberal democratic transformation, as it has discouraged change among 
the United States' authoritarian allies and emboldened hostile political forces. Thus, 
in  practice,  the Bush Doctrine's  Middle  East  democratisation  policies  have faced 
countervailing conditions that have challenged many of the assumptions, goals and 
overall outlook of this anti-terrorism grand strategy. 
144 Marina Ottaway et al, 'The New Middle East'. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, (Mar., 2008). pp. 13-14. 
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Conclusion 
The Return to Reality
In a recent report on American democracy promotion during President Bush's time in 
office, Thomas Carothers argues that the anti-terrorism grand strategy of Middle East 
democratisation that constitutes the heart of the Bush Doctrine has by 2008 “ended 
up as a semi-realist venture.”1 Carothers notes that while the “United States is still 
fighting in Iraq” in Bush's last year in power, this is primarily for “the more basic 
goals of keeping the country from breaking apart and achieving at least basic order.”2 
With regards to democratisation in the wider Arab world, Carothers comments that 
the Bush administration has now “fallen back into the old pattern of accepting or 
embracing useful autocratic friends,” and is aiming to organise 'friendly' authoritarian 
states, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf States, into an alliance against what 
it perceives as a revisionist Iran.3 While some elements of the Bush administration's 
democratisation  policies  remain in  effect,  such  as  its  aid  programs,4 Carothers 
concludes that the heart of the Bush Doctrine's transformational strategy “is gone... 
broken  on  the  shoals  of  Iraqi  political  realities  and  U.S  security  and  economic 
interests throughout the region.”5
It  is  this  context  of realist  resurgence in  American foreign policy through 
which  the  Bush  Doctrine's  democratisation  policies,  and  commensurately,  the 
neoconservative  paradigm from which  they  are  derived,  have  entered  a  state  of 
decline.  Since  the  invasion  of  Iraq  in  March  2003,  realist  scholars  have  offered 
among the strongest and most consistent critiques of interventionist democratisation 
in the Middle East. Realists have regularly emphasised the need for a foreign policy 
that rejects the strategy of forcible democratic transformation in the Arab world, and 
that  is  more  aware  of  the  benefits  of  prudence,  humility  and  pragmatism  in 
1 Thomas Carothers, 'US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush'. Washington, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, (2007), p. 7. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid, p. 6. 
4 See discussion of the aid programs Middle East Partner Initiative and the Broader Middle East and 
North Africa Initiative in footnote number thirty one in chapter three of this thesis. 
5 Carothers, 'US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush', p. 7. 
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international relations.6 Until 2006, the Bush administration and its neoconservative 
supporters chose to marginalise or ignore such arguments, and attempted to press 
ahead  with  their  goals  of  democratic  transformation  in  Iraq  and  the  wider  Arab 
world. However, a confluence of events in 2006  – particularly the dire situation in 
Iraq, the democratic elections and actions of hostile political forces in the Palestinian 
Territories  and  Lebanon,  and  the  decline  of  neoconservative  personnel  in  the 
administration  – compelled  President  Bush  and  his  foreign  policy  advisers  to 
significantly alter  their  strategy in Iraq,  and to eventually abandon many of their 
ambitions  for  transforming  the  Middle  East  in  favour  of  an  increasingly  realist 
posture in their last two years in office.7
The “Surge:” Acknowledging the Realities of Iraq
In  a  nationally-televised  speech  on  10  January  2007,  President  Bush  told  the 
American people that “it is clear that we need to change our strategy in Iraq.”8 In the 
context  of  the  worst  violence  seen  in  Iraq,  Bush  stated  that  “there  is  no  magic 
formula for success in Iraq,” and without a change in approach, the risks of failure 
would increase.9 Such an outcome, the President averred, would be “a disaster for the 
United States.”10 Bush noted that while the three elections held in Iraq in 2005 “were 
a stunning achievement,” the explosion of sectarian and Jihadist violence in Iraq in 
2006  “overwhelmed  the  political  gains  the  Iraqis  had  made”  and  brought  the 
democratisation,  if  not  the  very  continued  existence,  of  Iraq  into  doubt.11 In  an 
attempt to improve this dire situation, President Bush announced a “surge” strategy 
focused  on  the  deployment  of  an  additional  30,000  troops  to  Iraq,  a  change  in 
counter-insurgency  tactics  and  a  program  of  political  reconciliation  aimed  at 
establishing peace between Iraq's warring sectarian parties.12
6 For brief discussion, see Campbell Craig, 'American Realism Versus American Imperialism'. 
World Politics, Vol. 57, No. 1, (2004), p. 144. 
7 Carothers, 'US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush', p. 7; For further discussion, see 
Ottaway et al, 'The New Middle East', conclusion. 
8 'President's Address to the Nation'. The Library, The White House, 10 January 2007. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html, accessed 11 January 2007.
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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Over the course of 2006, the situation in Iraq deteriorated sharply. As chapter 
five of this thesis details, Jihadist and sectarian violence consumed many parts of 
Iraq  during  that  year,  causing  a  number  of  observers  to  question  the  Bush 
administration's strategy of democratisation.13 Within the Bush administration itself, 
questions were also being raised about current strategy, and new approaches were 
proposed as violence in Iraq continued to escalate. In June 2006, President Bush's 
National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, initiated a review of Iraq policy which 
questioned the assumptions made about the development of democracy in Iraq and 
the route to victory.14 According to Peter Feaver, a National Security Council Iraq 
policy staffer from 2005-6, it became increasingly apparent to him and other policy 
planners that  “over the course of 2006, the National  Strategy for Victory in Iraq 
collapsed,” as chronic insecurity and growing political violence directly challenged 
the United States'  democratisation strategy.15 Feaver writes that by the middle of 
2006 “the results on the ground in Iraq made it clear that, without a dramatic change, 
the President  would  be  leaving his  successor  with  an  untenable  mess,  if  not  the 
prospect of a catastrophic American rout.” As a result of this realisation, “a review of 
administration policy was therefore launched.”16
Integral  to  the  movement  towards  a  change  in  strategy  in  Iraq  was  the 
departure  from the  administration  of  leading neoconservative  personnel  and their 
allies.  On  8  November  2006,  Secretary  of  Defence  Donald  Rumsfeld  resigned 
following  significant  Republican  losses  in  the  mid-term  congressional  elections. 
Rumsfeld  had  come  under  increasing  pressure  for  what  many  viewed  as  his 
mishandling  of  the  deteriorating  situation  in  Iraq  and  his  refusal  to  reassess  the 
policies of 'Iraqification' and democratisation which he championed.17 Rumsfeld was 
13 See discussion in chapter five on the upsurge in Jihadist and sectarian violence in Iraq during 2006.
14 For a detailed narrative of the origins and development of the surge strategy, see Bob Woodward, 
The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006-8. New York, Simon and Schuster, 2008, 
introduction, chapter 7, passim. The Bush administration's change of strategy was also influenced 
by the extensive deliberations by military Chiefs of Staff, by dissenting generals and by military 
historians at the American Enterprise Institute.
15 Peter D. Feaver, 'Anatomy of the Surge'. Commentary, Vol. 125, No. 5, (Apr., 2008), p. 25.
16 Ibid. 
17 For discussion, see Jim Lobe, Michael Flynn, 'The Rise and Decline of the Neoconservatives'. 
Rightweb, International Relations Committee, (17 Nov., 2006). 
http://rightweb.irconline.org/rw/371.html, accessed 17 March 2008. 'Iraqification' was the name 
given to the policies that aimed to quickly develop Iraqi security forces and give them 
responsibility for maintaining order in the state. By 2006, this policy was in a dire condition, as 
Iraqi security forces were woefully small, under-trained and often infiltrated by sectarian fighters. 
As a part of the surge, the pace of Iraqification slowed and emphasis was placed on in-depth 
training over rapid deployment. 
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replaced on 18 December  2006 by Robert  Gates,  a  realist-leaning foreign policy 
thinker who had served as CIA director in George H.W. Bush's administration and 
was regarded as a moderate.18 Gate's appointment was significant, as it signalled a 
substantial transition away from neoconservative ideology and towards pragmatism 
and  moderation.  The  eclipse  of  neoconservative  influence  within  the  Bush 
administration began in 2005, with the resignation of prominent figures associated 
with intervention in Iraq. Both Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith left the Pentagon 
in 2005, while Lewis Libby and Richard Perle were removed from their positions in 
government amid scandals.19 From 2006 onwards, neoconservative influence in the 
Vice President's office and the National Security Council also started to wane. Many 
of the new advisers appointed to these organisations in President Bush's last  two 
years in power shared much of the outlook of Robert  Gates and his allies in the 
administration,  rather  than  the  views  of  Dick  Cheney  and  the  few  remaining 
neoconservatives.  With  these  changes  in  personnel  came a  shift  in  ideology and 
strategy that culminated with the announcement and implementation of the surge; a 
new policy focused not on an ambitious program of rapid democratisation, but on 
more pragmatic strategies aimed at establishing the requirements of basic security in 
Iraq. 
The publication of the Iraq Study Group Report in December 2006, and the 
Bush administration's subsequent embrace of its recommendations for a surge, aptly 
exemplified this resurgence of realism. The Iraq Study Group was chaired by James 
Baker,  a leading realist  figure and former Secretary of State to President  George 
H.W. Bush, and Lee Hamilton, a realist-leaning Democrat.20 Robert Gates was also a 
member of the study group before his appointment as Secretary of Defence, and he 
carried a number of the ideas expressed by the group into government.21 According to 
the study group's report, “the situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating,” and that to 
18 Ibid; See also 'President Bush Nominates Dr. Robert M. Gates to be Secretary of Defense'. 
The Oval Office, 8 November 2006. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/11/20061108-4.html, accessed 1 September 2007. 
Robert Gates has been retained as Secretary of Defence by President Barack Obama and will likely 
continue to serve until at least 2010. 
19 Lobe, Flynn, 'The Rise and Decline of the Neoconservatives'. Lewis Libby was charged with lying 
under oath and perverting the course of justice in the case of the outing of undercover CIA agent 
Valerie Plame. Richard Perle was forced to resign from his position as the chair of the Defence 
Policy Board owing to a conflict of interest with a weapons company in which he was a high-
ranking board member. 
20 James Baker, Lee Hamilton et al, The Iraq Study Group Report. New York, Vintage Books, 2006, 
pp. 124-7.
21 Lobe, Flynn, 'The Rise and Decline of the Neoconservatives'. 
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continue with current strategy would likely bring about defeat for the United States.22 
Examining alternatives for dealing with the situation in Iraq, the study group suggests 
that the United States send an additional 20,000 or more troops to the state for an 
eighteen-month period. The study group holds that the United States should adopt 
new counter-insurgency tactics focused on stationing troops in local communities in 
order to fight Jihadists and stem sectarian conflict, rather than attempting to rely on 
the processes of democratisation and 'Iraqification' to quell this violence.23 The report 
also contends that the United States needs to establish benchmark goals of political 
reconciliation and reform that must be met by the Iraqi government.24 In his address 
announcing the surge, President Bush agreed that an additional 30,000 troops would 
be sent to Iraq by mid-2007, and that new programs aimed at stemming political 
violence and enhancing security in the state would be initiated.
By  the  second  half  of  2007,  the  military  component  of  the  Bush 
administration's surge strategy met with success. By increasing its troop numbers at 
the same time as it formed alliances with Sunni tribal groups that had begun to rebel 
against Jihadists, the Bush administration had by 2008 established a level of security 
in Iraq unseen under its previous strategy centred on democratisation. In late 2006, 
differences developed between Al Qaeda in Iraq and Sunni tribes in Anbar province 
over Al Qaeda's extreme tactics and ideology. This led tribal sheiks to approach the 
United States military offering to turn against  the Jihadists they once aided.25 As 
30,000 more troops were deployed to Iraq in the first half of 2007, the American 
military began to make alliances with these Sunni “awakening groups,” paying them 
monthly salaries and providing then with arms and training to fight Jihadists across 
central  and western Iraq.26 In his September 2007 congressional testimony on the 
effects of the surge, the-then commander of American forces in Iraq, General David 
Petraeus, argues that “the most significant development in the past six months... has 
been the increasing emergence of tribes and local citizens rejecting Al Qaeda and 
22 Baker, Hamilton et al, pp. xv- xvi, 38-9. 
23 Ibid, pp. xv- xvi.
24 Ibid. 
25 Greg Bruno, 'The Role of the ‘Sons of Iraq’ in Improving Security'. Council on Foreign Relations 
Online, (May., 2008), http://www.cfr.org/publication/16088/, accessed 12 May 2008. 
26 Ibid. See also Woodward, The War Within, pp. 380-2. Woodward notes that alongside supporting 
the awakening groups, the United States military and CIA operatives have been involved in top 
secret counterinsurgency operations to infiltrate and break up Jihadist cells. According to 
Woodward, these operation have met with significant success to late 2008, playing a decisive role 
in undermining Jihadist groups in Iraq.
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other  extremists.”27 These  groups  have  been  integral  in  facilitating  a  'bottom-up' 
process of restoring security in many regions of Iraq, striking a major blow against 
Jihadists in co-ordination with American forces and making possible a number of 
gains that seemed out of reach in 2006.28 
Alongside the development of awakening groups in 2007, sectarian violence 
in  Iraq  has  been  significantly  reduced  owing  to  ceasefires  between  some of  the 
leading  sectarian  militias.  As  with  the  stemming  of  Jihadism  in  Iraq,  this 
improvement  owes  much  to  the  change  in  strategy  initiated  by  the  Bush 
administration in early 2007, particularly its new focus on encouraging 'bottom-up' 
initiatives, rather than imposing political solutions from above. According to Stephen 
Biddle, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Sunni insurgents came 
to understand during 2006 that they would likely lose in a full-scale civil war against 
the Shia.29 Many Sunni realised they were better off joining awakening groups to 
fight  foreign  Jihadists  rather  than  fellow  Iraqis.30 Further,  Shia  groups,  such  as 
Moqtada Al Sadr's Mehdi Army, began losing popular support in 2007 as security 
improved in Baghdad owing to the deployment of more American troops. Al Sadr 
therefore  opted  for  a  ceasefire  with  his  enemies  in  August  2007.31 While  these 
ceasefires can be tenuous, as shown by renewed violence between elements of the 
Mehdi Army and the Iraqi government in the first half of 2008, it  is clear that a 
number of bottom-up actions that aim to reduce sectarian violence in Iraq have met 
with some important successes since 2007.32
By late  2008,  the  Bush administration's  surge  strategy  helped  to  facilitate 
27 General David H. Patraeus, 'Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq'. Washington, 10-11 
September 2007, p. 5. Patraeus was named the commander of United States Central Command in 
early 2008.
28 Jim Michaels, 'U.S. Gamble on Sheiks is Paying Off – So Far'. USA Today, (28 Dec., 2007). 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-12-26-tribal-sheiks_N.htm, accessed 28 
December  2007; James Kurth, 'Winning a Civil War?' The American Interest, Vol. 3, No. 4, 
(Mar/Apr 2008). http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=396&MId=18, accessed 
25 March 2008. Some scholars have expressed concern that a reliance on awakening groups will 
make it more difficult to ensure long-term stability in Iraq. As Steven Simon of the Council on 
Foreign Relations writes, the strategy of supporting awakening groups “is not linked to any 
sustainable plan for building a viable Iraqi state. If anything, it has made such an outcome less 
likely, by stoking the revanchist fantasies of Sunni Arab tribes and pitting them against the central 
government and against one another. In other words, the recent short-term gains have come at the 
expense of the long-term goal of a stable, unitary Iraq.” See Steven Simon, 'The Price of the 
Surge'. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 3, (May/Jun 2008). 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87305/steven-simon/the-price-of-the-surge.html, 
accessed 12 May 2008. 
29 Stephen Biddle, 'Patient Stabilized?' The National Interest, No. 94, (Mar/Apr., 2008), pp. 37-8.
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid, p. 40. 
32 Ibid, pp. 39-40. 
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agreement on a timetable for the American withdrawal from Iraq. Prior to the success 
of  the surge,  President  Bush  and his  leading  foreign  policy advisers  consistently 
refused to commit to a withdrawal timetable, contending that this was fundamentally 
at  odds  with  their  strategy  of  achieving  victory  by  establishing  a  stable  liberal 
democracy in Iraq.33 As the Bush administration's November 2005 National Strategy 
for Victory in Iraq declared, “no war has been won on a timetable, and neither will 
this one.”34 Yet the gains made in security since early 2007 began to make possible 
the consideration of a withdrawal timetable.35 This was given added impetus by the 
pending expiration of the United Nations mandate for the American presence in Iraq 
at  the  end  of  2008.36 Accordingly,  the  Bush  administration  began  negotiating  a 
“Status of Forces” agreement with the Iraqi government in mid-2008. Owing to Iraqi 
pressure,  this  document  included  provisions  for  the  withdrawal  of  all  American 
combat troops from Iraq by the end of 2011.37 After lengthy deliberation within the 
Iraqi government and between Iraq's leaders and the United States, agreement was 
reached in mid-November 2008 that “all... United States forces shall withdraw from 
Iraqi territory no later than 31 December 2011.”38 This marked change in the Bush 
administration's position over the past two years gives a good indication of the extent 
to which many of the initial ambitions and aims of the Bush Doctrine in Iraq have 
been significantly scaled back as the United States attempts to deal with the complex 
realities of the state. 
33 See for example, 'President Addresses Nation, Discusses Iraq, War on Terror'; 'President Discusses 
War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy'; 'President Discusses Iraqi Elections, 
Victory in the War on Terror'.
34 'National Strategy for Victory in Iraq'. The National Security Council, November 2005. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html, accessed 4 December 2008. 
35 For discussion, see Sally Buzbee, 'Iraq Insists on Withdrawal Timetable for US Troops'. 
Associated Press, (9 Jul., 2008). 
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080708/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq;_ylt=AnjkVWYXWaN5cG4hFi86tC
Os0NUE, accessed 9 July 2008. 
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid. 
38 For details of the Bush administration's withdrawal agreement, see 'Agreement Between the United 
States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq 
and the Organisation of their Activities During their Temporary Presence in Iraq'. United States 
Embassy, Baghdad, 17 November 2008, p. 24. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/SE_SOFA.pdf, accessed 4 December 2008; For further 
information, see also, 'Strategic Framework Agreement for Relationship of Friendship and Co-
operation Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq'. American Embassy, 
Baghdad, 17 November 2008. http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/SE_SFA.pdf, accessed 4 
December 2008.
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The Reality of Regional Democratic Transformation
The Bush administration's 'return to reality' has not just been confined to Iraq. In his 
last  two  years  in  office,  President  Bush  has  effectively  abandoned  many  of  his 
administration's  ambitions  for  regional  democratic  transformation  in  the  broader 
Middle East.  As a result of the major setbacks the Bush administration's regional 
democratisation policies faced, in large part as a result of the unintended outcomes 
and negative regional effects of intervention in Iraq as examined in chapter five, its 
actions in practice have become increasingly 'realist' in character.39 President Bush 
and other senior administration officials still occasionally talk in grand terms about 
the  unfolding  of  Arab  democracy  and  its  beneficial  longer-term  effects.40 
Nonetheless,  it  is  clear  that  many in  the administration have  come to  realise  the 
difficulty of putting these ideas into practice and have recognised the possibility of 
political outcomes in the Arab world detrimental to American aims.
Since  2006,  the  Bush  administration  has  emphasised  a  more  gradualist 
conception of Middle East democratisation. President Bush has started to claim that 
Middle  East  democratisation  will  be  a  “generational  commitment”  with  the 
emergence of democracy taking decades, not merely a matter of years.41 In contrast to 
his earlier positions expressed about Arab democratic development as late as 2005, 
President Bush now argues that while “free elections are exhilarating events... history 
teaches us that the path to a free society is long, and not always smooth.”42 Bush 
contends that “no nation in history has made the transition to a free society without 
39 Carothers, 'US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush', p. 7. 
40 President Bush continued to talk in broad terms about democracy in the Middle East right up to his 
last days in office. See 'President Bush Makes Farewell Address to the Nation'. East Room, The 
White House, 15 January 2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2009/01/20090115-
17.html, accessed 16 January 2009. 
41 'President Bush Delivers State of the Union Address'. United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., 23 
January 2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070123-2.html, accessed 16 
August 2007; 'Fact Sheet: Fostering Freedom and Justice in the Middle East'. During Middle East 
Trip, President Bush Says Desire For Liberty Is The Greatest Weapon In The Fight Against 
Violent Extremism, 13 January 2008. http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/mideast/text. Implicit in 
a number of statements made by the Bush administration, particularly in relation to Iraq in the 
early years of the occupation, was the idea that the whole enterprise of regional democratisation 
would take merely a year or two. During the height of the 'Arab Spring' in the first half of 2005, 
many senior figures of the Bush administration consistently invoked the rapid collapse of the 
Eastern Bloc as analogous to events in the Arab world, with the implication that within a few years 
the Middle East would too have cast off authoritarianism and largely democratised.
42 'President Addresses American Legion, Discusses Global War on Terror'. Capital Hilton Hotel
Washington, D.C., 24 February 2006. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/text/20060224.html, accessed 3 March 2008.
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setbacks and false starts,” and that “free societies do not take root overnight,” but 
rather  require  a  lengthy  period  of  development  that  eventually  results  in  the 
consolidation  of  liberal  democracy.43 While  Bush  remains  adamant  that  history's 
arrow points in the direction of liberal democracy, it  is apparent that some of his 
earlier  assumptions  about  rapid  democratisation  have  been  challenged  by  the 
difficulties of establishing democratic regimes in Iraq and neighbouring states since 
2003. 
One of the changes most indicative of an increasing shift towards realism in 
practice is the way in which the Bush administration has toned down its calls for 
democratic  change  among  its  authoritarian  Arab  allies.44 University  of  Central 
Oklahoma Middle East specialist  Husam A. Mohamad writes in a December 2007 
article that “the worsening security situation in Iraq [in 2006], the increased popular 
appeal of Islamists across the region, and the rising criticism of the U.S approach to 
the Israel-Palestine issue,  have eventually enticed Bush's  advisers  to abandon the 
democracy promotion agenda” among authoritarian allies, “in favour of shoring up 
the status of Arab autocratic regimes that continue to serve the goals of U.S interests 
in the region.”45 Marina Ottaway adds that this new-found “realism” is in many ways 
“a return to pre-9/11 policies;” a return, after a few years of calling for democracy, to 
'business  as  usual.'46 This  development  is  a  significant  reversal  of  the  Bush 
administration's  earlier  position,  examined  in  chapter  three  of  this  thesis,  where 
President  Bush claimed that  the United  States  would decisively  break with  sixty 
years  of  policy  that  advanced “stability  at  the  expense  of  liberty”  in  the  Middle 
East.47 Such a change can help point to the extent to which previous assumptions 
about regional democratic transformation have in practice been challenged in such a 
way that even some of the practitioners of the Bush Doctrine have come to recognise 
the problems of their claims.
In toning down its calls for democratic transformation among its authoritarian 
allies, the Bush administration has come to embrace elements of strategies advocated 
by a  variety of  realist-leaning academics  and policy makers.  Ray Takeyh,  now a 
Senior  Fellow  at  the  Council  on  Foreign  Relations,  and  former  Clinton 
43 Ibid. 
44 Marina Ottaway, 'Who Wins in Iraq?: Arab Dictators'. Foreign Policy, (Mar/Apr 2007). 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3710, accessed 12 September 2008. 
45 Mohamad, pp. 104-5. 
46 Ottaway, 'Who Wins in Iraq?'
47 'President Bush Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London'. 
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administration Middle East peace negotiator, Martin Indyk, argue separately that the 
United States should adopt an “off-shore balancing posture” in the Middle East.48 
This strategy would aim to contain Iran and its allies through the establishment of 
defence alliances between Sunni Arab states in the Gulf and beyond.49 Rejecting the 
neoconservative claim that democratic transformation is the solution to the ills of the 
Middle East, these scholars argue that engaging in balance of power politics offers a 
more  pragmatic  route  for  resolving  conflicts  and  advancing  American  interests.50 
The Iraq Study Group,  meanwhile,  argues that  the United States must  engage in 
wide-ranging regional diplomacy in order to ensure American interests and security 
in  the  Middle  East.  The  study  group  contends  that  “the  United  States  should 
immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus 
for stability in Iraq and the region.”51 Such as strategy should “include every country 
that has an interest in avoiding a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq's neighbours.”52 In 
direct contravention of the neoconservative belief that enemy authoritarian regimes 
are irreconcilably aggressive and hostile, the study group holds that rather than push 
for regime change against states such as Syria and Iran, the United States should 
engage in serious diplomacy with these nations to help stabilise Iraq and address their 
legitimate security concerns.53
Some important  elements  of  these realist  ideas have emerged in  the Bush 
administration's  regional  policies  over  the  past  two  years.  By  2008,  the  Bush 
administration seemingly embraced a balance of power strategy in the Middle East, 
as it has, in Marina Ottaway's words, sought to “line up” what it labels “moderate” 
states in the Gulf, as well as Jordan and Egypt, against Iran and its allies.54 The Bush 
administration cast  aside  much  of  its  previous  talk  about  rapid  democratisation 
among its allies in favour of shoring up such states against  a perceived common 
adversary.55 Moreover, the Bush administration  has in its final year initiated some 
48 Ray Takeyh, 'Iran's New Iraq'. The Middle East Journal, Vol. 62, No. 1, (Winter 2008), pp. 13-31; 
Martin S. Indyk, Tamara Cofman Wittes, 'Back to Balancing'. The American Interest, Vol. 2, No. 3, 
(Nov/Dec 2007), pp. 42-52. 
49 Indyk, Wittes, pp. 50-1.
50 Ibid. 
51 Baker, Hamilton et al, pp. xiv-xv.
52 Ibid, pp. xiv-xv.
53 Ibid. 
54 For discussion of this development, see Ottaway et al, 'The New Middle East', pp. 21-2.
55 Ibid. This change in practice implies that the Bush administration is also stepping back from its 
earlier claims about the links between authoritarianism and terrorism, as it has ceased to pressure 
most authoritarian states of the region to democratise. While President Bush and others maintain 
that states such as Iran and Syria play a part in fostering terrorism owing to their regime type and 
ideology, this argument is often no longer applied in relation to regimes such as Saudi Arabia, 
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diplomatic  contacts  with Syria  and Iran.  Iranian diplomats briefly  met  with their 
American counterparts in Baghdad in April 2008, and Syrian officials were invited to 
attend regional talks on the Israel-Palestine conflict and issues relating to Lebanon. 
Such developments are indicative of an important shift away from the policies of 
rollback  and  regime  change  towards  realist-orientated  policies  focused  upon 
negotiation, compromise and pragmatism. 
Finally, the Bush administration's increasing turn towards realism in practice 
is reflected in the way in which its stances towards democratisation in the Palestinian 
Territories have changed.56 In the March 2006 National Security Strategy, the Bush 
administration acknowledges that the election of Hamas was free and fair, but states 
that if Hamas does not renounce terrorism, as well  as  its stated desire to destroy 
Israel, and refuses to act in a fashion considered 'democratic' by the United States, the 
Bush  administration  would  withhold  recognition  of  the  regime  and  would  not 
consider it “fully democratic, however it [took] office.”57 In light of Hamas's refusal 
to  change  its  stances  as  it  formed  a  government  in  April  2006,  the  Bush 
administration cancelled a number of aid programs aimed at Palestinian governance, 
economic development and social services.58 Following the dissolution of the Hamas-
led Palestinian Authority government in June 2007, President Bush and his foreign 
policy advisers openly embraced Mahmoud Abass and Fatah as the sole legitimate 
government of the Palestinian people; in the process toning down significantly their 
advocacy of further elections and reform in Palestinian politics.59 
Since 2006, the Bush administration has also started to pursue a diplomatic 
solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict.  This development represents the effective 
repudiation  of  the  neoconservative  belief  that  peace  between  Israel  and  the 
Palestinians  can  be  best  brought  about  through  the  promotion  of  Palestinian 
democracy. In November 2007, President Bush convened a peace conference on the 
Egypt or the Gulf States. 
56 See for example, 'President Bush Addresses United Nations General Assembly'. United Nations, 
New York, New York, 19 September 2006. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/text/20060919-4.html, accessed 3 March 2008. 
57 NSS 2006, p. 5. 
58 'Statement on Palestinian Assistance'. Washington, DC, 7 April 2006. 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/64237.htm, accessed 15 April 2006; 'Palestinian 
Assistance: Humanitarian Assistance and Democracy Building Fact Sheet'. Office of the 
Spokesman, Washington, DC, 7 April 2006.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/64234.htm, accessed 15 April 2006; 'Fact Sheet: Fostering 
Freedom and Justice in the Middle East'.
59 Ottaway et al, 'The New Middle East', pp. 15-17, passim. 
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Israel-Palestine  conflict  in  Annapolis,  Maryland.60 This  was  the  first  and  only 
American government-led conference held on this issue during Bush's time in power, 
with the President holding talks with Israeli leaders and a range of officials from 
Fatah.61 The President also announced an ultimately unfulfilled aim of reaching a 
formal peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians by the end of 2008.62 To 
some extent,  this  movement towards diplomacy reflects  the argument  of the Iraq 
Study  Group  that  the  United  States  must  engage  in  a  sustained  program  of 
diplomacy, not activist democratisation, in order to help resolve the Israel-Palestine 
conflict. According to the study group, “the United States will not be able to achieve 
its goals in the Middle East unless [it] deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict.”63 
Indeed, “there must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to 
a comprehensive Arab-Israeli  peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria and...  [the] two 
state-solution for Israel and Palestine.”64 In light of the election of Hamas in 2006 
and developments in Palestinian politics over the subsequent two years, the Bush 
administration has effectively shelved its ambitions for political transformation in the 
Palestinian Territories, returning instead to a more traditional diplomatic approach to 
resolving this conflict.  
The “End of the Neoconservative Moment”
The effective abandonment of much of the Bush Doctrine's democratisation policies 
in Iraq and the wider Arab world, coupled with the broader resurgence of realism 
among many foreign policy academics and practitioners, has by 2008 chastened a 
number  of  neoconservatives.  Many  leading  neoconservatives,  both  democratic 
globalist and democratic realist, have now come to question a number of their own 
60 For information on the Bush administration's first and only attempt at an Israel-Palestine peace 
conference, see 'Joint Understanding Read by President Bush at Annapolis Conference'. Memorial 
Hall, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 27 November 2007. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071127.html, accessed 5 September 2008. 
61 Ibid. 
62 'Fact Sheet: Fostering Freedom and Justice in the Middle East'. By late 2008, a peace deal between 
Israel and the Palestinians appeared very distant, as Israel launched a three-week long war in the 
Gaza Strip on 27 December to prevent rocket fire from Hamas and undermine the capabilities of 
the organisation. 
63 Baker, Hamilton et al, p. 54. 
64 Ibid. 
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previous  assumptions  and claims  about  Middle  East  democratisation.  Some have 
even  come  to  adopt  more  overtly  realist-leaning  stances  that  downplay  the 
importance  of  democratisation  altogether.  In  some  form,  the  neoconservative 
persuasion  will  continue  to  endure  among its  remaining  proponents  in  the  years 
beyond 2008. Yet the-now prevalent divisions among neoconservatives about  their 
own interventionist ideology, the Bush Doctrine, and what the future holds for the 
persuasion  – along  with  the  change  of  administration  in  January  2009  – points 
convincingly  to  the  “end of  the  neoconservative  moment”65 in  American  foreign 
policy in the Middle East.
Since 2003, a number of realist scholars have offered strong critiques of the 
interventionist  strategies  advocated  by  neoconservatives.  Realists  have  expressed 
criticism of what they view as the excessive idealism of activist democratisation and 
the harmful consequences of this for American national interests.66 One of the leading 
realist critiques of neoconservative thinking about Middle East democratisation has 
come from the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. Established in October 2003, 
the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy has the support of over seven hundred 
academics and former policy makers, the majority of whom are realists.67 Prominent 
realist signatories of the Coalition's statements include Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, 
Robert  Keohane,  Robert  Jervis,  Charles  Kupchan,  Andrew  Bacevich,  John 
Mearsheimer  and Christopher Prebble,  among many others.68 In  its  Statement  of 
Principles, the Coalition argues that its members are “united by our desire to turn 
American  national  security  policy  toward  realistic  and  sustainable  measures  for 
protecting U.S. vital interests in a manner that is consistent with American values.”69 
The  Statement  of  Principles  contends  that  the  neoconservative  prescription  for 
American policies towards the Middle East represents “an imperial strategy [that] 
threatens  to  entangle  America  in  an  assortment  of  unnecessary  and  unrewarding 
wars” detrimental  to  American national  interests  and the war  on terrorism.70 The 
Coalition  holds  that  despite  neoconservative  claims,  pursuing  democratic 
65 Ikenberry, 'The End of the Neoconservative Moment', passim. 
66 For brief discussion, see Craig, pp. 144-5. 
67 Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 'About Us'. Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 
(2003). http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/static/000024.php, accessed 11 September 2008.
68 Ibid. 
69 Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 'The Perils of Empire: Statement of Principles by the 
Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy'. Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, (Oct., 2003). 
http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/static/000027.php, accessed 11 September 2008.
70 Ibid. 
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transformation in the Arab world is not generally beneficial to American interests, 
and  is  not  a  sustainable  or  pragmatic  strategy  for  dealing  with  terrorism  after 
September 11.71 
Alongside criticising the strategy of activist democracy promotion developed 
by neoconservatives, some realists have also questioned the theoretical foundation on 
which such policies are based. In a 2005 study of neoconservative contributions to 
international  relations  theory,  University  of  Wales  political  science  professor, 
Michael Williams, contends that a strong theoretical critique of neoconservative ideas 
about the harmony of interests and values in foreign policy can be drawn from the 
work of classical  realist,  Hans Morgenthau.72 According to Williams, Morgenthau 
believed that the idea of a convergence of values and interests in foreign policy was 
potentially harmful to both a state targeted for intervention and the American republic 
itself.73 Without an appreciation of the limits of their power and the subjectivity of 
their proclaimed virtue, the leaders of the United States could launch the country into 
a major foreign war that could cause significant damage to national interests  and 
national  security.74 Moreover,  Williams  argues,  Morgenthau  held  that  linking 
intervention abroad to the regeneration of “republican virtue” at home could help to 
foster  “bellicose  nationalism”  and militarism that  might  threaten  the  very  liberal 
values  on  which  the  republic  is  built.75 Thus,  in  William's  words,  Morgenthau 
considered that  in  foreign policy  “too great  a  regard for  one's  own virtue was a 
constant  temptation  to  be  zealously  guarded  against,  lest  it  yield  an  hubristic 
blindness or arrogance,  deaf to the demands of prudence,  and leading to disaster 
rather than glory.”76 
Elements of these realist critiques have influenced a turn away from activist 
71 Ibid; See also Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 'The Perils of Occupation'. Coalition for a 
Realistic Foreign Policy, (28 Oct., 2004). 
http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/archives/2004/10/in_this_electio.php, accessed 11 
September 2008. 
72 Williams, p. 311. 
73 Ibid
74 Ibid; See also Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 
Fifth Edition, Revised. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, p. 6. 
75 Williams, p. 311-12. This criticism goes to the heart of the long-standing neoconservative belief 
that an outward looking and moral foreign policy is the key to ensuring a healthy and patriotic 
democratic polity. While Morgenthau and other realists of his generation agreed with first-
generation neoconservatives that an entirely amoral foreign policy and technocratic domestic 
politics is harmful to liberal democracy, such realists warn that attempts to regenerate “republican 
virtue” and overcome 'liberal decadence' through armed intervention abroad risks encouraging an 
over-zealous patriotism that can become anti-democratic, militaristic and increasingly intolerant in 
character. 
76 Ibid, pp. 326-7. 
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democratisation  by  some  leading  neoconservative  figures.  While  most 
neoconservatives  still  hold  that  American  values  and  interests  can  usually  be 
advanced by spreading democracy, there has been recognition by some of the need 
for a renewed dose of realism in neoconservative thought. Following the invasion of 
Iraq, Francis Fukuyama broke with many of his neoconservative peers. In After the 
Neocons, Fukuyama writes that he has “concluded that neoconservatism, as both a 
political symbol and a body of thought, has evolved into something that I can no 
longer  support.”77 Recognising  the  importance  of  the  resurgent  realist  critique  of 
democratic  globalism,  Fukuyama  believes  that  “one  of  the  consequences  of  the 
perceived failure in Iraq will be the discrediting of the entire neoconservative agenda 
and  a  restoration  of  the  authority  of  foreign  policy  realists.”78 In  light  of  this 
development, Fukuyama contends that in future, American foreign policy should be 
based  on  what  he  terms  “realistic  Wilsonianism.”79 This  is  a  hybrid  outlook 
comprising elements of pre-1990's neoconservative foreign policy thinking melded 
with a strong dose of realism, which will apparently “better matches ends to means” 
and take a  considerably more cautious  view of  the costs  and benefits  of  activist 
democratisation.80 
In a similar vein to Fukuyama, neoconservative intellectual Robert Kagan has 
also turned to  offering realist-leaning alternatives to democratic  globalism. In his 
2008 book The Return of History and the End of Dream, and in subsequent articles, 
Kagan  has  moved  away  from  the  democratic  globalist  ideas  he  once  regularly 
advocated  with  William  Kristol.81 In  contrast  to  the  arguments  he  made  in  the 
influential article 'Toward a neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy' or in the book  Present 
Dangers, Kagan now expresses scepticism about the global spread of democracy and 
77 Fukuyama, After the Neocons, pp. xxv-xxvii. 
78 Ibid, pp. 5-7. 
79 Ibid, pp. xxvii-xxviii; Francis Fukuyama, 'After Neoconservatism'. The New York Times, (19 Feb., 
2006). The concept of “realistic Wilsonianism” is oxymoronic in character, as realism and 
Wilsonianism are usually antithetical and define themselves in opposite to one another. Finding a 
balance between these two ideas is a long-standing goal of neoconservatism, but attempting to put 
this into practice, as does the Bush Doctrine, has proven to be harmful to the promotion of both 
American values and interests abroad. Further, Fukuyama's approach  parallels in many ways the 
idea of “democratic realism” advocated by Charles Krauthammer, as it does the concept of 
“practical idealism” advocated by Condoleezza Rice. Both of these ideas have been extensively 
criticised by realists and brought into question as a practical framework for American foreign 
policy, and it thus seems unlikely that Fukuyama's similar concept would fare much better. 
80 Fukuyama, 'After Neoconservatism'. 
81 Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams; For critical analysis of Kagan's new 
position, see Andrew J. Bacevich, 'Present at the Re-Creation: A Neoconservative Moves On'. 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 4, (Jul/Aug 2008), pp. 125-132. 
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warns that the enduring threat in the twenty-first century is not Jihadist terrorism, but 
renewed great power conflict.82 In an April 2008 article on the revival of great power 
rivalry and its implications for the democratic world, Kagan argues that 
The spread  of  democracy  was not  merely the  unfolding of  certain 
ineluctable  processes  of  economic  and  political  development.  The 
global shift towards liberal democracy coincided with the historical 
shift in the balance of power towards those nations who favoured it. 
But that shift was not inevitable, and it need not be lasting. Today, the 
re-emergence  of  the  great  autocratic  powers,  along  with  the 
reactionary forces of Islamic radicalism, has weakened that order and 
threatens to do so further in the years and decades to come.83
Adopting a realist balance of power posture, Kagan argues that in order to check the 
rise of autocratic powers, the democratic world must form a “league of democracies” 
and return to policies of containment, rather than regime change, in order to deal with 
present threats.84 Thus, in a remarkable transition, Kagan has effectively repudiated 
most of his democratic globalist beliefs and has now refashioned himself as a 'realist' 
who is more concerned with containing great power conflict than encouraging the 
democratic transformation of the Middle East.85
As a result of the problems faced by the Bush Doctrine in the Middle East 
since 2006, a number of neoconservative commentators have, like Fukuyama and 
Kagan, rescinded much of their support for activist democratisation in favour of more 
cautious  stances.  While  some neoconservatives,  such as William Kristol,  Michael 
Ledeen and Norman Podhoretz, remain unapologetic supporters of regime change 
and democratisation in the Arab world,86 a number of their peers have become more 
82 Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, pp. 53-80; See also Robert Kagan, 'The 
September 12 Paradigm: America, the World, and George W. Bush'. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 
5, (Sept/Oct 2008). http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080901faessay87502-p0/robert-kagan/the-
september-12-paradigm.html, accessed 11 September 2008. 
83 Robert Kagan, Robert Cooper, 'Is Democracy Winning?' Prospect Magazine, (24 Apr., 2008).
84 Robert Kagan, 'The Stuff of Dreams'. National Post, (22 Jul., 2008), A15; Robert Kagan, 'End of 
Dreams, Return of History'. Policy Review, No. 114, (Aug/Sept 2007).
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html, accessed 6 August 2007. During 
the brief war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia in August 2008, Kagan contended 
that Russia's invasion of parts of Georgia showed that great power rivalry and the revionist 
aspirations of autocratic powers, not terrorism, will be more enduring threats of this century.
85 For critical discussion of Kagan's changing position, see Bacevich, 'Present at the Re-Creation', pp. 
127-9. 
86 William Kristol, 'The Long War': The Radical Islamists are on the Offensive. Will we Defeat 
Them?' The Weekly Standard, Vol. 11, No. 24, (6 Mar., 2006); William Kristol, 'It's Our War: 
Bush Should go to Jerusalem – and the U.S. Should Confront Iran'. The Weekly Standard, Vol. 11, 
No. 42, (24 Jul., 2006); Michael A. Ledeen, 'Faster, Please'. Foundation for the Defence of  
Democracies, (December 2008). http://pajamasmedia.com/michaelledeen/, accessed 12 December 
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critical towards the ideas they once advocated. This change in outlook among many 
neoconservatives  is  exemplified  by  Charles  Krauthammer,  who  wrote  in  a  2007 
article on Iraq that, compared with the outcomes to date there, neoconservatives “had 
hoped for much more.”87 Krauthammer contends that “our original objective was a 
democratic and unified post-Hussein Iraq. But it has turned out to be a bridge too 
far,” as the sectarian violence unleashed by regime change brought Iraq to the brink 
of partition and fostered a predominantly illiberal democracy.88 Such developments 
were “exacerbated by post-invasion U.S. strategic errors,” especially those relating to 
military strategy and the CPA's attempts at democratisation.89 While Krauthammer 
believes that “a democratic, unified Iraq might someday emerge,” he holds that Iraq 
will for some time remain a fractured and occasionally violent state.90 Similar views 
are now expressed by Reuel Marc Geretch, Joshua Muravchik, Max Boot and other 
neoconservative commentators who were once staunch advocates of interventionist 
democracy promotion in the Middle East.91 
Many elements of these above sentiments are shared by neoconservatives that 
once held influential policy making roles in the Bush administration. While not all 
have  become critical  of  the  Bush  Doctrine,  there  has  been  a  noticeable  shift  in 
outlook over the past two years among many of the neoconservatives that served in 
the Bush administration.  In  a  2007 interview with journalist  David Rose,  former 
Defence  Policy  Board  chair  Richard  Perle  contends  that  “I  think  if  I  had  been 
Delphic, and had seen where we are today, and people had said, 'Should we go into 
Iraq?,' I think now I probably would have said, 'No, let's consider other strategies for 
dealing with the thing that concerns us most.”92 Similarly, former Undersecretary of 
Defence for Policy, Douglas Feith, admits that serious mistakes were made in the 
implementation  of  regime  change  and  democratisation  in  Iraq.93 Unlike  Perle, 
however, Feith maintains that intervention in Iraq was the right policy, as it “paved 
2008; Michael A. Ledeen, 'The Same War: Hezbollah, Natch'. National Review Online, (13 Jul., 
2006). http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.24651/pub_detail.asp, accessed 13 April 
2008. Podhoretz, WWIV, pp. 5-7; See also Rago, 'The Weekend Interview with Norman 
Podhoretz'. 
87 Charles Krauthammer, 'The Partitioning of Iraq'. The Washington Post, (7 Sept., 2007), A21.
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid. 
91 Reuel Marc Gerecht, 'On Democracy in Iraq'. The Weekly Standard, (30 Apr., 2007); Muravchik, 
'The Past, Present, and Future of Neoconservatism', pp. 19-30; Max Boot, 'How Not to Get Out of 
Iraq'. Commentary, Vol. 124, No. 2, (Sept., 2007), pp. 19-27.
92 David Rose, 'Neo Culpa'. Vanity Fair, (Jan., 2007), p. 83. 
93 Feith, p. 515. 
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the way for elections that were competitive, fair and widely supported,” while also 
potentially encouraging “political reform in the Arab and Muslim worlds that could 
serve our interests in international peace, security and prosperity.”94 This, Feith holds, 
means that despite its problems in practice, the principles behind intervention in Iraq 
remain sound. 
Feith's  sympathetic  assessment  of  the  Bush  Doctrine  is  not  shared  by  a 
number  of  his  former  associates  in  government.  Former  neoconservative  policy 
makers David Frum, of the National Security Council, and Kenneth Adelman and 
James Woolsey, of the Defence Policy Board, now each now take a critical view of 
the Bush Doctrine and many elements of neoconservatism. According to David Rose, 
Kenneth Adelman now holds that “neoconservatism itself – what he defines as “the 
idea of a tough foreign policy on behalf of morality, the idea of using our power for 
moral good in the world” – is dead, at least for a generation. After Iraq, he says, “it's 
not going to sell.””95 James Woolsey and other former policy makers of the Pentagon 
and Defence Policy Board, meanwhile, view Iraq as a “great strategic defeat” for the 
United  States  and  fear  that  neoconservatism will  not  survive  as  a  viable  foreign 
policy ideology owing to its association with this war.96 It is possible that elements of 
these critical views, and parts of Feith's views, are shared by other figures of Bush 
administration; however, pending the release of further memoirs, this can only be 
speculative  at  present.97 While  some former  neoconservative  policy  makers  have 
found reason to be less pessimistic by late 2008 as a result of the successes of the 
surge in Iraq, most have become much more realistic about the likely outcomes of 
intervention  in  Iraq  and  now  advocate  a  limited  role  for  the  United  States  in 
encouraging democracy in the Middle East.
These above developments considered, it is still premature at present to claim 
that  neoconservatism  will  leave  no  residual  mark  on  American  foreign  policy. 
Important elements of the other pillars of the Bush Doctrine that are derived from 
neoconservative thought, such as the need to maintain American hegemony and the 
94 Ibid, pp. 234-6. 
95 Rose, p. 84.
96 Ibid. 
97 It is likely that a memoir will be published by Donald Rumsfeld on the war on terrorism and Iraq, 
and that memoir material will be published by Condoleezza Rice and President Bush in the coming 
years. While it is unlikely that any of these figures will admit major errors in principle, it is 
possible that they will argue, as Feith has, that mistakes were made in the implementation of 
regime change and democratisation in Iraq.
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option of pre-emptive war, appear to have retained a degree of influence among some 
groups  of  foreign  policy  thinkers.98 Further,  many  aspects  of  the  overall 
neoconservative  approach to  the  war  on  terrorism were  present  in  debates  about 
foreign  policy  during  the  2008  Presidential  election  campaign,  with  Republican 
Presidential  candidate  John  McCain  and  Vice  Presidential  nominee  Sarah  Palin 
reprising neoconservative themes about the war on terrorism as a Manichean struggle 
that  should  be  considered  WWIV.99 Finally,  elements  of  the  democratic 
interventionism articulated in the Bush Doctrine continue to be supported by a small 
group of neoconservatives that remain in the Republican Party,  as  by a group of 
“liberal hawks” in the Democratic Party.100
Despite these elements of continuity, the resurgence of foreign policy realism 
and the abandonment of many aspects of Middle East democratisation have made it 
much less likely that the neoconservative paradigm of activist democracy promotion 
will  retain  lasting  influence.  Ensuring  a  “responsible  withdrawal”  from  Iraq, 
addressing  the  state  of  the  United  States'  image and its  national  interests  in  the 
Middle East appear to be major aims of the new American president, Barack Obama, 
not the redoubling of the Bush Doctrine's policies of regime change in the cause of 
spreading democracy in the Arab world.101 Obama argues that he will continue the 
war on terrorism initiated by the Bush administration, but he has indicated already 
that he believes a grand strategy of armed democratisation in the Middle East is not a 
98 For discussion of the residual influence of the other elements of the Bush Doctrine aside from its 
democracy promotion ideology and strategy, see Anonymous, 'Can the Bush Doctrine Last?' The 
Economist, Vol. 386, No. 8573, (29 Mar., 2008), p. 6. 
99 Robert McMahon, 'McCain's Brain Trust'. Newsweek, (3 Jul., 2008). 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/139898, accessed 5 December 2008; See also Rightweb, 'Profile: 
John McCain'. Rightweb, Political Research Associates, (12 Nov., 2008). http://www.rightweb.irc-
online.org/profile/3890.html, accessed 5 December 2008. Neoconservative intellectuals Robert 
Kagan, Max Boot and William Kristol were utilised as part-time foreign policy advisers for some 
portions of McCain's campaign. 
100 For examples of the “liberal hawk” view on activist democratisation in American foreign policy, 
see Will Marshall, 'Rejoin the Battle of Ideas'. Progressive Policy Institute, (10 Sept., 2007). 
http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?knlgAreaID=450004&subsecID=900021&contentID=25443
5, accessed 6 December 2008; Will Marshall (Ed), With All Our Might: A Progressive Strategy for 
Defeating Jihadism and Defending Liberty. New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2006; Clifford 
May, 'What's at Stake?' The Foundation for Defence of Democracies, (2008). 
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=516485&Ite
mid=365, accessed 6 December 2008; For good discussion of the “liberal hawk” view on 
democratisation and the war on terrorism, see Smith, chapters 3, 6.  
101 For an overview of the Obama administration's approach to Iraq, see 'The Agenda: Iraq'. The 
White House, 21 January 2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/iraq/, accessed 28 January 
2009. For President Obama's articulation of his broader foreign policy goals in the Middle East, 
see 'President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address'. Washington, 20 January 2009. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/, accessed 21 January 2009.
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realistic policy for dealing with the threat of Jihadist terrorism.102 With the example 
of Iraq in mind, Obama and his foreign policy advisers appear to be developing a 
'centrist' foreign policy that recognises many of the dangers of attempting to spread 
democracy through the use of American military power. This emerging change in 
policy may reflect more broadly the chastening of the 'activist' elements of liberal 
internationalist  thinking.  Many of  the  key  theoretical  assumptions  and optimistic 
claims about interventionist democracy promotion made by 'activist' liberal scholars 
have now been brought into significant doubt by the effects and consequences of 
democracy promotion in Iraq and the wider Arab world. 
With the Bush administration having now left office, its anti-terrorism grand 
strategy of democratisation in the Middle East is in eclipse. In its last years in power, 
the Bush administration effectively abandoned its ambitions of democratic revolution 
in the Middle East, and in practice exhibited greater interest in ensuring stability and 
the containment of American adversaries. The many neoconservatives who invested 
their  intellectual  stock  in  the  Bush  Doctrine  are  more  divided  than  ever  on  the 
question of activist democratisation, with a majority assuming an increasingly 'realist' 
orientation on foreign policy and only a small minority remaining committed to the 
cause. Over the past five years,  a number of critics have proclaimed the end of the 
“neoconservative moment” and the decline of the “Bush revolution” in Middle East 
democratisation, only to have their arguments confounded by the continuation of this 
interventionist paradigm.103 While it may have previously been premature to make 
these  declarations,  it  is  apparent  that  today  the  “Bush  revolution”  and  the 
“neoconservative moment” in American Middle East policy are both now effectively 
over.
102 See 'Obama Tells Al Arabyia Peace Talks Should Resume'. Interview of President Barack Obama 
by Hisham Melhem of Al Arabyia News, The Map Room, The White House, 27 January 2009. 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/01/27/65087.html, accessed 28 January 2009; See also, 
Obama, 'Renewing American Leadership'. 
103 See for example, Ikenberry, 'The End of the Neoconservative Moment'; Fukuyama, 'The 
Neoconservative Moment'; Philip H. Gordon, 'The End of the Bush Revolution'. Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 85, No. 4, (Jul/Aug 2006), pp. 75- 81. 
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